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ABSTRACT

Sadra and Hegel on the Relationship between Essence/Existence and Subject/Object

By
Kamal Abdulkarim Shlbei
May 2013

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Jennifer Bates
This dissertation examines the problematic status of Truth within the intersection
of the medieval ontological relationship of essence/existence and the modern
epistemological relationship of subject/object. The main question that motivates this
dissertation is this: does the modern distinction between subject and object find its roots
in the medieval distinction between essence and existence? Rather than investigating the
many medieval and modern philosophers in whom we could find answer to this question,
this dissertation focuses only on two philosophers as study cases: One is the Islamic
philosopher Mulla Sadra, and the other is the German philosopher George. W. F. Hegel.
My chose of these two philosophers is not arbitrary. According to many scholars,
whereas the medieval relationship of essence/existence finds its highest development in
Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism, the modern relationship of subject/object finds its
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highest summit in Hegel‘s Absolute Idealism. Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism breaks
with the metaphysical essentialism of both Greek philosophy and Arabic philosophy.
However, Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism is not explicitly mentioned by Hegel— neither
in the historical development of the Philosophical Idea in the Lectures on The History of
Philosophy, nor in the conceptual development of the Logical Idea in the Science of
Logic. If the moment of the Absolute Existentialism is contained within Hegel‘s Absolute
Idealism at all, it is so implicitly, as a moment within the Hegelian Idea‘s self-dialectical
process of determining. In this dissertation, I unveil Sadra‘s moment of the Absolute
Existentialism within Hegel‘s moment of the Absolute Idealism. I argue that, although
Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism and Hegel‘s Absolute Idealism are different, both
challenge the traditional views of the metaphysical essentialism of Plato and Aristotle.
That is to say, both Sadra and Hegel criticize and reject the view that abstract essence is
the ultimate reality. I provide the logical connection between Sadra‘s and Hegel‘s
critiques of metaphysical essentialism. I show that, within Hegel‘s Absolute Idealism,
Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism emerges in opposition to quality as affirmative reality in
the metaphysical essentialism of the Aristotelian tradition.
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Introduction
He makes the night enter into the day and makes the day to enter into the night and
brings forth the living from the dead and brings forth the dead from the living—The Holy
Qur'an (3: 27)
For everyone there is a direction to which he turns his face. Strive, then, to excel each
other in good deeds. Wherever you are, God will bring you all together. God is certainly
powerful over everything—The Holy Qur'an (2: 48)
Among the ontological relationships, which enriched philosophy in Middle Ages,
the relationship of essence to existence seems to be the ontological relationship par
excellence. 1 In contrast, the relationship of the knowing subject to the known object
imposed itself as the prominent epistemological relationship in modern philosophy. 2
Modern philosophy‘s break with medieval philosophy makes these two relationships of
essence/existence and subject/object look different; each has its own philosophical
concerns. Nonetheless, if we look to the center around which both of these relationships
revolve, the concept of ‗Truth‘ emerges as the promising one.
Both of these relationships of essence/existence and subject/object aim to
approach Truth. While the medieval approach of the relationship of essence/existence
leads to ontological Truth claims, the modern approach of the relationship of
subject/object leads to epistemological Truth claims. From the standpoint of the
relationship of essence/existence we can pose this fundamental question: Does Truth
have a substantial relation with essence and just an accidental relation with existence or

1

See: Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: PIMS, 2005), especially chapter II,
―Essence and Existence‖.
2
In this regard Barry Sandywell writes, ―Where the dominant focus of pre-modern philosophy was onto
theological—asking questions about the nature of existence and Being (being qua being in Aristotle‘s
idiom), God or Nature—the focus of modern epistemology centers on the relationship between the knower
and the known—how can the mind know the world? What is the spectatorial relationship between subject
and object (or the knowing subject and the object of knowledge)?‖ Barry Sandywell, Dictionary of Visual
Discourse: A Dialectical Lexicon of Terms (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), p. 267.
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vice versa? The response to this question usually introduces two opposite philosophical
tendencies, Essentialism and Existentialism; each regards Truth from a different
ontological point of view. Whereas Essentialism affirms the priority of essence over
existence, Existentialism maintains that ―existence precedes essence.‖ 3 We can
reformulate the latter question from the standpoint of the relationship of subject/object by
asking whether Truth has a substantial relation with the knowing subject and just an
accidental relation with the known object or vice versa. In response to that, we find
ourselves in front of two different modern schools, Subjectivism and Objectivism; each
claims Truth from its own epistemological perspective.
Does the modern epistemological distinction between subject and object find its
deep root in the medieval ontological distinction between essence and existence? To what
extent is the break of modern philosophy with medieval philosophy, on the basis of the
modern epistemological relationship of subject/object, legitimate? These are some
questions that motivate this dissertation. However, this dissertation does not claim to find
answers to the problematic status of Truth at the intersection of the medieval relationship
of essence/existence and the modern relationship of subject/object. This task exceeds the
limit of this dissertation. Rather than investigating the many medieval and modern
philosophers in whom we might find answers to my proposed problem, this dissertation
focuses on two philosophers as study cases: One is the Islamic philosopher Sadr Al-Din
Muhammad Al-Shirazi (1571-1641), known as Mulla Sadra, and the other is the German
philosopher George. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831).4

3

Jean Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotion (New York, Citadel Press, 1985), p. 13.
With respect to the importance of Hegel in the problem of the relationship of Subject/Object, I draw and
benefit from Nectarios G. Limnatis, German Idealism and The Problem of Knowledge: Kant, Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel (Hampstead, NY: Springer, 2008).
4
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Sadra, who labeled his philosophy Transcendent Wisdom, wrote many books and
treatises.5 My reading focuses on his major books related to his Absolute Existentialism.
These are: The Transcendent Wisdom of The Four Journeys of The Intellect, The Book of
Metaphysical Prehensions, The Wisdom of The Throne, and The Define Manifestations.
As for Hegel, my reading primarily focuses on Lectures on The History of Philosophy,
Science of Logic, and The Encyclopaedia Logic.
Let me now explain why I chose these two philosophers as study cases for the
problematic status of Truth within the relationships of essence/existence and
subject/object. Although Sadra does not, chronologically speaking, belong to medieval
philosophy, his philosophy is based on philosophical developments of the medieval
problem of the relationship of essence/existence. Moreover, in Sadra‘s theory of
knowledge, the modern relationship of the knowing subject to the known object is
implicit in his medieval doctrine of the unification of the intellect/knower with the
intelligible/known. As for Hegel, he represents the philosophical summit of the modern
problem of the relationship of subject/object. But what is significant in particular for this
investigation is that Hegel‘s logical treatment of the relationship of essence to existence
is central to his Absolute Idealism.
But why do I choose Sadra from the East and Hegel from the West? This question
becomes more appealing when we know that these two philosophers do not know each
other, though they are well known in their own regions. Both Sadra‘s Absolute
Existentialism and Hegel‘s Absolute Idealism are represented by many scholars as the
important, if not the most important, philosophical moments in East and West

5

For more on Sadra‘s life and works, see: Ibrahim Kalin ―An Annotated Bibliography of the Works of
Mulla Sadra with a Brief Account of his Life,‖ in Islamic Studies (2003), 42: 21–62.
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respectively. Investigating the relationship of essence/existence and subject/object in
terms of the relation between these two philosophical giants is thus significant.
For Hegel, philosophy in its dialectical development must sublate its previous
principles. 6Accordingly, for Hegel, his philosophy represents the highest philosophical
moment within which not only the previous principles of western philosophy, but also the
principles of eastern philosophy are sublated. On the other side, Sadra‘s Absolute
Existentialism, as many scholars argue, 7 contains and overcomes the main principles of
its predecessors: Peripatetic, new-Platonic, and Intuitionism.
The moment of Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism is not explicitly mentioned by
Hegel— neither in the historical development of the Philosophical Idea in the Lectures on
The History of Philosophy, nor in the conceptual development of the Logical Idea in the
Science of Logic. If the moment of the Absolute Existentialism is contained within
Hegel‘s Absolute Idealism at all, it is so implicitly, as a moment within the Hegelian
Idea‘s self-dialectical process of determining.
In this dissertation, I unveil Sadra‘s moment of the Absolute Existentialism within
Hegel‘s moment of the Absolute Idealism. 8 I argue that within Hegel‘s Absolute

6

Hegel writes, ―Although it must certainly be conceded that all philosophies have been refuted, it must also
equally be affirmed that no philosophy has ever been refuted, nor can it be….So ―refuting‖ of a philosophy
means only that its restricting boundary has been overstepped and its determinate principle has been
reduced to an ideal moment.‖ Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 86 addition 1, p. 138. It is not my
purpose to argue with or against Hegel‘s latter claim. I cite it for the purpose of my general argument in this
dissertation.
7
In this regard, some prominent scholars in Islamic Philosophy, such as Oliver Leaman and Seyyed
Hossein Nasr, consider Sadra as one of the most important Islamic philosopher in the last four hundred
years. See: Oliver Leaman, A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press,
1999), pp. 88-107. See further Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present:
Philosophy in the Land of Prophecy (New York: State University of New York, 2006), p.223.
8
By including Sadra though Hegel did not, I amend Hegel‘s account of the history of medieval philosophy.
According to Hegel, ―We find the various stages of the Logical Idea in the history of philosophy in the
shape of a succession of emerging philosophical systems, each of which has a particular definition of the
Absolute as its foundation.‖ Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 86 addition 1, p. 138. I argue that Sadra
has a logical position in this Hegelian history.
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Idealism, the moment of Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism emerges in opposition to a
moment in the metaphysical essentialism of the Aristotelian tradition, that is, in
opposition to quality as affirmative reality.9
In order to achieve this task, I firstly investigate how Sadra‘s Absolute
Existentialism has emerged (to speak in a Hegelian way) in opposition to its previous
moment. This previous moment lies in the traditional views of the metaphysical
essentialism of Plato and Aristotle as Sadra inherited them from his Islamic
predecessors—especially Avicenna, 10 Suhrawardi, and Ibn Arabi. By the metaphysical
essentialism of Plato and Aristotle, therefore, I do not mean what Plato and Aristotle
really hold regarding the relationship of essence/existence. Rather, I mean the traditional
views which are widely attributed to Plato and Aristotle by the Avicennian Peripateticism
and the Illuminationist tradition in the Islamic East. These traditional views, as Sadra
understands them, maintain that the ultimate reality is essence, whether in its
transcendental sense of the Platonic Ideas or in its immanent sense of the Aristotelian
substantial forms.
To show that Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism presents a challenge to the
traditional views of metaphysical essentialism, I provide a comprehensive interpretation
9

I use the term ‗moment‘ in accordance with Hegel‘s terminology. For Hegel, the term ‗moment‘
represents an aspect of the whole. A ‗moment‘ of the whole is fully intelligible only in its relation to the
other moments or aspects which constitute the whole. As Magee explains ―Hegel sometimes uses the term
'moment' to refer to an 'aspect' of something, or, more technically, a part which is separable from the whole
only in thought..., In Hegel's Logic, each category is a moment in the whole. Each is a part, but not a literal,
physical part--and each derives its meaning from its place in the whole, and is thus not fully intelligible
considered in separation from it.‖ Glenn Alexander Magee, The Hegel Dictionary (New York: Continuum
International Publishing Group, 2010), pp. 150-151.
10
Avicenna‘s influence on Sadra is significant when we consider Avicenna‘s influence on the medieval
philosophers. In this regard Parviz Morewedge writes, ―Ibn Sina[Avicenna]‘s influence on Jewish and
Christian philosophies has been well documented. For example, basing many of his Christian metaphysical
theological issues, such as the essence-existence distinction, on Ibn Sina‘s philosophy, Aquinas mentions
the Persian philosopher over five hundred times. In this light, it is impossible to exaggerate his influence on
either latter Muslim philosophers or on Latin fathers of Christian tradition.‖ Parviz Morewedge, The
Mystical Philosophy of Avicenna (Binghamton, NY: Global Publications, 2001), pp.4-5.

xv

of Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism. This is accomplished in Chapter One. There, I argue
that Sadra‘s critique of essentialism is based on his double view of the reality of essence:
essence-in-itself, and essence-for-other (existence). Whereas the reality of essence-initself is equivalent to nothing, the reality of essence-for-other makes sense only as a
mental being in the knowing subject. Under the impact of the reality of existence, the
knowing subject, from within, creates universal concepts/essences and then mistakenly
attributes them to the existents as their inner reality. For Sadra, this is an inadequate
account of reality, performed by the cognizing soul at one of its stages of unfolding into
Absolute existence. Here I discuss Sadra‘s doctrine of substantial motion to show how
the unfolding of existence is correlated with the unfolding of knowledge.
According to Sadra‘s doctrine of substantial motion, existence is one objective
reality with various existential grades of unfolding towards Absolute Existence.
Thus the existence which descends from the higher degrees begins to ascend from
the lowest degree, and gradually in ascent it returns to the ultimate level from
which it had descended. So existence is like a circle which revolves around itself,
its end joining the beginning, as God the exalted said: As He originated you so
will you return [7:29], and He said: It is He who originates creation, and then He
will bring it back again [30:27]11
To grasp the reality of existence neither as a multiplicity of existents nor as a unity of
universal essences but rather as multiplicity-in-unity, the knowing subject must pass to a
higher stage of unfolding: the stage of intellection. Here, the difference between one
existent and another is not their abstract essences but their grade of existence. Existence
is the qualitative deferential element of reality and essence is just a negative quality that
can be equated with nothing.

11

Ibid., p. 113.
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The result of my analysis in Chapter One shows that, for Sadra, the unity of the
Absolute cannot be fully known. It can only be approached by the intuitive grasp of the
Extended Existence as unity-in-multiplicity which Sadra calls the ―Truth of truths.‖ This
intuitive knowledge of the Truth of truths is a kind of mystical knowledge that goes
beyond the understanding‘s principle of abstract identity. If the discursive knowledge of
understanding takes ―multiplicity‖ and ―unity‖ as true only in their separation, Sadra‘s
mystical knowledge takes them in their unity. In this regard, Sadra‘s mystical knowledge
of the Extended existence as unity of distinct opposites is similar to Hegel‘s speculative
knowledge. For Hegel,
the meaning of the speculative is to be understood as being the same as what used
in earlier times to be called ―mystical‖, especially with regard to the religious
consciousness and its content….About this we must remark first that the
―mystical‖ is certainly something mysterious, but only for the understanding, and
then only because abstract identity is the principle of the understanding. But when
it is regarded as synonymous with the speculative, the mystical is the concrete
unity of just those determinations that count true for the understanding in their
separation and opposition.12
But, whereas Sadra limits this mystical knowledge of the opposites to the
Extended Existence as the proximate grade of the Absolute Existence, Hegel extends it to
the Absolute itself. As I conclude in the fourth chapter, from Hegel‘s view, the deficiency
of Sadra‘s account of the Absolute lies in that Sadra does not consider negation as an
essential drive of the Absolute‘s self-determination.
Sadra‘s account of existence is not without difficulties of its own. The main
difficulty consists in his account of the inessentiality of essences. Essences in-themselves,
Sadra maintains, are nothing; they are not even objects of creation. They ―have never

12

Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 82, addition. p. 133.
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inhaled the perfume of real existence at all,‖ 13 as Sadra expresses. The identity of the
individual existent, especially when we consider Sadra‘s account of the motion in the
category of substance, is problematic. Sadra argues that what identifies a determinate
existent is its existential grade within the whole picture of the ontological gradation of
existence towards the Absolute. But the individual existent is inherently in a state of
substantial change from one existential degree to another degree. The existent‘s
substantial state of changing contrasts its state of identity with itself. Unlike Hegel, who
argues that there is a speculative sublation of opposites, Sadra appeals to the doctrine of
intellective forms which he posits in the eternality of God‘s knowledge. To me, this
doctrine does not solve the problem of the unity of God, which is not only central to
Sadra‘s philosophy but to Islamic philosophy in general. For how can we save the
absolute unity of God if His knowledge contains all the existents as unique species? I
raise these difficulties in Sadra‘s philosophy again in the final chapter.
In Chapter Two, I investigate Hegel‘s reading of Plato and Aristotle in his
Lectures on The History of Philosophy. This step is important in that it helps us
understand the difference between Hegel and Sadra in terms of their critiques of
metaphysical essentialism. Hegel‘s interpretation of Plato and Aristotle not only differs
from the traditional views of metaphysical essentialism but also stands over against the
subjective Idealisms and objective Idealisms of modern philosophy. Thus Hegel‘s
critique of the Kantian thing in-itself, for example, can be well understood in light of
Hegel‘s account of the relationship of essence to existence. 14

13

Mulla Sadra, The Metaphysics of Mulla Sadra, trans. Parviz Morewedge (New York: SSIPS, 1992), p.
43.
14
One could argue that Kant‘s critique of the ontological proof of the existence of God does not start from
a genuine critique of the medieval relationship of existence/essence upon which the proof originally stands.
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The main result of Chapter Two is that Hegel does not consider Plato‘s and
Aristotle‘s accounts of essence as two different views of reality: (i.e., he does not accept
that the ―idealist‖ Plato just believes in the transcendental world of essences or that the
―empiricist‖ Aristotle just believes in the objectivity of existence). Hegel‘s dialectical
reading of Plato and Aristotle unveils the speculative moment of essence within their
philosophies. Truth does not lie in the isolated world of objective transcendental
essences, nor does it lie in the isolated world of the subjective essences of cognizant finite
beings.
The speculative account of essence that Hegel finds in the philosophies of Plato
and Aristotle is a negative dynamicity that contains its mediation within itself. The
question as to whether this is consistent with what essence is in Hegel‘s speculative
philosophy, is dealt with in Chapter Three, in which I examine Hegel‘s own position as
he represents it in his Science of Logic.
But let me first mention another two important results of Chapter Two. The first
one is related to the general approximation between Hegel and Sadra in terms of their
disapproval of considering the abstract essence as a true correspondence to reality. The
second important result concerns Hegel‘s discussion of the four Aristotelian principles.
Hegel makes Aristotle‘s formal principle equivalent to ―determination or quality as such,
the wherefore of anything, essence or form.‖15 This result raises the following idea: If
Hegel really maintains that Aristotle‘s account of essence is equivalent to quality as such,

The lack of such critique of the relationship of essence/existence might preclude the other relationship of
subject/object in Kant‘s Subjective Idealism from reaching its highest moment in Absolute Idealism.
15
G.W.F Hegel. Hegel‟s Lectures on The History of Philosophy, trans. E.S. Haldane & Frances H. Simson
(New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), p. 335.
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then in Hegel‘s Logic we must look to the sphere of Quality rather than the sphere of
Essence, if we want to make sense of Hegel‘s critique of metaphysical essentialism.
Whether Aristotle‘s account of essence is indeed equivalent to quality as such is
beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, Aristotle has four meanings for quality;
one of them makes sense with what Hegel says above. In Book V in his Metaphysics
Aristotle says,
We call a quality (1) the differentia of the substance, e.g. man is an animal of a
certain quality because he is two-footed, and the horse is so because it is fourfooted; and a circle is a figure of particular quality because it is without angles—
which shows that the differentia with reference to substance is a quality—this,
then, is one meaning of quality—differentia of substance.16
I find that Hegel‘s account of quality in his Lectures confirms his account of
quality in his Logic. So Hegel‘s critique of the qualitative determination of Truth in his
Logic can be taken as equivalent to his critique of the traditional views of essentialism.
Given this, Sadra‘s moment of the Absolute existentialism as an opposition to the
traditional views of metaphysical essentialism may be found within Hegel‘s treatment of
the category of Quality in the Logic.
I suspend my last result until I see first if Hegel‘s strict division of Arabic
philosophy into (theologians /speakers) and (commentators /philosophers) is also
applicable to Sadra. And this was the task of Chapter Three.
In Chapter Three, I show that Hegel‘s and Sadra‘s critique of Arabic philosophy
share some common concerns. Both refuse the speakers‘ claim of causality which takes
16

Aristotle, The Completed Works of Aristotle, vol.2. ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984), 1020a 34-b2, p. 1611. (my emphasis). Moreover, in his Categories Aristotle says, ―I call
‗quality‘ that in virtue of which some things are said to be such and such. But the name ‗quality‘ is used in
many ways….A forth genus of qualities is ….the form of each thing…And each thing, with respect to its
form, is said to be such and such.‖ 16 Aristotle, Aristotle Selected Works, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle &
Lloyd P. Gerson (Grinnell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1991), pp.45-46.
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the connection between cause and effect as a mere habit. Moreover, both of them criticize
the formal logic of understanding upon which the metaphysical essentialism of Arabic
philosophers is based. Therefore, Sadra‘s philosophy cannot be properly fit within
Hegel‘s division of Arabic philosophy into ―theologians/ speakers‖ and
―commentators/philosophers‖.
In order to see whether Sadra and Hegel start from the same standpoint in their
critique of Arabic philosophy, I examined the principles underlying Sadra‘s and Hegel‘s
critique of Arabic philosophy. They are different. Whereas Sadra take existence as the
ground in which the opposites find their dissolution, Hegel takes essence as the ground
into which the opposites find their sublation. Sadra‘s dissolution of opposites into the
absolute unity of existence is different from Hegel‘s sublation of the opposites into the
speculative unity of essence. Whereas Sadra builds his account of the absolute
groundedness of existence on the assumption that essence-in-itself is an indeterminate
negativity that he equates with nothing, Hegel‘s essence-in-itself as a ground is a
dynamic self-sublation of its own determinations—a sublation that must result in
existence. In order to prove the last point, I provide a detailed analysis to two important
moments in Hegel‘s Logic: ―Essence‘s issuing from Being‖ and ―Essence‘s emerging
into Existence.‖
Chapter Four concludes the dissertation by buildings upon the results of the
previous chapters. I examine the result that I reached in Chapter Two regarding quality as
a determination of truth in metaphysical essentialism. Three results emerged from my
detailed analysis to Hegel‘s sphere of Quality in his Logic. Firstly, Hegel‘s immediate
account of quality resembles the traditional Aristotelian view of essence as positive
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quality. Secondly, Sadra‘s account of essence-in-itself resembles the moment of negative
quality in Hegel‘s Logic. Finally, Hegel‘s account of essence sublates the previous two
moments of positive and negative quality within a higher moment of determinacy that
dialectically unfolds towards the Idea of Being and Essence.
Thus, in this dissertation I show that, although Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism
and Hegel‘s Absolute Idealism are different, both challenge the traditional views of
metaphysical essentialism. I also provide the logical connection between Sadra‘s and
Hegel‘s critiques of metaphysical essentialism. I show that, within Hegel‘s Absolute
Idealism, Sadra‘s Absolute Existentialism emerges in opposition to quality as affirmative
reality in the metaphysical essentialism of the Aristotelian tradition.
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Chapter One
Sadra on Metaphysical Essentialism: The Unfolding of Existence and
the Concealment of Essence
The whole is one rational being called the „great man‟ and the world of objects is like his
body and exterior, and the world of spirits is like his soul and interior, and the whole is
set orderly in one line—Sadra, Divine Manifestations, p.33.
For these thousands of years the same Architect has directed the work: and that Architect
is the one living Mind whose nature is to think, to bring to self-consciousness what it is,
and, with its being thus set as object before it, to be at the same time raised above it, and
so to reach a higher stage of its own being—Hegel, Logic Encyclopedia, § 13.

Introduction
Introducing his philosophical conversion from the metaphysical principality of
essence to the metaphysical principality of existence, Mulla Sadra says,
In the past, I used to be firm on the defense of the principality of essence, making
existence a mentally dependent abstract entity, until my God guided me and
showed me his proof. It became clear to me that the issue is opposite of what has
been convinced and determined. Thank God who took me out of the darkness of
illusion through the light of comprehension, who removed from my heart the
clouds of these doubts through the rise of the sun of truth, and who held me close
to the true discourse in this life and the life after. Existences are genuine
determinate realties and essences are the eternal ―thisnesses‖ which have never
inhaled the perfume of real existence at all. 17
Sadra had originally sided with a tendency that premises its account of Truth/reality on an
ontological assumption of the metaphysical principality of essence over existence. 18 But
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he eventually rejected this position and converted to its opposite, the metaphysical
principality of existence. The significance of this philosophical conversion is related to
the philosophical context of the problem of essence and existence in the Islamic
intellectual tradition, a tradition of more than seven centuries.19 In this regard, many
scholars have considered Sadra as the representative of the highest Islamic philosophical
moment, in which the three different Islamic traditional moments of Peripatetic, newPlatonic, and Intuitionism are synthesized. 20 If this is so, Sadra‘s philosophy might bear
its own confirmation of Hegel‘s statement that
in philosophy the latest birth of time is the result of all the systems that have
preceded it, and must include their principles; and so, if, on other grounds, it
deserves the title of philosophy, will be the fullest, most comprehensive, and most
adequate system of all. 21
My interpretation of Sadra‘s doctrine of the principality of existence, however, is
not limited to the explicit Islamic formulation of the problem of essence and existence—
as it is manifested clearly with Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes.22 My focus, rather, is
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on its implicit formulation in Plato‘s and Aristotle‘s traditional views of Being—as it is
understood by Sadra.
In so doing, I must make it clear at the outset what is meant by the traditional
views of Plato and Aristotle, both of which Sadra and Hegel try to overcome.23 With
regard to Plato, the traditional views present him as an idealist who thinks that
―essences/Ideas‖ exist objectively and absolutely in a transcendental realm of Truth of
which the concrete existents/beings of the sensible world are just copies of these
essences. 24 The traditional views of Aristotle, on the other hand, present him as a realist
philosopher who thinks that ―essences/universals‖ are immanent in substances. Gilson
summarizes these views:
It has often been remarked, and rightly, that the forms of Aristotle are but the
Ideas of Plato brought down from heaven to earth. We know a form through the
being to which it gives rise, and we know that being through its definition. As
knowable and known, the form is called ―essence‖.25
Accordingly, these views introduce both Plato and Aristotle as ―essentialists‖ who
consider essences to be the truest correspondence of reality.
In order to limit my analysis, I will not deal with the other dimensions of Plato‘s
and Aristotle‘s philosophy. My aim is to analyze how Sadra overcomes the metaphysical
claim which considers reality as a correspondence to essence, whether in its Platonic
23
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transcendental form or in its Aristotelian immanent form. This will be in light of the
ontological relationship between essence and existence, on the one hand, and the
epistemological relationship between subject and object, on the other hand. This parallels
my general argument in this dissertation, which claims that, both in Sadra and Hegel, the
ontological duality of essence and existence implies the epistemological duality of
subject and object, and vice versa.26

The Ontological Difference between (Being/Essence) and (Existence) and its
Epistemological Reflections27
If for every philosopher there are central questions around which his
investigations revolve, Sadra‘s main philosophical questions could be formulated in three
26
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interrelated questions: does ―existence‖ exist in a determinate and concrete sense the way
things in the external realm exist? Is the corresponding reality of the affirmation of
―existence is an existent‖ the same as that of the affirmation of ―a tree, for instance, is an
existent‖? How could the difference between, as Sadra puts it, ―the existence of things
and the existent status of existence itself,‖ 28 be philosophically employed in order to
perform a comprehensive theory of reality?
The question of existence is central in Sadra‘s thinking:
The question of existence is the foundation of the principles of wisdom, the basis
of philosophical theology, and the mill-stone of sciences of unity, the resurrection
of souls and bodies, and of much else that only we have developed and
articulated.29
In order to avoid the loss of the implications and philosophical direction of Sadra‘s
thought, it is important to isolate and make clearly recognizable the fundamental and
primary meaning of the Arabic term (wujud)/existence. Sadra‘s writings are imbued with
the word wujud. In this regard, Chittick, in his translation of Sadra‘s The Elixir of the
Gnostics, states that
wujud is the primary topic of discussion. In the Asfar30 and its commentary the
word itself is employed15, 000 times, not to mention its verbal forms and
derivatives. 31
The Arabic term wujud, however, remains an approximate, rather than an exact,
translation of the English term ―existence‖. Here I disagree with some scholars such as
Toshihiko Izutsu who considers wujud to be ―an Arabic word which exactly corresponds
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to the English word existence.‖ 32 In fact, the exact literal translation of wujud is ―to find‖
and it entails, moreover, an involving of the human cognitive faculties by which
something can be actually found. As Seyyed Naser explains,
As far as the etymological derivation of the term wujud is concerned, it is an
Arabic term related to the root wjd, which possesses the basic meaning ―to find‖
or ―come to know‖ about something. It is etymologically related to the term
wijdan, which means ‗consciousness,‘ ‗awareness,‘ or ‗knowledge,‘ as well as to
wajd, which means ‗ecstasy‘ or ‗bliss‘. 33
Not recognizing this literal meaning and this implied epistemological dimension of the
Arabic term wujud could cause confusion when we relate wujud with the English term
―existence‖. 34
Within this literal meaning of wujud, both ―consciousness‖ and ―presence‖
furnish the initial epistemological and ontological web for an object to be found. In
propositions such as ―I find it‖, existence epistemologically and ontologically extends
(yn„basid) between the subject/knower and the object/known. 35 The literal meaning of
wujud thus demands that, for an object to be found for a conscious subject, both object
and subject must be present in some definite place and at some definite time. In this

32

Toshihiko Izutsu, The Concept and Reality of Existence (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2007), p.
41.
33
Seyyed H. Nasr, Islamic Philosophy From its Origin to the Present, p.66.
34
With regard to the epistemological dimension of wujud, Chittick rightly notes that ―one important
dimension of the discussion of wujud that is immediately lost to sight in translation is the fact that the word
itself demands consciousness and perception.‖ William Chittick, Perception According to Mulla Sadra
(London: Institute of Islamic studies, 2002), p.228.
35
We will see, when I discuss Sadra‘s doctrine of the unity of the knower/subject, the known/object, and
the act of knowing, how his theory of ―knowledge-by-presence‖ is related to the epistemological dimension
of wujud/existence. In this context, the literal meaning of the term wujud, when it is related not only to its
ontological dimension but also to its inherent epistemological dimension based on ―tasting and finding,‖ or
what Sadra calls kashf (unveiling or unconcealedness), could bear a significant comparison with
Heidegger‘s interpretation of Truth as it is manifested in the Greek term aletheia. Heidegger writes, ―What
the Greeks name ἀλήθεια [Aletheia] we ordinarily "translate" with the word "truth." If we translate the
Greek word "literally," however, then it says "unconcealedness." Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans.
Andre Schuwer & Richard Rojcewicz,(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 11.

6

limited linguistic sense, the Arabic term wujud bears similarity with the German term
Dasein. As Gilson notes, the well-known Arabic philosopher
Averroes remarks that, in common language, when people want to say that a thing
exists, they say that it is ―to be found,‖ just as, in order to convey that a certain
thing does not exist, they say that it is ―not to be found.‖ We ourselves would now
say that, to Averroes‘ compatriots, as to some German philosophers, to be is to be
there: sein is dasein.36
Hence, the concrete presence of an object is constitutive in the literal meaning of
wujud. Sadra employs this implied sense of the objective concreteness of wujud to stress
―the realized determination‖ of existence that appears as an evident result of the
existential realization of an object. As he says, ―The realization [lit. inner-reality] of
existence in its presence and inner revelation is the most evident of all entities, whereas
its essence is the most hidden in concept and in its inner-being.‖37 When we apply this
meaning of wujud/existence to concepts per se, or essences per se—without any spiritual,
imaginative, or material correlation—we find that none of them can be found or can be
concretely present; that is, none of them exists. Essences qua essences, therefore, are
indeterminate. When they are regarded without any reference to their existential
correlations, essences are equivalent to ―nothingness‖. Essences in themselves stay
forever in their concretely absent state and this is why they, as Sadra says, ―have never
inhaled the perfume of real existence at all.‖ 38 The forever-concretely absent state of
essences in themselves constitutes their own peculiar ontological status. This leads me to
what I call the Sadrian dualism of what is concretely presence and what is concretely
absence. The former refers to existence in its determinate presence and the latter refers to
essence per se in its forever absence and forever indeterminate state.
36
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The Difference between Essence-in-itself and Essence-for-Existence
For Sadra, although essence is ontologically absent when it is considered solely
in-itself, it has an ontological presence when it is considered in relation to the external
existence. Hence Sadra distinguishes between two ontological accounts of essence:
essence-in-itself, and essence-for-existence, so to speak. It is the former account of
essence which Sadra considers as equivalent to nothingness. That is, when we cognitively
consider essence-in-itself without any extra-mental correlation, then essence does not
have any reality:
An essence, considered only in itself apart from existence, would be deprived of
existence. If it [an essence] is considered in itself regardless of both existence and
privation, it would be neither an existent nor an entity deprived of the status of
being an existent.39
Essence in itself is thus indifferent to its own existence or non-existence. This
makes essence deprived of any kind of activity and effects. Essence, however, acquires a
meaningful sense in relation to something other than itself. If the status of essence-initself is ontologically poor to the extent it becomes equivalent to nothing, essence-forexistence is only meaningful in relation to the reality of existence. For Sadra, essences, as
Rahman puts it ―arise only in the mind by the impact of reality upon it.‖40 In this sense,
Sadra considers essences no more than a consequence of the human understanding‘s
conceptual analysis of the objective reality of the external world. Consequentially, Sadra
posits the ontological reality of essences within the ontological status of what he calls
―mental Being‖:
We can make true affirmative judgments about things that have no existence in
extra-mental reality at all. Similarly, we can judge what possesses being. We
judge it comprehensively for all its quantitative realized particulars. For example,
39
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we say ‗every Gryphon flies‘ and ‗every triangle has three sides‘. Now we know
the reference [truth] of every affirmative judgment requires the existence of its
subject. Since we know that the subject of the judgment has no concrete
existence, we know that it must have another existence. That is mental Being.41
Mental here refers to the human mind as a subjective creator of the cognitive
forms of the reality of existence. The soul creates from within itself concepts and abstract
universals under the impact of the external reality of existence. 42 It is important here to
stress the point that Sadra believes in the active role of the knowing subject in the
cognitive process of knowledge. For him, the cognitive forms, as he writes, ―present to
the cognizant soul, and [are] related to it as an act is related to its actor, not as something
received is related to its recipient.‖43 Within this epistemological view, essences, as
abstract universals, are formed by the active knowing subject. Essences, accordingly, do
not objectively exist in a Platonic transcendental realm, nor are they immanent as the
most real in substances in the Aristotelian traditional sense. Rather, essences emanate
from within the cognitive transformation of the knowing subject himself under the impact
of the reality of existence on him.
The reality of existence is thus the main differential factor between existences.
This does not mean that things do not differ from each other by means of their essences.
It is true for Sadra that the essence of man is different from the essence of stone, but this
difference stems fundamentally from the reality of existence.
Although its species and its individuals differ in essence, and its genera and
differences are diversified by definition and by essence, existence in its totality is
41
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a unique entity, having but a single unique essence, simply presenting superior
and inferior levels and degrees.44
The difference in terms of essences is thus secondary and not primary. The difference in
essence is a conceptual difference and not a real difference. What determines the real
difference between man and stone consists primarily in their existential degree, which,
subsequently, results conceptually in a difference of essence. Essences, in this
metaphysical vision, are merely the cognizing soul‘s self-approximation to the reality of
existence, and the difference essences bring remains abstract and not concrete.
Why, for Sadra, is the knowing subject in all knowledge (sense-perception,
imagination, and intellection) not a passive recipient of the material forms or the bodily
qualities of the external object? The reason for this consists in the different nature of the
material forms of the external object from the inner nature of the cognizing soul itself.
For Sadra, ―the external sensible and the affections of the sense organ are merely
preparatory and provide the ‗occasion‘ for the rise in the soul, or rather, the creation by it,
of the perceptible form.‖ 45 According to Sadra, the cognizing soul‘s self-creation of its
cognitive forms, under the impact of the reality of existence, constitutes the condition of
the identity between the knower and the known. For it is in this case that the nature of the
knower and the nature of the known becomes similar, and thus the identity between them
could be possible. This point is explained in this following important passage. Sadra
explains,
Perception in general does not take place—as the well-known doctrine of the
majority of the philosophers states—by the perceptual faculty‘s abstraction of the
perceptible form itself from matter and encountering it along with its enveloping
material attachments—since it has been established that forms imprinted in matter
cannot move locally….Perception occurs because the giver (of forms, i.e., the
44
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soul itself) bestows another psychic and luminous cognitive form, thanks to which
perception or knowledge arises. This form is the actual sentient and the actual
sensible at the same time. As for form-in matter, it is neither sentient nor sensible,
but is only a condition (or occasion) for the emanation of that (actually cognized)
form. 46
Sadra‘s account of the cognitive activity of the knowing subject as a self-creator
of forms is based first on his critique of abstraction. He criticizes his preceding Islamic
philosophers in their misapprehension of the Greek‘s philosophers‘ true view of
abstraction by saying:
These philosophers, when they read in the books of the ancient sages that the
various types of knowledge—sense perception, imagination, and intellection—
take place by a kind of abstraction, took this ―abstraction‖ to mean that certain
qualities or parts (of the known object) are removed while others are preserved.
On the contrary, all knowledge comes through a sort of existence—one level of
existence being replaced by another.47
Sadra reinterprets the ancient‘s view of abstraction in a way that could support his
metaphysical theory of the simultaneous unfolding of existence and knowledge:
The meaning of their (i.e., the philosophers‘) statement that every type of
knowledge involves a kind of abstraction and that difference in the ranks of
knowledge corresponds to the difference in the levels of abstraction is—as we
have already said—not that abstraction involves the removal of certain qualities
and retention of certain others, but its meaning is that existence changes levels—
from lower and baser to higher and nobler. 48
The knowing subject‘s self-creation of successive knowable forms results in the
unfolding of knowledge as identical to the unfolding of existence. For the knowing
subject‘s existential status in the stage of sensible knowledge, for instance, will not be the
same as that of imaginable knowledge or intellectual knowledge.
For Sadra, the existential cognitive process of unfolding does not exclude its
lower ones but includes them. That is, the higher existential and cognitive level that the
46
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knowing subject reaches not only exceeds but also includes the lower level. To emphasis
this important point, Sadra writes, ―Thus, when the soul is perfected and becomes actual
intellect, it is not the case that it loses some faculties, like the perceptive, and comes to
have others, like the rational.‖ 49 On the contrary, the cognizing soul in its higher stage of
existence/knowledge both includes and transcends its previous levels. The same soul in
its higher and simple stage of unfolding is all-inclusive. The same soul is, as Sadra writes,
―intellective, perceptive, smelling, tasting, walking, growing, self-nourishing, appetitive,
and angry.‖50 The true knowledge is thus that kind of existence which envelops all of its
ontological and epistemological developments within simple wholeness. Rahman stresses
this point by saying:
According to Sadra, the higher does not ―abstract from‖ or negate but absorbs,
includes, and transcends them: they exist in it in a simple manner. That is why,
while characterizing God, he enunciates the principle, ―a simple being is [i.e.,
includes] all things.‖51
If we could use Hegel‘s terminology, the cognizing soul in its higher stage sublates its
previous levels of existence/knowledge. The highest moment that the cognizing soul
could reach is the actual intellect. At this stage, the knowing subject becomes, as Sadra
says, ―pure existence free from matter‖:
Knowledge is neither a privation like abstraction from matter, nor a relation but a
being (wujud/existence). (It is) not every being but that which is an actual being
(bil-fi „l), not potential (bil-quwwah). (It is) not even every actual being, but a
pure being (wujudan khalisan/pure existence), unmixed with non-being. To the
extent that it becomes free from an admixture of non-being, its intensity as
knowledge increases. 52
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Sadra, in his view of the ontological and epistemological transformation of the
knowing subject, breaks with his predecessor Aristotelian philosophers. As Rahman
explains, ―According to Sadra, the Aristotelian-Ibn Sinaian theory of abstraction holds,
whereas the objects of knowledge change—from the sensibles, through the imaginables
to the intelligibles—the cognizing subject, the soul, remains the same.‖ 53 In contrast,
Sadra, based on his theory of ―the substantial change,‖54 maintains that the knowing
subject substantially changes from one level of (existence/knowledge) to another higher
level of (existence/knowledge). The unfolding of existence implies the unfolding of
knowledge and vice versa.
In this existential evolutionary process of the knowing subject, essences come to
be mere conceptual creations arising from within the soul at a certain level of its
existential development, in which the soul is still preoccupied by the affairs of its body.
Essences in this existential and cognitive development of the knowing subject are mere
approximation to the reality of existence but not the true correspondence of it. They are
illusory representations of the reality of existences. What correspond to the reality of the
external existences are their individual intellective forms rather than their universal
essences. Does Sadra confuse the intellective forms with the essences in the Platonic
sense? Rahman explains Sadra‘s position by writing,
As for the intellective forms, Sadra‘s position is that these forms exist in their
own right in a Platonic sense, and as immaterial individuals (afrad) and that when
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the soul fully knows them, it does so by an illuminationist direct knowledge
whereby it becomes identical with them. 55
These intellective forms, however, are not universal essences under which
individuals of certain kind are subsumed. Rather, they are themselves unique individuals.
That is, each material existent in the realm of contingency has its unique intellective form
that exists as a pure existential difference in the divine mind or the actual intellect. When
the individual existent progressively becomes his intellective form, it at once becomes a
unique species. So, although Sadra‘s metaphysical position of intellective forms has
Platonic merit, there is considerable difference that we can see. For whereas the Platonic
essences are immaterial universals under which material individuals of certain kind are
subsumed, the Saderian intellective forms are immaterial individuals. They are pure
existences free from matter, each of which is devoted only to one material individual.
Sadra, however, is aware of Plato‘s theory of Ideas. He thought that he
comprehended it more correctly than his Islamic predecessors. He, for instance, criticizes
Avicenna who considers Plato‘s Ideas as ―abstract universal essences‖ devoid of all
particularity. 56 Sadra argues that these traditional views of Plato misunderstand what
Plato really meant. For Sadra, Plato‘s Ideas should be understood not as isolated and
abstract entities, not as universals under which individuals univocally subsumed, but as a
―concrete and existential order of existence which contains within it all particularities and
determinations.‖57 For Sadra, ―there is no subsistence of the essence abstracted from
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existence.‖58 The key point in Sadra‘s reinterpretation of Plato consists in his
transformation of the Platonic Ideas from being universal essences to being individual
intellective forms.
However, at the end of this chapter we will see how Sadra‘s position of
intellective forms is still problematic and forms a weak point in his metaphysics of
existence. But let us just mention again that Sadra does not think that he rejects what
Plato really says about the Ideas, only what his interpreters understand. Sadra‘s position
in this point is exactly the same as Hegel‘s. For, as we will see in the next chapter, Hegel
thinks that Plato is misinterpreted by many interpreters, modern and medieval, and
Hegel‘s task is to reinterpret Plato in a way proper to the development of the
philosophical idea.

Sadra’s Triple Metaphysical View of Existence
In Sadra‘s metaphysics, there are three grades of existence: The Absolute, the
Extended, and the Relative. The Absolute existence in its pure simplicity and unity is
completely undetermined and unlimited. The Extended existence, on the other hand,
represents the first manifestation of the Absolute existence. Sadra also refers to this
Extended existence as the First Intellect, or the Sacred Effusion. 59 In its unity, the
Extended existence possesses infinite ontological determinations. From this single
Extended existence all the ontological differentiations, which are manifested in the
cosmos, issue. So, whereas the Absolute existence is unity that produces only unity, the
Extended existence is unity that produces multiplicity. But this does not mean that unity
and multiplicity are exclusive opposites within the Extended existence. It is only so from
58
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the perspective of the third degree of existence: the Relative or the Relational existence.
This degree of existence refers to all the existents existentiated by the Extended
existence.60
These three grades of existence correspond to three cognitive levels:
1- The Absolut existence (The Absolute Unity)—completely unknowable.
2- The Extended existence (Unity in Multiplicity/ Multiplicity in Unity)—knowable
only by intellectual intuition.
3- The Relative existence (Multiplicity and Unity as exclusive opposites)—
knowable by sense-perception and conceptual analysis.
But these three ontological degrees of existence with their epistemological
correspondences are all manifestations of God‘s Truth. In this existential metaphysical
view of reality, all existents are appearances, attributes, names, and manifestations
qualifying the simple reality of existence in its Absolute necessity. God, as the absolute
simplicity of the reality of existence, includes and transcends at the same time all His
manifestations.
You should know that The Necessary [Existent]/[God] is the true in its Reality.
Each simple reality, due to its unity, is the totality of all entities. [As it is stated in
The Quran] ―It leaves out nothing, Small or Great, but takes account thereof.‖
[18:49]61
In His absolute degree of existence, God is the pure unity that is completely
unknowable by the human mind. Sadra also calls this absolute degree of existence ―the
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Hidden Ipseity,‖ which, as Zailan writes, ―transcends all limitations and determinations
and which is absolutely unknowable.‖ 62 In the extended degree of existence, God is
manifesting as ―unity in multiplicity‖ and ―multiplicity in unity‖. Since this degree
represents the first manifestation of the Absolute, it is, according to Sadra, the Truth of
truths. This is the highest epistemological stage that the human mind, by means of the
intellectual intuition, can reach. In the relative degree of existence, God is manifesting in
the infinite ontological determinations of multiplicity as relational existents. This is the
lowest degree of existence in which the individual existents are viewed by conceptual
analysis as distinct essences in the human mind.
In this triple metaphysical view of existence, everything originates from and
returns to the Absolute existence. Origination is the descending of existence from its
(absoluteness), through (extendedness), to (relativity). Returning is the reverse movement
of existence that progressively moves forwards towards its origin and never moves
backwards. In its metaphysical Extension mode as ascending towards the Absolute,
Relative existence unfolds in gradual intensive progress from a lower degree to a higher
degree of existence. In this metaphysical picture of gradation, the Extended existence still
preserves its simple unity:
Existence is a single, objective and simple reality, and there is no difference
between its parts, unless in terms of perfection and imperfection, strength, and
weakness.63
With this existential, gradational ontology in view, the Extended existence is the
ontological center around which the Absolute existence‘s self-manifestations are
different, but it is also the same center around which they are identical. This relationship
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finds its implication in the important Sadrian principle which states that existence is
―‗unity/one‘ in ‗multiplicity/many‘ and ‗multiplicity/many‘ in ‗unity/one‘.‖ 64
Here we notice three ontological and epistemological moments interwoven in
Sadra‘s account of the Extended existence. The first moment is the immediacy of the
unity of existence—the concept of existence as self-evident for the knowing subject. The
second moment is the multiplicity of existences—the knowing subject‘s self-creation of
essences as an approximation to the reality of existence. The third moment is the
synthetically, mutual relationship between ―unity in multiplicity‖ and ―multiplicity in
unity‖—the knowing subject‘s intuitional grasp of the reality of existence. For Sadra, it is
precisely this third moment that truly reveals the Truth of truths. 65
In the first moment of unity, we, from a Hegelian point of view, face the sphere of
immediacy. Like Hegel, Sadra rejects this one-sided principle of Truth which does not
recognize the other principle of distinction and difference. He rises from this point of
view of unity in which all things are undistinguished to the point of view of multiplicity,
distinction, and difference. Although this sphere, in which things mediate each other in
terms of their differences, that is, in terms of their ―essences,‖ seems more precise and
elaborated than the sphere of immediacy, Sadra refuses to see Truth from this one-sided
view of difference. For him, the sphere of classification and difference, which results in
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multiplicity as essences in the human mind, constitutes just part of Truth but not the
whole of Truth.
To grasp Truth in its highest ontological sense is to rise over both ―unity‖ and
―multiplicity‖ to ―unity in multiplicity‖/―multiplicity in unity‖. For Sadra, the true unity
must have the multiplicity within it, and vice versa. This is the ontological case of the
Extended existence in its perpetual unfolding towards the Absolute existence. God, as the
ground of Origination and Return, is the Absolute unity of the Extended existence and the
Relative existence. The infinite existence has the finite existence within it only by the
mediation of the Extended existence, which is at once finite and infinite. The Extended
existence is infinite in its immediate emergence from the Absolute, yet it is finite in its
relation with the multiplicity of the Relative existences.
The Extended existence, with all its ontological differentiations, is constitutive of
our subjectivity as knowers. For we, as Relative existents within the Extended existence,
create all kinds of knowable forms, including essences. But this epistemological
emergence of the cognitive forms within our soul is correlated with the absolute
unfolding of the Extended existence from which we are initially emerged.
According to this analysis, there is tension between two relationships in Sadra‘s
metaphysics. The first one is between relativity and absoluteness, and the second one is
between the knower and the known. The ontological dimension (of relativity in
absoluteness and absoluteness in relativity) and the epistemological dimension (of
knower in known and known in knower) implicitly entail each other in Sadra‘s account of
the Absolute existence. By the mediation of the Extended existence, Sadra thinks that the
problem of how multiplicity issues from the Absolute unity of God is solved. Whether he
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is aware to the mutual relationship between what is epistemological and what is
ontological is another issue that could be answered under the light of our later discussion
of Hegel.

The Substantial Motion of Existence (al-harakat al-jawhariyya)
The Extended existence, in its unfolding extension from a lower degree of
existence to a higher degree of existence towards the Absolute, represents the perpetual
dynamic nature of existence in itself. Sadra‘s consideration of the unfolding of existence
is based on his break with the Aristotelian account of motion. In contrast to the Muslim
Peripatetic tradition, Sadra affirms the motion in the category of ―substance‖ itself. He
introduces his different view of motion by saying:
According to most philosophers, the remaining categories in which motion is
supposed to occur are four, but in our opinion they are five: substance, quality,
quantity, place, and position. 66
Admitting motion in substance forms a revolutionary break with the Aristotelian
theory of motion. Whereas Aristotle does not accept motion in the category of substance
but only in the accidental categories of quantity (growth or diminution), quality
(alteration), and place (locomotion), 67 Sadra does not only insist on the motion in
substance, but also makes it the foundation of his metaphysics:
Note that motion, being essentially both a renewal and passing-away of things, is
identified with this thing in motion. So motion‘s proximate cause must be some
identity essentially nonperduring. Otherwise the components of motion would not
be annihilated and so motion could not be motion, and renewal could not be
renewal but only rest and cessation. The agent of motion must be itself in motion
intrinsically.68
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It is not my purpose, however, to analyze the three complicated and long
arguments that Sadra presents in his Asfar to support his claim of the substantial motion
of existence. 69 What is important here is Sadra‘s awareness of the reason behind
Aristotle‘s refusal of the motion in substance. This reason is concerned with the principle
of identity, according to which substance must remain unaffected throughout its motion.
For Aristotle, substance must be the stable foundation of motion; otherwise it will lose its
identity. Hence, motion must happen in accidents of which substance is the substratum.
Aristotle‘s substance does not have a contrary and hence the motion in substance leads
either to destruction (change from positive to negative) or generation (change from
negative to positive).70
For Sadra, the Aristotelian‘s concern about the loss of identity in motion is not a
problem because the identity of substance is related primarily to its existence, and not to
its essence. This constitutes a critique of the abstract law of identity based on the
principality of essence over existence.71 Having considered existence as the sole
principality of reality, Sadra holds that substance preserves its identity during its
existential motion insofar it moves gradually, and not by leaps, from a realistic degree of
existence to another realistic degree of existence. The new existential form that substance
realizes in the course of its substantial change does not exclude but includes its previous
one. Substance only actualizes and realizes itself existentially in this substantial motion
from one existential mode of existence to another, more intensive existential mode. This
69
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substantial change, as we have seen, is applied by Sadra to the cognizing soul in its
cognitive and existential evaluation from one level of realization to another higher level.
According to this metaphysical vision, the knowing subject graduates
substantially from a lower intensive degree of existence (with its higher intensive
corresponding essence/mental Being) to a higher intensive degree of existence (with its
lower intensive corresponding essence/mental Being). The more the knowing subject
realizes itself existentially the more it negates the abstract universals of reality and
becomes closer to the Absolute existence, which is pure existence without any
corresponding essence. Essence in the Absolute existence is perfectly vanished both
concretely and conceptually. For, as discussed above, the Absolute existence is pure and
simple oneness without any multiplicity that could be represented as essence. That the
Absolute is pure existence without any trace of essence needs more discussion. This will
be clarified now in light of Sadra‘s important difference between the concept of existence
and the reality of existence.

The Ontological and Epistemological difference between The Concept of
Existence /Mental Being and The Reality of Existence
The linguistic implication of the Arabic term kaun/Being will shed more light on
the correlation between ‗the concept of essence‘/‗mental Being,‘ on one hand, and ‗the
concept of existence‘/‗the reality of existence‘, on the other hand. Kaun, as a name, can
be considered as an equivalent Arabic term to the English term ―Being‖ when ―Being‖ is
used as equivalent to universe-cosmos-world. On the other hand, kaun, as a verb, has
copulative uses related to the three tenses (past-present-future), similar to some extent to
the English verb to be. However, kaun in this verbal sense designates more specifically
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the past tense. In light of this linguistic implication and on the basis that what is past is
concretely absent, essence-in-itself as absent becomes more related to kaun as past Being.
It is worthwhile here to notice the linguistic similarities—in terms of the
correlation of essence and past Being— between Arabic and German. In this regard,
Hegel himself says,
With respect to other meanings and uses of the category of Essence, we may note
that in the German auxiliary verb, sein (to be), the past tense is expressed by the
term for Essence (wesen): we designate past being as gewesen. This anomaly of
language implies to some extent a correct perception of the relation between
Being and Essence. Essence we may certainly regard as past Being, remembering
however meanwhile that the past is not utterly denied, but only laid aside and thus
at the same time preserved. 72
Thus, while the reality of existence addresses what is concretely present, (the concept of
essence /(past Being) addresses what is absent in the concrete level of the external world.
The ontological preservation of the concept of essence as past Being is performed in the
human mind as a knower. Sadra, however, introduces what he calls ―mental Being‖ as an
ontological preservation not only for the concept of essence but also for the concept of
existence as well as any imaginative or unreal concept. Mental Being here is considered
in general as another order of existence, different in degree from the order of the reality
of existence.
Sadra‘s metaphysics busies itself chiefly with the relationship between the
cognitive forms, which have the ontological status of mental Being, including the concept
of essence and the concept of existence, on one hand, and the reality of existence, on the
other hand. Moreover, the crucial insertion of the epistemological dimension of mental
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Being within the relationship of existence/essence makes this relationship neither purely
ontological nor purely epistemological but a combination of both.
The difference between the order of existence in its external reality and the order
of existence in its conceptual mental Being can be clarified more in the light of the
difference between the existential propositional form of (X is, or X exists) and the
copulative propositional form of (X is Y). To clarify this important difference let us take
the example which Sadra borrows from Aristotle. 73 An existential proposition such as
―Homer is‖ can be transformed to ―Homer is an existent.‖ If we compare this existential
proposition with another copulative proposition, such as ―Homer is a poet,‖ we find that
―an existent‖ grammatically and logically plays the same role as ―a poet‖—both are
predicates denoting a quality of Homer. For Sadra, it is only at this level of
logical/Mental analysis of reality that existence could be regarded as a property or a
categorical accident.74 That is, it is only the ‗concept of existence‘, not the ‗reality of
existence‘, which can be considered as a predicate or an accident of an essence.
According to Sadra, the main confusion of the philosophers, who value essence
over existence, lies in their consideration of existence only in its conceptual level
(abstract Being), rather than in its concrete external level. That is to say, they confuse the
ontological and the epistemological dimensions of reality. If existence is taken in its
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conceptual consideration only, Sadra agrees that essence will be prior in principle to
existence:
From the mental point of view,[…] the prior factor is essence, because it is a
universal mental notion which is realized in its deep-seated sense of being in the
mental realm; it is not obtained [in the mode of being concrete] from existence,
except in a general and mental concept. Therefore, essence is the principle factor
in mental propositions but not in the realm external to the mind. This priority in
this respect is a priority in meaning and essence rather than a priority in
existence.75
At the level of the reality of existence, however, the comparison between the two
propositions of ―Homer is an existent‖ and ―Homer is a poet‖ is totally different. While in
the latter proposition Sadra agrees that ―Homer‖ is the subject and ―a poet‖ is the
predicate, in the former proposition of ―Homer is an existent‖ he completely reverses the
relationship between the subject and the predicate. For in the latter proposition Sadra
considers ―existence‖ as the real subject, while ―Homer‖ is but an accident or a predicate
determining or modifying existence into a particular thing (Homer). For, as Sadra writes,
The reality of anything is its existence, which ranks with its effects and
implications. Existence, therefore, must be the most real of [all] things for it is the
possessor of reality, because whatever possesses reality possesses reality [only]
due to it. Existence is the reality of anything possessing reality.76
At the conceptual level of mental Being, then, existence in its predicative form (X is Y)
does not necessarily negate ―nothingness‖ but could imply it. Here we can say that
―Homer is a poet and is not a musician‖ at the same time. We can affirm at the same time
that Zayd is in the house and is not in the market. We can conceptually affirm that the
unicorn is an existent, for it exists in the mental Being. Here the reality implied in the
verb ‗is‘ does not necessarily have a correspondence in the external world. What
corresponds to ―is‖ remains confined within the conceptual sphere of judgment as
75
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affirmation or negation. Essences-in-themselves belong to this general ―absence‖ of isness. In contrast to this conceptual view of existence as mental Being and taken from the
stand point of the reality of existence, the concrete existence of ―Zayd‖ transgresses the
logical or mental boundaries of the judgment in that it corresponds to the realized
concreteness of ―Zayd‖ as an existent. This marks a significant difference between the
subjective, logical realm of essences as mental Being, on one hand, and the objective,
external realm of the reality of existence, on the other hand. From the standpoint of the
reality of existence, the subjective realm of the mental Being/essences could be an
ontological realm of contradictions and impossibilities, for we can posit in our mind even
what is really impossible and contradictory e.g., a square circle. On the other hand, the
reality of existence is necessarily an ontological realm of consistencies and actualities.
Sadra builds his metaphysics around the privileging of presence over absence.
However, his metaphysics of presence is not of pure presence of essences or pure
presence of existence—which becomes, among other kinds of presence, the target of
critique for the western deconstructive thinkers 77—but of concrete presence of existence.
Let us clarify this point more in light of Sadra‘s distinction between (the concept of
existence) and (the reality of existence).
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As we have seen earlier, the distinction between essence and existence is only
conceptual, in our experience. In the external world, however, existence and essence are
identical and there is no real distinction between them: 78
If it is affirmed that the existence of every contingent is identical with its essence
in the determined [realm], then either there is or there is not a difference between
them in meaning and conception. The latter is invalid, because it implies that
―man,‖ for example, and ―existence‖ would be synonymous utterances, and our
saying ―man [is] man‖ would be the same, and it would be impossible to imagine
one of them while disregarding the other.79
But this conceptual distinction between essence and existence means that existence is
also taken as a concept. Sadra agrees that existence could be viewed as a concept in in the
logical analysis of mental Being, but he criticizes his philosophical Islamic predecessors,
who could not think of existence outside of its conceptual dimension. In contrast to his
predecessors, Sadra stresses the reality of existence over the concept of existence. While
the latter can be reconciled with Aristotle‘s universal categorical scheme of
substance/Being/essence, the former cannot. For Sadra, the conceptual level of existence
is similar to that of essence; both are situated within the static and univocal realm of
mental Being rather than the dynamic and equivocal realm of the reality of existence.
Let us analyze more what Sadra means by the distinction of the concept of
existence and the reality of existence. An object has its ontological status of mental
Being/essence as long as it is possible to be conceived. By means of this epistemological
act, an external object can be conceptually transformed from the ontological status of the
reality of existence to another ontological status of mental Being/essence—from its
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concrete level to its abstract level. But this conceptual transformation of a present
existent/object does not reflect the inner reality of this object because it cannot transform
it ontologically but only epistemologically. It is only the representation of an existential
object that is in the mind of the subject, and not the object itself. It is true that the object
has now another ontological status of mental Being but this is different from its
ontological status as concrete existence. For Sadra, the former is reflected as the concept
of existence, while the latter is the reality of existence.
Although the concept of essence and the concept of existence are now both
considered within the abstract level of knowledge, there is a difference between them.
Unlike the concept of essence, which is complex because it is combined from genus and
differentia, the concept of existence is simple, self-evident, and cannot be deduced from
an ultimate concept. It is conceptually the most apparent presence to the degree in which
the concept of existence is by no means definable. 80 This primary concept of existence
demands no intermediary. As Sadra himself says, ―its understanding cannot be supplied
by anything more manifest and prevalent than it.‖81 He emphasizes this unique,
distinguished feature of the concept of existence:
It is a mistake to attempt to describe existence, for it would need to be described
by something more hidden than the [entity] itself—unless the aim were to
[approach it by] either an indication or an ostensive notification, or some
description; the latter is merely a syntactical [lit. linguistic inquiry]. 82
The difference between the concept of existence, which is now correlated with the
mental Being/essence located epistemologically in the mind of the subject, and the reality
of existence, which reflects the concrete presence of an existent/object, is crucial in
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Sadra‘s metaphysics of Truth. What we are now dealing with is a single term ―wujud,”
but taken in two different degrees of precision: the abstract level and the concrete level.
The former level implies all kinds of concepts including the concept of existence. The
latter level stands exclusively as an ontological realm for the reality of existence. So,
although the concept of existence is not the same as the concept of essence, both are now
situated within the same realm of the abstract mental Being of the subject/knower. As a
result, neither the concept of existence nor the concept of essence, but only the reality of
existence is what can account for the present objectivity of the concrete existence. Now,
if Truth, as Sadra thinks, consists within the very objectivity of existence rather than the
mental Being of the subjectivity of concepts, then it must correspond neither to the
concept of existence, nor to the concept of essence, but solely to the reality of existence.
This sharp distinction between the concept and reality of existence will result in
the exclusion of any conceptual universal— whether it be essence, form, species, or
genus—from being the true correspondence of reality. Any knowledge obtained through
a formal or conceptual mediation cannot grasp the reality of an object:83
All notions which arise from [our experience of] the external world and are fully
grasped by the mind, their essences are preserved [in the mind] even though the
mode of their existence changes [in the mind]. But since the very nature of
existence is that it is outside the mind and everything whose very nature it is to be
outside the mind can never possibly come into the mind—or else, its nature will
be completely transformed—hence, existence can never be [conceptually] known
by any mind.84
Accordingly, neither the concept of essence nor the concept of existence can grasp the
reality of existence. For there is no correspondence between the nature of the reality of
existence, which always in a state of substantial change, and the nature of the concepts of
83
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essence and existence, which are in a state of static fixity. In so far as the reality of
existence is in a state of unfolding, the corresponding knowledge must be also in a state
of unfolding. That is, the unfolding of existence must be identical to the unfolding of
knowledge. This can happen when we consider knowledge not as something
distinguished from existence, but as a mode of existence.

The Univocity of (The Concept of Existence and The Concept of Essence/The
Mental Being/) and the Equivocity of (The Reality of Existence)
We have seen how Sadra‘s distinction between the conceptual order of mental
Being and the reality of existence allows the possibility of contradiction in the subjective
realm of mental Being. The human faculty of imagination, which is highly estimated in
Sadra‘s metaphysics and which is considered to be immortal, creates absolute possibility
of mental entities within the world of mental Being.85 As a result, the conceptual realm of
mental Being admits an infinite number of mental entities, possible and impossible,
fictional and real.
The metaphysical circle of the concept of existence as mental Being becomes
more extensive in that it includes within it even what is impossible and chimerical. The
metaphysical circle of the reality of existence, on the other hand, becomes less extensive
but more intensive in that it includes within it only what is actually realized, unique,
individualistic, and concrete. The conceptual realm of existence as the mental Being of
concepts, universals, and essences is static and fixed. That is, all the conceptual entities
within the mental Being share the same degree of existence. The difference between them
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is only difference in terms of their meanings not in terms of their existence. Existence in
the mental Being, i.e., the concept of existence, is applied univocally whether one is
talking about God, a man, or a unicorn. In contrast, the realm of the reality of existences
is differential and dynamic. The reality of existence that admits degrees of power and
perfection is applied equivocally and not univocally to the existences. In this equivocal
picture of the reality of existence there are those existences which are more powerful and
perfect and those who are less. An accident, for example, is less perfect than its substance
on the real level of existence. The most powerful and perfect existence is the Absolute
existence. The other existences are but His manifestations, attributes, names, and
modifications. These existences are related to the Absolute by the mediation of the
Extended existence, as we have seen.

Sadra and Kant on the Knowledge of the Thing-in-itself
Sadra is proud that he is the first philosopher to become aware of the difference
between the concept of existence, on one hand, and the reality of existence, on the other
hand. 86 To make modern sense of this claim, let us compare it with the Kantian duality of
phenomenon and noumenon.
The Kantian phenomenon and the Sadrian concept of existence are both located in
the mind. On the other hand, the Kantian noumenon is similar to the Sadrian reality of
existence in that both are outside the mind. For Kant, appearances, or phenomena, are
transcendentally ideal objects because they exist only in the mind according to epistemic
conditions, and for this reason they are knowable. Things-in-themselves, on the other
hand, are transcendentally real objects existing outside us because they are not subject to
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the epistemic conditions, and for this reason they are unknowable.87 Sadra also argues
intensively throughout his writings that the reality of existence cannot be captured by any
understanding or rational reasoning. 88 He also would have agreed with Kant that this
inner reality of existence can be knowable only through a very peculiar kind of intuition.
But while Kant argues that ―such an intuition, namely intellectual intuition, lies
absolutely outside our faculty of cognition,‖ 89 Sadra believes that such an intuition is
possible.90
The difference between Kant and Sadra in terms of the unknowability of the real
is related to their different understandings of ―existence‖. Kant, in his critique of the
ontological proof of God, asserts that existence is not ―a real predicate, i.e., a concept of
something that could add to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing or
of certain determinations in themselves.‖91 Sadra in his philosophical career faced this
issue of the predictability of existence, which the Islamic prominent essentialist AlSuhrawardi had raised as an argument for the principality of essence over existence. To
make sense of this point in relation to my discussion it is sufficient to quote Rahman‘s
description of this argument:
Al-Suhrawardi further argued that if existence were a constituent of external
reality, then existence will have to exist and this second existence will, in turn,
have to exist, and so on ad infinitum…. He then enunciated a general principle
87
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that every general concept (like existence, unity, necessity, contingency, etc.)
whose nature is such that, if a corresponding factor or form is assumed to exist in
external reality, this will lead to an infinite regress, must exist only in the mind
and not in external reality. What these arguments really prove is that existence is
not an extra factor or attribute in external reality but merely denotes a status of
being more or less in Kantian terms.92
Against this Kantian status of being which operates by an abstract notion of existence
which eventually leads him to consider it as an empty concept, Sadra defends the realistic
side of existence which lies in its realized concreteness. Taken as a concept, Sadra would
agree with Kant, as he agrees with Al-Suhrawardi, that existence is just an analytic
concept that does not add any new conceptual knowledge to what is already known. But
this view is only a one-sided view of existence. In contrast to this Kantian abstracted
notion of existence which results in viewing existence as an object without any content
whatsoever, Sadra looks to existence as the full content of every reality. Viewed from this
perspective, existence is completely synthetic, for it is the determination of the thing in
itself by which it gains its uniqueness. Existence –as a reality, and not just as a concept—
accordingly, does not only signify the ―positing‖ of a thing, as Kant insists, but also
constitutes its unique determination. Existence as a reality becomes the sole differentia by
which things are distinguished and individuated, as it will become clear when I discuss
individuation as a mode of existence. As a result, the present concreteness of existence is
the rich reality of Truth.
So, while the real cannot be captured by reason, it can be captured by an unusual
kind of cognition. The technical terms Sadra gives to this kind of cognition are:
―presence‖ (hudur), ―inner witnessing‖ (shuhud), ―tasting‖ (dhawq), or ―illumination‖
(ishraq). As Izutsu puts it, this mode of cognition
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in the view of Mulla Sadra, consists precisely in knowing ‗existence‘ through the
―unification of the knower and the known‖ , i.e., knowing ―existence‖ not from
the outside as an ―object‖ of knowledge, but from the inside, by man‘s becoming
or rather being ―existence‖ itself, that is, by man‘s self-realization.93
In order to grasp the reality of existence, we need another kind of cognition that could
overcome not only the epistemological but also the ontological gap between the subject
and the object, a cognition that is peculiar to the reality of existence itself. Sadra writes,
―The knowledge of the reality of existence cannot be except through the illuminative
presence and an intuition of the [immediate] determined [reality].‖ 94 Here Sadra argues
in favor of a special kind of intuitional immediacy in which the knower/subject,
known/object, and the knowledge are existentially unified.95
In order to grasp this kind of unification between the knower and the known, the
object of knowledge must be considered in another appropriate mode. Here comes what I
consider the turning point in the relationship between ontology and epistemology in
Sadra‘s metaphysics. The highest object of knowledge that can reveal the truth of reality
is no longer essences or abstract universals— as it is the case with the traditional views of
Plato and Aristotle. If, as Sadra says, ―the reality of anything is its existence, which ranks
with its effects and implications,‖96 then, the true object of knowledge is nothing else but
existence in its own realization as an existent in itself. Sadra affirms that ―existence is [in
itself] existent.‖97 It is important to note here that, for Sadra, ―existence in itself‖ as ―an
existent‖ is different from other existents,
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for its [ontic status] as the possessor of reality is not in need of any other reality. It
is determined due to its inner-reality. Other entities—namely essences—are
determined due to it and not due their own inner-natures.98
Thus, the absolute identity between the subject and the object can be perfectly
performed only if the object of knowledge is ―existence‖ and not ―essence‖. This point
forms a break with the metaphysical tendency of the traditional views of Plato and
Aristotle, which consider essence as the real object of knowledge. It also marks a
significant difference with Hegel‘s Absolute Knowing, as I will argue in the later
chapters.
Rather than identifying the true knowledge with the concept of essence or with
the concept of existence, Sadra thus identifies it with the reality of existence. For him, as
far as the reality of existence negates ―nothingness‖, knowledge negates ―ignorance‖.
This process goes side by side. The more we epistemologically negate ―ignorance‖ the
more we ontologically negate ―nothingness‖ and, hence, the more we intensify our mode
of existence.
Let us view the problem within the limit of the traditional views of Plato and
Aristotle, which introduce the logical realm of essences as static and unchangeable.
Against such views which take the static feature of essences as a criterion of Truth, Sadra
argues that it is exactly this feature that makes essences equivalent to ―nothingness‖, and
it is exactly this claimed feature that constitutes the factor of contradiction internal to the
logic of essence. Concrete existence, on the other hand, is dynamic life. It is this evervital dynamicity of existence that negates ―nothingness‖ and makes contradiction
impossible in the extra-mental reality and thus gives to existence its consistency.
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The Philosophical Appropriation of the Theological Conception of Creation 99
The theological conception of ―creation‖ requires that the world must exist out of
―nothing‖. Sadra‘s theological sense of the reality of ―existence‖ reflects the conceptual
emergence of ―essences‖ from ―nothingness‖ to their ontological status as ―mental
Being‖ in the human mind. Earlier in this chapter, we saw that, for Sadra, the cognizing
soul creates from within itself all kinds of knowledge. The sensible, imaginable, and
intellectual forms of existence are related to the knowing subject as its acts. For Sadra,
the creative relationship between the cognizing soul and its own cognitive forms
resembles the creative relationship between God and the contingent world. For the
contingent world is related to God as His acts. In this regard, Rahman writes,
For just as God is Pure and Simple Existence, the Absolute Existence, the
Absolute Mind and all other existents are related to Him, thanks to the ―unfolding
existence [extended existence/ wujud munbasit)‖ at different levels—which
constitute a systematically ambiguous world of existence of identity-indifferences, at the same time generating a semi-real realm of essences—so the
soul gives rise, thanks to the unfolding knowledge (which is a perfect analogue of
the ―unfolding existence‖ of God) to different levels of knowables—of
perception, imagination, estimation, and intellection—as systematically
ambiguous knowables which are, in a sense, different and in a sense identical. 100
The metaphysic of creation is reconciled with a philosophical theory of reality by
the mediation of the substantial motion of the unfolding existence or the Extended
existence. It is by virtue of this dynamic changeability of existence that essences emerge
in the mind as subjectivity; otherwise, they will stay forever in their ―nothingness‖:
They [i.e., essences], so long as they remain un-illuminated by the light of
existence, are not something to which the mind can point by saying whether they
exist or not….They eternally remain in their native concealment and their original
99
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state of non-existence. They (essences) cannot be said to be or not to be—neither
do they create, nor are they objects of creation [the objects of creation being the
contingent existences, not essences]…. [Contingent] existences, on the other
hand, are pure relations [to absolute existence]; the mind cannot point to them
either when they are considered out of relation with their sustaining Creator, since
these have no existence independently [of God]. However, in themselves [unlike
essences], these [contingent] existences are concrete realities, uninfected by the
indeterminacy [of essences], pure existences without [the admixture] of essences
and simple lights without any darkness. 101
Sadra here refers to the un-creativity of essences in the realm of the reality of existence,
not in the mental realm of existence/ mental Being. The un-creativity of essences in the
existential real level makes them no longer entities that exist in their own transcendental
realm, nor are they real distinct entities immanent in things. Essences are created only by
the cognizant soul, and they merely have the ontological status of mental Being. What are
there to be found in the reality of existence are ―concrete realties,‖ as Sadra says above.
But we should refer here to a kind of inconsistency in Sadra‘s view of essences,
contingent existents, and Absolute existence. For although the contingent existences are
different from essences in that they are concrete realities, they do not enjoy their own
reality out of their relation to the Absolute existence. They are pure relations to God, as
Sadra says. Creation—whether on the conceptual level of mental Being, or on the
concrete level of the reality of existence—is viewed within the substantial motion of the
Extended existence. 102But the Extended existence, as we have seen, emerges from the
Absolute existence as its first manifestation and simultaneously includes the Relative
existence within it. That is, multiplicity and unity are reflected in the absolute substantial
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motion of the Extended existence, which produces the multiplicity in its pure illuminative
relation to the Absolute. Hence all the various manifestations of existence are pure
relations to the Absolute Existence, with no self-subsistence of their own. 103

Individuation as A Mode of Existence
The Islamic traditional view of the Platonic dualism of (real essences/apparent
existences) is substituted by the Sadrian dualism of (conceptual essences /concrete
existences). What is considered really real in the traditional Platonic sense becomes in
Sadra‘s account of reality merely mental Being deprived of any concrete effects, while
what is considered mere appearance in the traditional Platonic sense becomes determinate
manifestations of the reality of existence in Sadra‘s metaphysics.
As for the Aristotelian duality of matter/form, Sadra reinterprets it in light of the
Aristotelian duality of genus/differentia. An overturning of the latter duality involves an
overturning of the former duality. The priority of differentia over genus, in terms of the
determination of reality, would reflect the priority of existence over essence. Sadra‘s
centrality on the primacy of the reality of existence does not accept genus or the common
nature of existents to be the main determination of individuality. He writes,
A particular individual must have something more than the common nature of
which it partakes and this additional factor must be a factor peculiar by its innerreality, which is inconceivable as the result of the mere multiplicity of notions. 104
The decisive point here consists in Sadra‘s equation of differentia with existence. He
asserts that ―individuation is identical with existence.‖105 In another place he says, “The
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existence of everything is equal to its individuation and its individuation is equal to its
existence. And that which gives it existence gives it its individuation, too.‖106 Hence,
there is no other meaning for existence except these conditions of which a particular
individual becomes existentially distinguished and unique. Existence, taken as a realized
reality and not as a concept, is the principal of differentia because, as Sadra says, ―all
other entities are individuated due to it, each realized entity is realized due to it, and each
determinate and specified entity is determined due to it.‖107 The overturning of the
ontological principality of essence, therefore, releases differentia from being limited only
within what Aristotle considers as a secondary substance.
For Sadra, the relationship between genus and differentia in Aristotle is related to
the relationship between form and matter. Both of these relationships, Sadra thinks, find
their origin in the Aristotelian categorical scheme of Being/Substance. 108 Sadra‘s main
goal is to liberate differentia from the universal subsuming of genera in the Aristotelian
categorical scheme of Being/Substance. Rethinking substance, for Sadra, means
rethinking the whole Aristotelian theory of Being. He notices that, although Aristotle
introduces his account of reality, in contrast to Plato, as a philosophy of individual
substances, Aristotle still operates within a philosophy of species, since what is mostly
real in substance is nothing else but its universal form which, at the end, is a kind of
essence. Sadra says,
The substance, quality and the other categories are kinds of essence, and there are
universal meanings which are called genus, species, being essential and being
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accidental. But, in contrast, the realities which exist are concrete determined
inner-natures and specific inner-realities, which cannot be included in the classes
under a universal, be it that of inner-reality or accident. Substance, for example, is
a universal essence, whose truth in the external concrete realm is not to be in a
subject. Quality is a universal; its ontic status of reality is a universal reality,
whose truth in the external realm of concrete existence is not to be receptive either
of division or of relation. Similarly it is the case for the other categories. 109
I take this passage as a clear break with the Aristotelian categorical scheme of reality
within which Being/substance is limited. 110 Here we see how the collapse of substance as
a universal essence results in the collapse of the other categories. By asserting that
Aristotle‘s substance is a kind of a universal essence, just like the other accidental
categories, Sadra exposes Aristotle‘s metaphysical essentialism of Truth. The ―concrete
determined inner-nature‖ of the present existence refuses to be subsumed under any kind
of universality.
Sadra‘s displacement of essence from the differential dynamic realm of the reality
of existence to the identical static realm of the mental Being prevents essence from being
the main principle of Truth. That is, essence in its static ontological state of mental Being
cannot grasp the inner dynamic nature of the differential realm of existence. The
intensive differential element of the reality of existence, which is not reducible to any
type of universality but demands its own uniqueness at the equivocal level of the realized
existence, and not at the univocal level of the mental Being, is Sadra‘s account of
individuation. The abstract universal of mental Being that results in essences, therefore,
cannot capture this unique existential mode of an individual. Essence as a universal can
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side only with this static univocity of mental Being, and, for this reason, it cannot grasp
the dynamic nature of existence.
Sadra‘s metaphysical vision of one simple reality of existence refuses the Islamic
Platonic duality of Being/Becoming as well as the Islamic Aristotelian duality of
substance/accident. In contrast to two distinct realms, Sadra‘s metaphysics introduces
only the simple Truth of the concrete perpetual unfolding of existences—in which any
change that happens in accident is necessitated by a previous change in substance itself.
Accordingly, essences of any kind—whether they are Platonic Ideas, or Aristotelian
forms, are not sufficient to be the real correspondence of reality. Against the Platonic
traditional views of truthful unchangeable essences, and against the Aristotelian
traditional views of truthful unmoved substantial forms, Sadra introduces the truthful
ever-unfolding of concrete existences. And, as Sadra says,
The truth of existence is the actuality and the realization of existence itself not in
an abstract sense, as all previous philosophers thought, but in the sense that
existence is itself the truth of realization. And for those who do not attach for
existence any truth other than this abstract concept, it is difficult for them to
consider existence as pure good.111
***
Having elaborated Sadra‘s metaphysis of existence and essence, we must now
point to the main problem with it. This problem is related to the tension between monism
and pluralism in his metaphysics. Let us view the problem in this question: does Sadra‘s
view of one simple reality with its two univocal and equivocal dimensions break with the
one-sided view of monism and the one-sided view of pluralism?
Against the view of reality as monism, in which distinct substances lose their
own realties in one univocal substance, and against pluralism in which distinct substances
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are considered only in their plurality, Sadra wants his metaphysics to be like a synthesis
of the abstract static univocity of the concept of existence, on the one hand, and the
dynamic concrete equivocity of the reality of existence, on the other hand. Sadra warns
his readers,
Be not like those who are committed the effeminacy of pure immanence or the
enunchism of mechanically combining both, like a Janus-faced object, but be in
your belief like the inhabitants of the sanctuaries of the Divine Realm, the lofty
ones, those who believe that existence by its very nature is both unitary and
diverse, and both in a real sense. 112
But Sadra‘s synthesis of unity and diversity is not free from inconsistency. On the one
hand, Sadra considers the reality of existence as the mode of individuation for every
existent in the Relative realm of existence. This consideration implies that individuals
have their own realities that make them distinguished as concrete existences. On the other
hand, Sadra insists that all Relative existents are appearances, manifestations, and mere
relations to the Absolute existence. This line of thought deprives the individual existents
from their own realities and makes them just shadows of the Absolute. Sadra‘s attempt to
synthesize these two different realms by means of the Extended existence is still
problematic. This principle of synthesis itself results in contradiction that Sadra does not
resolve. For although Sadra‘s mediation of the Extended existence might save the unity
of the Absolute from being self-contradictory, it does not save the contradiction within
the Extended existence itself, which, as a unity, is made to produce multiplicity.
Sadra shifts the principle of self-development, whereby the Relative existents are
comprehended by the knowing subject who is relative as well, from the Absolute
existence to the Extended existence. He thought that by doing so the Absolute would be
saved in its absolute eternity. The substantial motion of existence neither happens in the
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Absolute nor in the intellective forms of things which exist in the divine mind. But if
these intellective forms of the relative existents stay in their ontological absoluteness in
the divine mind and the relative existents are appearances of them, then we return to kind
of Platonism.
It is true that Sadra distinguishes between these intellective forms and essences.
Under the impact of the reality of existence, essences, as we have seen, exist in the
knowing subject as his self-creation. The intellective forms, on the other hand, exist in
the divine mind as his own-creation. The analogy between the Human mind‘s selfcreation of essences and the Divine mind‘s self-creation of intellective forms is striking.
For if the intellective forms that exist in the Divine mind are the true correspondence of
the reality of existence, and the essences which exist in the Human mind are just false
approximations for them, then the process of the unfolding of the knowing subject is
itself false.

From Sadra to Hegel: Short Transition
For Sadra, if the Absolute existence is the realm of Necessity, and the Relative
existence is the realm of Contingency, the Extended existence is posited as the mediated
realm of both Contingency and Necessity. The Absolute existence/God is the true Who is
the beginning/origination and the end/return of the substantial movement of existence,
yet the Absolute does not change. For Hegel, the true, "is the process of its own
becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its
beginning.‖113 For Sadra, the Extended existence, with its infinite ontological
determinations which constitute the Relative existence, has the Absolute as its end and
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also as its beginning. The Extended existence already presupposes its end as its goal. The
movement of existence is forward and it never moves backward. For Sadra,
Every prior form of existence behaves like genus or matter and is swallowed up
into the concreteness of the posterior from which behaves like differentia or form.
This movement from the less perfect to the more perfect is, further, unidirectional and irreversible, for existence never moves backwards.114
But Sadra does not recognize, as Hegel does, that the unfolding truth of reality,
though it is forward and never backward, is at once circular. The circularity of truth
demands the dialectic as the driving principle of movement. Nonetheless, Sadra‘s
philosophy, based on the inner substantial movement of existence as the subject matter of
knowledge, is in principle dialectical. However, even if dialectic is implied in his
philosophy, Sadra might not conscious enough of it.
Hegel could argue—as he does with Plato and Aristotle— that the reason for
Sadra‘s deficiency in grasping the Notion as dialectical circularity consists in the form by
which he represented his philosophy, which is still pictorial and not rational and
systematic enough. This claim will undergo further examination after I show how Hegel
discovers, in Plato and Aristotle, the implied dialectical relationship of subject/object, on
the one hand, and Being/essence/existence, on the other hand.
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Chapter Two
Hegel on Metaphysical Essentialism: The Unlocking of Essence
Philosophy is not somnambulism, but is developed consciousness, and what these heroes
have done is to bring that which is implicitly rational out of the depths of Mind, where it
is found at first as substance only, or as inwardly existent, into the light of day, and to
advance it into consciousness and knowledge. This forms a continuous awakening—
Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy.
Would anyone, who wished for fruit, reject cherries, pears, and grapes, on the ground
that they were cherries, pears, or grapes, and not fruit?—Hegel, Logic
Encyclopaedia,§13

Introduction
Hegel‘s Introduction to his Lectures on the History of Philosophy is not simply an
opening to the philosophies with which Hegel deals. In its deep dialectical sense, this
introduction reflects the main principles of Hegel‘s view of Truth. These principles, as
Hegel writes, ―are the two principles of Development and of the Concrete.‖115 Their
significance for his view of Truth is prominent when we see how they speculatively
rather than abstractly serve as a guide by which Hegel distinguishes, preserves, and
sublates, what is essential from what is unessential in every philosophy he deals with.
From the speculative perspective of the movement of thought, these principles are not
static presuppositions of Truth. Rather, they are the product of the developmental
activity of thinking:
The product of thinking is the thought; thought is, however, still formal;
somewhat more defined it becomes Notion, and finally Idea is Thought in its
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totality, implicitly and explicitly determined. Thus the Idea, and it alone is
Truth.116
If the Idea alone is Truth, then, ―the aim of Philosophy,‖‘ Hegel adds,
is to know this one Truth as the immediate source from which all else proceeds,
both all the laws of nature and all the manifestations of life and consciousness of
which they are mere reflections, or to lead these laws and manifestations in ways
apparently contrary, back to that single source, and from that source to
comprehend them, which is to understand their derivation. 117
For Hegel, recognizing these elements of Truth in the succession of ―noble minds,
a gallery of heroes of thought‖118 is a reactivation of their inherent activity. By doing so,
he delves deeper into what is most fundamental in those ―noble minds‖. His reading of
Plato and Aristotle pushes in this direction of filtering their philosophical views from the
abstractions and empty generalities that are imposed upon them in the course of the
history of philosophy. Hegel‘s aim is to reinstate Plato and Aristotle correctly within the
context of the concrete development of Truth.
Within the horizon of the dialectical relationship between subjectivity and
objectivity, on the one hand, and the dialectical relationship between thought and reality,
on the other hand, Hegel‘s interpretation of Plato and Aristotle exhibits two interrelated
ways. The first way exposes the deficiency of some modern philosophies, especially the
philosophies of intuition, and the philosophies of understanding (Verstand). The second
way supports some philosophical themes evolving around Hegel‘s appreciation of
speculation and reason (Vernunft). My task in this chapter is to follow these two ways in
116
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order to grasp their inner dialectical joints. This exposes the mutual relationship between
subjectivity /objectivity, on the one hand, and essence/ existence, on the other hand, in
Hegel‘s thought.

Hegel’s Method of Reading Plato
In his presentation of Plato‘s philosophy, Hegel writes,
This philosophy has been differently understood in different periods of time; and
more than all, because it has been much and roughly handled in modern times by
those who have either read into it their own crude notions, being unable to
conceive the spiritual spiritually, or has regarded as the essential and most
significant element in Plato‘s philosophy that which in reality does not belong to
Philosophy at all, but only to mode of presentation.119
It is clear from this passage how Hegel‘s critique of Plato‘s philosophy is not directed
merely against Plato himself. Hegel finds reasonable justifications for some deficiencies
in Plato‘s philosophy related basically to the concrete development of Truth. As Hegel
says, ―the philosophical culture of Plato, like the general culture of his time, was not yet
ripe for really scientific work.‖120 However, Hegel discovers in Plato rich philosophical
content that could be redirected as a critique against those philosophies which satisfy
themselves only with what is explicit and unessential and could not look deeper into what
is implicit and essential in Plato‘s philosophy.
Hegel‘s reading of Plato, then, does not concern itself with what is stated by Plato
explicitly, but with what is included implicitly. 121 Hegel dialectally regulates this tension
between what is implicit and what is explicit in Plato‘s philosophy in a way similar to his
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regulation of the two different states of being-in-itself and being-for-itself. 122 This
strategy of reading could be viewed as a confirmation of the Hegelian statement which
states that ―all knowledge, and learning, science, and even commerce have no other
object than to draw out what is inward or implicit and thus to become objective.‖123 Two
interrelated results follow from this Hegelian strategy of drawing out what is inward in
Plato‘s philosophy. Firstly, it liberates many central Platonic themes—related to God,124
soul, 125 the theory of recollection, and, most importantly to my discussion, the central
Platonic theory of Ideas—from their traditional metaphysical dogmatism. Secondly, it
gives to these same themes a Hegelian phenomenological dimension.
By making what is implicit in Plato‘s philosophy explicit, Hegel achieves what
Plato himself could not achieve, and reads into him what modern philosophers could not
read. This gives the justification of Hegel‘s statement when he demands that ―we must
stand above Plato.‖126 This standing above Plato, however, cannot be done until we
―acquaint ourselves with the needs of thoughtful minds in our own time.‖ 127This means
nothing other than reading Plato through the lens of speculative logic rather than the lens
of formal logic.128 While the former enables us to discover what is more united and more
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concrete, the latter merely displays what is separated, finite, and unreal in Plato‘s
philosophy.
One of the main achievements of this strategy is to rediscover in Plato‘s
philosophy not only the apparent negative moment in which Plato‘s dialogues result, but
also the negation of this negative moment. This strategy of reading, therefore, breaks with
the strategy of ―formal philosophy,‖ which, as Hegel says,
cannot look at dialectic in any other way than as being the art of confusing
ordinary conceptions or even Notions, and demonstrating their nullity, thus
making their result to be merely negative. 129
So, if the philosophies of formal logic stop at the negative results of Plato, Hegel‘s
speculative insight goes a further step to explore the hidden affirmative moment in
Plato‘s speculative thinking. Accordingly, and as Hegel says, ―it would be perfectly
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justifiable to return to Plato in order to learn anew from him the Idea of speculative
Philosophy.‖130 This returning and learning from the speculative Plato pushes towards
supporting Hegel‘s attitude concerning the doctrine of Essence provided in his Logic, as
we will see.
Hegel‘s division of Plato‘s works mirrors Hegel‘s own division of his
Encyclopaedia system. Here Hegel‘s first division of Plato‘s works , Dialectic, echoes
Hegel‘s own first division of Encyclopaedia, Logic, especially when we look at the way
in which Hegel pushes it in this direction. The other two divisions of Plato‘s works
correspond to the other two divisions of Hegel‘s Encyclopaedia. These divisions,
according to Hegel, are Plato‘s Philosophy of Nature,131 and Plato‘s Philosophy of
Mind,132 to each of which Hegel devotes a separate and long treatment.133
Rather than direct my focus onto the many aspects of Plato‘s philosophy upon
which Hegel applied his speculative reading, I will center my analysis on one main issue
related to my topic. This issue is concerned with how Hegel interprets the relationship
between subjectivity and objectivity in the logic of Plato‘s Dialectic.134 I will try to
investigate whether Hegel‘s Plato is a subjectivist, an objectivist, or, on the other hand,
advocates the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, and how, accordingly, the relationship
between essence and existence could be interpreted.
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The Three Dialectical Moments in Hegel’s Platonic Dialectic
According to his view that the true speculative logic must deal only with the
necessary movement of pure Notions and should result in an affirmative moment, 135
Hegel selects from Plato‘s dialogues only three that could confirm to Hegel‘s speculative
demand. These dialogues are Parmenides, the Sophist, and the Philebus.136 In these
speculative dialogues, Plato, as Hegel says,
lays great stress on the dialectical point of view, which is not the point of view of
the merely external, but is a living point of view whose content is formed of pure
thoughts only, whose movement consists in their making only their unity in what
is truly justified. 137
Generally speaking, the Hegelian interpretation of these Platonic speculative
dialogues, on the one hand, and the Hegelian logical Notion, on the other, dialectically
conclude with the same positive affirmation of the absolute unity of subjectivity
/objectivity, on the one hand, and thought /reality, on the other. In his introduction to the
general notion of Logic in his Science of Logic, Hegel is aware of this affinity between
his logic and that of Plato. In the context of stressing the Notion of pure logic, Hegel
writes,
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To get some idea of this [pure movement of thought] one must discard the
prejudice that truth must be something tangible. Such tangibility is, for example,
imported even into the Platonic Ideas which are in God's thinking, as if they are,
as it were, existing things but in another world or region; while the world of
actuality exists outside that region and has a substantial existence distinct from
those Ideas and only through this distinction is a substantial reality. The Platonic
Idea is the universal, or more definitely the Notion of an object; only in its Notion
does something possess actuality and to the extent that it is distinct from its
Notion it ceases to be actual and is a non−entity; the side of tangibility and
sensuous self−externality belongs to this null aspect.138
Contrary to Plato‘s speculative dialogues, the other Platonic dialogues, which
Hegel excluded from his speculative selection, contain, in general, the one-sided
unessential moments of subjectivity and objectivity which could be found in the dialectic
of consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit.139 The resemblance here, however, is
not to be taken in its perfect form but only in its general spiritual sense related to the
moment of negation at which the dialectic in both cases arrives. Hegel explains these two
sides of subjectivity and objectivity in Plato‘s dialectic:
These first two sides of the dialectic, directed as they are towards the dissolution
of the particular and thus to the production of the universal, are not yet dialectic in
its true form: it is a dialectic which Plato has in common with the Sophists, who
understood very well how to disintegrate the particular. 140
The final conclusion of the one-sided dimension of the un-speculative Platonic dialogues
is similar to the final conclusion of the one-sided dimension of consciousness in
Phenomenology in that both are not sufficient to grasp the True.141
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Thus the aim of many of Plato‘s Dialogues, which conclude without any positive
affirmation is to show that the immediately existent, the many things that appear
to us, although we may have quite true conceptions of them, are still not in
themselves, in an objective sense, the true, because they alter and are determined
through their relation to something else and not through themselves; thus we must
even in the sensuous individuals consider the universal, or what Plato has called
the Idea.142
This reminds us, as Gadamer shows, of the moment of the one-sided principle of sensecertainty in Hegel‘s Phenomenology of Spirit.143
Contrary to the philosophers who concern themselves only with the Platonic
dialogues that conclude without any positive affirmation—whether reflected in the
subjective side or the objective side of the Platonic dialectic—Hegel grasps Plato‘s
philosophical depth in the unity of these two sides of the dialectic. This unitary principle
is inherent in the three mentioned speculative dialogues. For Hegel, it is precisely this
unitary side of the dialectic which represents the truly speculative Plato. This does not
mean that the one-sided principles of subjectivity and objectivity are not necessary.
Rather, they are constitutive in the process of the whole. The point that concerns Hegel
most is that the dialectic does not stop only at one side of subjectivity or objectivity but
progresses in its dialectical movement carrying what is essential in these previous
principles into their sublation moment.
Hegel‘s progress from Plato‘s un-speculative dialogues to Plato‘s speculative
dialogues reflects the progress from the stage of understanding to the stage of reason,
from the stage of differences to the stage of the speculative unity of differences, from the
being-for-self, for it would then be confronted by non-essence; but, if it were related to this, it would itself
be unessential.‖ Hegel, Phenomenology of Sprit, p 79.
142
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143
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stage of abstractness to the stage of concreteness. The three speculative dialogues, with
which Hegel‘s reading is mostly concerned, are the most difficult for the formal
philosophies of understanding, ―just because they deal with pure thought.‖144 In Plato‘s
speculative dialogues, thought reaches the moment of reason‘s self-dialectical
movement— not in its relation to the external things, which is the case of understanding,
but in its relation to the pure notions of thought.
Thus, Hegel invites us to explore the depth of the Platonic philosophy within the
concrete sense of the Idea, rather than the abstract sense of the Idea. The former unites
the different determinations of Truth in a higher identity whereas the latter deals only
with determinations in their separation and externality. This invitation is in fact an
invitation to Hegel‘s own view of Truth. In his Introduction to his Lectures, he states it
clearly:
It is a common prejudice that the science of Philosophy deals only with
abstractions and empty generalities…. In itself the Idea is really concrete, for it is
the union of the different determinations. It is here that reasoned knowledge
differs from mere knowledge of the understanding, and it is the business of
Philosophy, as opposed to understanding to show that the Truth or the Idea does
not consist in empty generalities, but in a universal; and that is within itself the
particular and the determined. 145
The speculative universal, therefore, differs from the abstract universal in that it does not
exclude the particular but includes it. Accordingly, if the Platonic Absolute world of
essences is the truth of the particular determinate existents, the Absolute must be viewed
as a concrete universality rather than abstract universality; that is to say, a universality
which includes existence in an immanent way rather than excludes it in a transcendent
way.
144
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The Absolute of Plato, as being the one in itself and identical with itself, is at the
same time concrete in itself, in that it is a movement returning into itself, and is
eternally at home with itself. 146
This ―movement returning into itself‖ makes the ―difference‖ within Plato‘s
Absolute an immanent difference rather than transcendent difference. That is to say, the
moment of ―opposition‖ within Plato‘s Absolute is an internal moment of opposition, and
not an external moment of opposition. The former moment is speculative and exists for
an internal reflection/reason while the latter is empirical and exists for an external
reflection/understanding. Hegel thus presents Plato within the speculative horizon of the
internal reflection of thought in which the Absolute opposes itself and distinguishes itself
from itself. That is to say, the Absolute determines itself by negating itself; its
determination is its own negation. Viewed from this perspective, the Absolute, which
Hegel now discovers in Plato, is a rediscovery of the Absolute that Hegel already
introduces in his Phenomenology by saying:
It is itself and its opposite in one unity. Only thus is it difference as internal
difference, or difference in its own self….The two differentiated terms both
subsist; they are in themselves as opposed, i.e., each is the opposite of itself; each
has its other within it and they are only one single unity. 147
Hegel‘s interpretation of Plato‘s dialectic leads, therefore, to the dialectical
construction of the opposite moments of subjectivity and objectivity. While he is aware
of the fluid nature of these moments in the Platonic dialectic, Hegel‘s aim is to
conceptually grasp their internal organic unity within the dialectical movement of
thought. In order to do so, Hegel does not consider the Platonic dialogues as merely an
external reproduction of the previous philosophies, but as a unity of what is most
fundamental in them.
146
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Plato‘s Dialogues are not to be considered as if their aim were to put forward a
verity of philosophies, nor as if Plato‘s were an eclectic philosophy derived from
them; it forms rather the knot in which these abstract and one-sided principles
have become truly united in a concrete fashion. 148
These abstract and one-sided principles are the one-sidedness of subjectivity inherited
from Parmenides, on the one hand, and the one-sidedness of objectivity inherited from
Heraclitus, on the other hand. For Hegel, the former resembles the logical moment of
Being, whereas the latter resembles the logical moment of Becoming. The Parmenidean
Being expresses the static essential side of Truth, while the Heraclitean Becoming
expresses the dynamic existential side of Truth. These are the two moments of Truth
which formal philosophies of understanding treat as two separated principles, as two
opposite moments that could not be united. In contrast, Hegel‘s dialectical interpretation
of Plato shows that, although these two principles are introduced by Plato expressly and
separately in many dialogues, which are the ones we have mentioned above, 149 there is
still another implicit principle in his dialectic in which these opposite principles are
indeed united:
Plato grasped the Absolute as the unity of Being and non-being—in Becoming, as
Heraclitus says—or of the one and the many. He further now took into the
objective dialectic of Heraclitus the Eleatic dialectic, which is the external
endeavour of the subject to show forth contradiction.150
Thus, Hegel‘s Platonic dialectic introduces not only two moments but three
moments; two of them are explicitly stated by Plato and the third is already implicit. The
two explicit moments are subjectivity and objectivity, and they reflect respectively the
moments of affirmation and negation. The third moment is the unity of these previous
148
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moments of subjectivity and objectivity. This latter synthetic moment reflects the
moment of the negation of the negation, the sublation of contradiction. Here we reach the
summit of the Hegelian interpretation of Plato by which Hegel does not only stand above
Plato151, but also above the modern philosophies of subjective idealism and objective
idealism, as well as the theological interpretation of Plato. For Hegel, this implied
moment of sublation in Plato‘s dialectic is exactly what the Platonic Universal means,
and it is exactly this moment which formal philosophy could not understand. He writes,
The universal is hence determined as that which resolves and has resolved the
contradictions in itself, and hence it is the concrete in itself; thus this sublation of
contradiction is the affirmative. Dialectic in this higher sense is the really
Platonic; as speculative it does not conclude with a negative result, for it
demonstrates the union of opposites which have annulled themselves. Here begins
what is difficult for the understanding to grasp.152
The important point that concerns my discussion is the notion of the immanency
of the universal in which the opposites are absorbed. Hegel does not see in Plato a
transcendent universal that exists beyond the existentiality of the apparent opposites of
existence. In contrast, Hegel sees in Plato the immanent universal that has within it its
own resolved contradictions. This leads me to a disagreement with Gadamer who argues
that Hegel‘s reading of Plato
relies far more upon the principles of the Cartesian method, on the learning of the
Catechism, and on the Bible. Thus Hegel‘s admiration for the Ancients is
intertwined in a curious way with his feeling that modern truth shaped by
Christianity and its renewal in the Reformation is superior.153
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In contrast to Gadamer‘s view, it is of this Cartesian principle of subjectivity guided by
the knowledge of understanding, as well as of this Christian dogma of a transcendent
world guided by intuitive knowledge,154 which Hegel finds the true speculative Plato to
be free, or at least, Hegel tries to free Plato from it. The difficulty that Hegel mentions in
the above passage refers to the insufficiency of the philosophies of understanding which
operate within the sphere of abstract essence, including that of Descartes. Within this
sphere of abstract essence, knowledge stops merely at the level of separation, at the level
of contradiction, at the level of duality. It cannot go a further step as to unite these
opposite determinations. That is to say, the abstract knowledge of understanding
produces formal universals which cannot move beyond the limitation of essence
governed by the abstract law of non-contradiction. It cannot solve the contradiction since
it will violate its abstract law of identity. The result is the production of abstract or empty
absolute—a God which is void from the richness of reality.
Hegel warns his readers of the deficiency of this one-sidedness of thought right
from the beginning of his introduction to his Lectures on the History of Philosophy:
Were the Idea abstract, it would simply be the highest conceivable existence, and
that would be all that could be said of it; but such a God is the product of the
understanding of modern times. What is true is rather found in motion, in a
process, however, in which there is rest; difference, while it lasts, is but a
temporary condition, through which comes unity, full and concrete. 155
The dismissing of the internal relations between objects and the focus on the externality
alone cannot reveal the inner truth of an object. Hegel‘s Platonic dialectic sublates this
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moment of externality by recognizing interiority as a constitutive principle in the reality
of the Idea.
The insufficiency of the one-sided principle of subjectivity is not found in Plato‘s
dialectic and this why Hegel asserts that
the idealism of Plato must not be thought of as being subjective idealism, and as
that false idealism which has made its appearance in modern times, and which
maintains that we do not learn anything, are not influenced from without, but that
all conceptions are derived from out of the subject. 156
This passage implies an attack on the innate ideas of the Cartesian subjectivity, of which
the idea of abstract God is substantial. And Hegel clearly refuses to attribute the notion of
the innate ideas to Plato‘s theory of recollection:
We must not think that the bald conception of innate ideas is hereby indicated—
such an expression implies the existence of ideas by nature, as though our
thoughts were in part already implanted, and had in part a natural existence which
did not first produce itself through the movement of the mind. 157
Subjectivity and objectivity in Hegel‘s Plato are just immanent moments of the
development of the universal, which needs more determination to become more concrete.
The speculative moment of Truth cannot be achieved until the previous moments of
subjectivity and objectivity, thought and reality, essence and existence, are sublated to a
higher moment in which the contradictions are dissolved.

The Hegelian Refreshment of the Platonic World of Essences
The subjective principle of Truth in Hegel‘s Plato is, therefore, neither that of
Parmenides nor that of the false subjective idealism. The Platonic subjectivity does not
reflect only the universal static side of essence. Nor does it dismiss the objective side of
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existence reflected in the sensible world. Nor is the Platonic objectivity that of Heraclitus
or the objective idealism, in which the dialectical role of subjectivity is absent. For Hegel,
Plato‘s highest form is the identity of Being and non-being. The true is that which
is, but this Being is not without negation. Plato‘s object is thus to show that nonbeing is an essential determination in Being, and that the simple, self-identical,
partakes of other-being.158
If Plato‘s object, as Hegel now says, is ―to show that non-being is an essential
determination in Being, and that the simple, self-identical, partakes of other-being,‖ then
Hyppolite seems mistaken when he asserts that
Platonic alterity allows for an immobile dialectic, a dialectic that still does not
have the self for its driving force. Hegelian dialectic, however, deepens alterity
into opposition and opposition into contradiction. 159
But Hegel, as we saw, highlights the moment of negation which already is implicit within
the conceptual realm of the rational Platonic Universal. It is this internal negation of the
Platonic Universal which constitutes the determination of the Absolute, and, by way of
mediation, it constitutes the determination of the particulars. By negating itself, the
Platonic Universal posits ―difference‖ as an essential element within itself, and, as thus,
―non-being‖ becomes ―an essential determination in Being‖. This makes the important
point that negation is both within the external existential world and within the internal
essential world, in both of which the Absolute is the mediation. By negating itself as a
transcendent essence, the Absolute posits itself as immanent existence. That is to say,
both essence and existence contain their own negation by means of the mediation of the
Absolute. The ontological contradiction of essence parallels the ontological contradiction
of existence; each of which contains and reflects the other. On the other hand, the
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epistemological contradiction of subjectivity parallels that of objectivity, each of which
contains and reflects the other— each of which negates and sublates the other.160
If this reading of the Hegelian interpretation of the dialectical movement of
essence/existence-subjectivity/objectivity truly reflects the really Platonic dialectic, then
the traditional metaphysical view of the central theory of the Platonic Ideas with its
implied static essentialism opens up a different dimension. The point here is to oppose
the dynamicity of the Platonic Universal with the static nature of the formal Universal of
the philosophies of understanding. Whereas the formal Universal is confined within
species and within the law of abstract identity, Hegel sees the dynamic unity of
differences, the dissolution of contradictions, and the true expression of what is
dialectically more determinate, in the Platonic speculative Universal. And while the
formal Universal is only concerned with one side of Truth—whether it is the subjective
or the objective, the essential or the existential—Hegel‘s Platonic Universal is the
moment in which not only the subjective essential moment of Truth, but also its objective
existential moment is absorbed and sublated. Hegel writes,
The Idea is nothing else than that which is known to us more familiarly by the
name of the Universal, regarded, however, not as the formal Universal, which is
only a property of things, but as implicitly and explicitly existent, as reality, as
that which alone is true.… Through the presentation of his Ideas, Plato opened up
the intellectual world, which, however, is not beyond reality, in another place, but
is the real world. 161
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To Hegel, therefore, the Platonic world of essences is not a transcendental static
world that is totally free from contradiction and totally isolated from the objective
existences of the phenomenal world. If essence is transcendent in a second world, then it
cannot be distinguished, and that kind of undistinguishable world, for Hegel, is dead.
Hegel thus breathes life into the traditional and false views of the Platonic static world of
essences by stressing the activity of the mutual, dialectical relationships of essence
/existence, reality/appearance, subject/ object:
The undistinguished is the lifeless; the active, living, concrete universal is hence
what inwardly distinguishes itself, but yet remains free in so doing. Now this
determinateness consists in the one being identical with itself in the other, in the
many, in what is distinguished. This constitutes the only truth, and the only
interest for knowledge in what is called Platonic philosophy, and if this is not
known, the main point of it is not known. 162
This passage makes the decisive point: Plato‘s world of essences inwardly distinguishes
itself. That is to say, essence includes its negation within itself as a part of its definition
or determination. Plato‘s essence thus reaches the state of essence in Hegel‘s Logic
Encyclopaedia, where essence, as Hegel writes, “is negativity relating itself to itself, and
hence by being self-repulsion from itself; thus it contains the determination of distinction
essentially.‖163
With Hegel, the ideal Platonic world of essences is thus no longer a world of
subjective essences that are totally beyond the objectivity of existence. Essence, as
speculative universal of reason rather than formal universal of understanding, gets its
own identity with itself in the particular objective world of existence, ―in the other, in the
many, in what is distinguished.‖ Hegel‘s Plato is, therefore, far away from being
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considered as essentialist in the Parmenidean sense or in the subjective idealism sense.
Nor can it be considered as existentialist in the Heraclitean sense or in the empirical
objective idealism sense. Accordingly, the relationship between essences and their
objective real existence is not merely a relation of separation and opposition, a relation of
priority and posterity—as the traditional views say. In other words, the relationship
between essence and existence is not a relation of transcendence, but a relation of
immanency. It is a dialectical relation of concreteness and development, determination
and sublation.
By not confining contradiction within the objective realm of existence but rather
making it equally constitute the main element in the subjective realm of essence, Hegel
radically departs not only from the old traditional interpretation of Plato but also from
any transcendental ontology.164 Having admitted qualitative differences within the
traditional view of the absoluteness of essence, Hegel discovers in Plato‘s speculative
philosophy an ontology that breaks with the transcendence, with the beyond, with the
thing-in-itself.
This union of what is different, of Being and non-being, of one and many &.,
which takes place without a mere transition from one to another, constitutes the
inmost reality and true greatness of Platonic philosophy. This determination is the
esoteric element in Platonic philosophy, and the other is the exoteric.165
If Truth in Hegel‘s Plato finds its highest dialectical sense in the unity of differences, in
the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, and in the unity of reality and appearance, it also
164
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finds its highest moment in the unity of essence and existence. ―Essence therefore,‖ as the
Logic Encyclopaedia concludes, ―is not behind or beyond appearance, but since it is the
essence that exists, existence is appearance.‖166
This result, again, disagrees with Hyppolite who says that, ―by admitting
negation, he (Plato) wanted to avoid falling into contrariety and contradiction. [….] In
contrast, Hegelian dialectic will push this alterity up to contradiction.‖

167

According to

my analysis, the contradiction is already implied in Hegel‘s Plato‘s world of essences. It
is this Hegelian detection of the contradiction within the Platonic world of essences
which allows Hegel‘s Plato to resolve the tension between the universal subjective world
of essence and the particular objective world of existence. Hegel, rather, pushes the
Platonic relationship of (essence/existence)-(reality/appearance) up to the relationship of
subjectivity and objectivity. In its highest dialectical moment, this latter relationship, like
any other relationship, is the ―union of what is different.‖
Having discovered in Plato‘s essences the implied inner dialectical nature of
reason‘s concepts, Hegel shows that this inner dialectical nature of reason constitutes
reason‘s own driving principle. It is through this inner activity of reason that reason
overcomes the contradictions of understanding and becomes able to capture the
dialectical inner nature of the objective external world of existences. As a result, nothing
can escape the all-comprehensive dynamicity of dialectical reason, not even the thing-initself.
This analysis of Hegel‘s reading of Plato disagrees with Julie Maybee‘s reading.
Whereas Maybee argues that Hegel uses Kant against Plato, or, as she says, ―Kant‘s view
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that reason itself is dialectical provides the key to responding to Plato‘s argument,‖168 my
reading shows that Hegel uses Plato against Kant, particularly against Kant‘s dogmatic
unknowable thing-in-itself. The moment of the esoteric sublation in Plato‘s dialectic,
which Hegel makes exoteric, explains how the unity between thought and reality is
possible. This point reflects the break with the Kantian dualism of appearance and the
thing-in-itself. For Hegel‘s Plato
grasped in all its truth Socrates‘ great principle that ultimate reality lies in
consciousness, since, according to him, the absolute is in thought, and all reality is
Thought. He does not understand by this a one-sided thought, nor what is
understood by false idealism which makes thought once more step aside and
contemplate itself as conscious thought, and as in opposition to reality; it is the
thought which embraces in an absolute unity reality as well as thinking, the
Notion and its reality in the movement of science, as the Idea of a scientific
whole. 169
Maybee‘s error, Hegel would argue, consists in her focusing on the exoteric
element of the Platonic philosophy rather than its esoteric element.170 She reads Plato
through the lens of reflective understanding rather than the lens of speculative reason.
This kind of reading mistakenly places Hegel‘s view of Plato within the same traditional
views of Plato, which consider the world of Ideas in its eternal fixity. She says,
Rationality itself, he [Plato] assumed, must be constant and unchanging, static and
fixed. For Hegel, Plato‘s assumption can be rejected by pairing the messy world
with a new conception of rationality that is not constant, static and unchanging,
but contains its own moving principle, contradiction and opposition, and so is
capable of overgrasping the messiness, the comings and goings, the imperfections
of world. 171
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Against such interpretations of Hegel‘s Plato, my reading shows that the view that
rationality contains negation and that thereby it is changeable is not a new concept that
Hegel imposed upon Plato‘s theory of Ideas, but rather a concept that he discovered in the
Platonic dialectic. If Hegel uses Kant, he uses him not in an argument against the
speculative Plato, but in one against the false traditional views of Plato. Both these false
views of Plato and the transcendental idealism view of Kant are sublated in a higher
moment of speculative Idealism that is peculiar to Hegel‘s system. 172
Moreover, I disagree with Sadler who writes that
Hegel, by understanding Plato as the discoverer (albeit still in quasi-mythological
garb) of ‗the concept‘, had made it possible, through the equation concept = eidos
= category, to understand Plato as a ‗Kantian‘ philosopher. 173
Such views confine Hegel‘s Plato within the strict limitation of subjectivity and within
the strict limitation of understanding. On the contrary, my view presents Hegel‘s Plato
within the free activity of the unlimited speculative reason, in which the mutual dynamic
relationships of subjectivity and objectivity, reality and appearance, essence and
existence are manifested. It is not surprising, therefore, that Hegel returns to Plato at the
end of his Science of Logic where Hegel gives his own account of The Absolute Idea.
Hegel, in contrasting his absolute method of the speculative reflection with the external
reflection of understanding, writes,
The procedure of the finite cognition of the understanding here is to take up again,
equally externally, what it has left out in its creation of the universal by a process
of abstraction. The absolute method, on the contrary, does not behave like
172
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external reflection but takes the determinate element from its own subject matter,
since it is itself that subject matter‘s immanent principle and soul. This is what
Plato demanded of cognition, that it should consider things in and for themselves,
that is, should consider them partly in their universality, but also that it should not
stray away from their catching at circumstances, examples and comparisons, but
should keep before it solely the things themselves and bring before consciousness
what is immanent in them. 174

The Hegelian Transition to Aristotle
According to Hegel, Plato‘s three speculative dialogues nonetheless still suffer
from a kind of deficiency: they do not ―show forth the necessary movement of pure
Notion,‖175 due to some external considerations from which Plato could not perfectly free
himself. Hegel‘s reinterpretation of Plato‘s speculative dialectic is an overcoming of this
deficiency. He argues that this deficiency could be found in any philosophy that treats the
movement of pure thought not within its internal pure notions alone, but also with
relation to external things. In accordance with his logic, Hegel demands that speculative
concepts must necessarily define themselves in relation to each other, rather than in
relation to external things. Based on this demand, Hegel dialectically purifies Plato‘s
dialectic by dropping out any external material consideration in the movement of thought.
By doing so, his dialectical interpretation pushes the Platonic dialectic towards the very
final ends of the Logical moment of the Notion in which essence and existence are
absorbed, on the one hand, and the Phenomenological moment of the Absolute Knowing
in which subjectivity and objectivity are dissolved, on the other.
In the preface of his Phenomenology, Hegel writes,
I can bear in mind that if at times the excellence of Plato's philosophy has been
held to lie in his scientifically valueless myths, there have also been times, even
called times of ecstatic dreaming, when Aristotle's philosophy was esteemed for
174
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its speculative depth, and Plato's Parmenides (surely the greatest artistic
achievement of the ancient dialectic) was regarded as the true disclosure and
positive expression of the divine life, and times when, despite the obscurity
generated by ecstasy, this misunderstood ecstasy was in fact supposed to be
nothing else than the pure Notion.176
Although the speculative moment of the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, essentiality
and existentiality, in which Truth gets its fuller determination, is implicitly present in
Plato‘s speculative dialectic, Plato himself was not conscious enough of it. Plato‘s
mythical presentation of thought, Hegel argues, is behind this failure.
But this failure is not only concerned with Plato but also with those philosophers
who misapprehend him. 177Against those philosophers who overlap the form and content
of Plato‘s philosophy, Hegel insists that we must keep ―the form in which Plato has
propounded his ideas…distinct from Philosophy proper.‖178 Hegel, therefore, excludes
myth from being an adequate form of truth on the basis that ―the merit of Philosophy
consists alone in the fact that truth is expressed in the form of the Notion.‖ 179 He writes,
The myth is always a mode of representation which, as belonging to an earlier
stage, introduces sensuous images, which are directed to imagination, not to
thought; in this, however, the activity of thought is suspended, it cannot yet
establish itself by its own power, and so is not yet free. …[W]hen the Notion
attains its full development, it has no more need of the myth.180
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This critique of myth is also a critique directed to sensation, feeling, perception,
and all forms of religious dogmas. 181 What stands above these presentations, which
parallel to some extent those stages in the Phenomenology through which consciousness
dialectically passes forward, is what Hegel seeks in Plato‘s speculative dialectic. He
warns his modern readers182 not to be captured by these forms of Truth even if
such a representation of Plato‘s philosophy can be supported by Plato‘s own
words; but one who knows what Philosophy is, cares little for such expressions,
and recognizes what was Plato‘s true meaning. 183
The Hegelian dialectical reading of Plato, thus far, leads us beyond what looks
more interesting but less true to what is less interesting but more true in Plato‘s dialogues.
And, as Hegel says, ―If we read with interest what is speculative, we are apt to overlook
what is most beautiful.‖184 In terms of the form of thought, the Hegelian task with
Aristotle seems easier than with Plato, since Aristotle‘s mode of presentation is free from
181
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myth. However, with regard to the content of thought, the task with Aristotle is different.
―Aristotle,‖ as Hegel confesses,
is much more difficult to comprehend than Plato. In the latter there are myths, and
we can pass over the dialectic and yet say that we have read Plato; but with
Aristotle we enter at once upon what is speculative.185

Hegel’s Strategy of Reading Aristotle
Hegel‘ strategy of reading Aristotle heads in the same direction as that of his
reading of Plato. It is less a critical reading of Aristotle than a critique directed, implicitly
or explicitly, at other philosophies—especially the modern idealism of his age. 186
Somewhat paradoxically, Hegel sees in Aristotle, as the founder of the law of identity,
the rich philosophic content that he can employ against the modern philosophies of
identity:
With Aristotle it is thus no dry identity of the abstract understanding that is
indicated, for he distinguishes subjective and objective precisely and decisively.
Not dead identity such as this, but energy, is for him what is most to be
reverenced, God.187
This passage reflects the interpretive conclusion Hegel gives to Aristotle‘s Absolute –
God— after a long discussion that mainly centers on the Aristotelian relationship of
(matter/form)-(potentiality/actuality).
What strikes me most about Hegel‘s reading of Aristotle is the difference between
Hegel‘s beginning and his ending. Hegel begins with the traditional ontological duality of
matter/form--/potentiality/actuality and ends with the modern epistemological dualities of
185
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subjectivity/objectivity. This Hegelian circular reduction makes the difference between
the beginning as ontology and the ending as epistemology seem problematic. This
reduction finds its ultimate point of view in Hegel‘s modern appropriation of the
Aristotelian Absolute:
We in our way of speaking designate the Absolute, the True, as the unity of
subjectivity and objectivity, which is therefore neither the one nor the other, and
yet just as much the one as the other; and Aristotle busied himself with these same
speculations, the deepest forms of speculations even of the present day, and he
has expressed them with the greatest definiteness.188
In light of Hegel‘s high estimation of the speculative Aristotle, I will, firstly,
follow the dialectical steps by which Hegel reaches this account of Aristotle. Secondly,
within the horizon of this Hegelian reducibility of matter/form-potentiality/actuality to
subjectivity/objectivity, I will try to offer an interpretive reading of the relationship
between essence and existence.
***
Hegel presents Aristotle as ―one of the richest and deepest of all the scientific
geniuses that have as yet appeared—a man whose like no later age has ever yet
produced.‖189 As with Plato‘s philosophy, Hegel considers Aristotle‘s philosophy a
victim of many misapprehensions throughout the course of the history of philosophy. For
Hegel, Aristotelian philosophy has been falsely dissolved into five different forms. These
false forms started with the Peripatetic and passed through the New-Platonic, the
188
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Scholastic, the Renaissance, and ended with the ―false modern ideas and conception,‖ 190
of Aristotelian philosophy. None of these forms grasped ―the deep and properly speaking
speculative side of Aristotelian philosophy.‖ 191 Their main fault consists in viewing
Aristotle as a realist who is opposed to Plato and whose philosophy is, as Hegel says,
―mere empiricism—Locke‘s philosophy at its worst.‖192 Hegel‘s task is to purify
Aristotle from these false forms and to discover in him what the others could not
discover. By doing so, Hegel thinks that he could reinstate Aristotle in his proper stage
within the concrete development of Truth.
Before I proceed into Hegel‘s interpretation of Aristotle, it is important to
mention a fact related to Hegel‘s survey of the different historical forms of Aristotelian
philosophy. The point I raise here is related more specifically to the schools of Peripatetic
philosophy. Hegel mentions only the Roman philosopher Cicero. Moreover, Hegel
generally characterizes Peripatetic philosophy as a ―form of a popular philosophy, in
which attention was principally directed to natural history and to morals.‖193 Hegel here
entirely excludes many Islamic Peripatetic philosophers such as Al-Kindi , Al-Farabi,
Avicenna, and Averroes. Interestingly, the traditional Aristotelian view of the Islamic
Peripatetic philosophers, especially Al-Farabi and Avicenna, is in agreement with
Hegel‘s view that there is no essential opposition between Plato and Aristotle. Al-Farabi,
for instance, devotes a well-known book, The Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the
Two Sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle,194 to the argument that the two philosophers
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Plato and Aristotle are in agreement on their main principles. ―So let it be clear to you,‖
writes Al-Farabi, ―that, in what they [Plato and Aristotle] presented, their purpose is the
same, and that they intended to offer one and the same philosophy.‖195
I raise this point because Sadra is considered as the inheritor and the complement
of the Islamic Peripatetic tradition, though in a different direction. This point, however,
will be examined more when I conceptually contrast Hegel with Sadra in the next
chapter.

From Substance to Subject
For Hegel, Aristotle does not confine his thought only within one determined
dimension of truth. Aristotle, rather, is open to different aspects of determinations in their
reference to the whole. Although his starting point is from the external empirical facts in
their particular determinations, from existence in its independent objectivity, Aristotle
keeps holding truth in its wholeness which includes all its determinations. Aristotle, as
Hegel maintains, ―does not omit determinations; he does not hold now to one
determination and then to another, but takes them as all in one.‖196
Here Hegel presents Aristotle as an observer and a thinker at the same time. That
is, Hegel‘s Aristotle is not only an observer, who loses himself in the objectivity of
existence, nor is he a thinker who only sinks in the abstract subjectivity of essence. If the
mere observer consumes himself in the existentiality of the objective world while the
thinker consumes himself in the subjectivity of the essential and ideal world, Aristotle, as
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a speculative philosopher, finds truth in the dialectical relationship between objectivity
and subjectivity, existentiality and essentiality:
For Aristotle‘s empiricism is a totality because he always leads it back again
immediately to speculation; he may thus be said to be a perfect empiricist, yet at
the same time a thinking one. 197
With this speculative picture of Aristotle in view, Hegel puts us in the midst of the
three interrelated moments of the movement of thought: sensation, understanding, and
reason. Regardless of the different details of his tracing of these moments in his
Phenomenology and his Logic, Hegel‘s tracing of these moments in Aristotle‘s
philosophy reaches similar results. For Hegel, Aristotle‘s account of truth is neither
sensation in its immediate presentation of identity, nor understanding in its mediated
presentation of non-identity. Hegel‘s Aristotle rises up to the sublated moment of reason
in which the identity of ―identity and non-identity‖ is the true presentation of the Idea.
For Hegel, the three epistemological, Aristotelian moments of sensation, understanding,
and reason interweave with the three ontological, Aristotelian modes of substance
(Sensible Substance, Human Nous, and Divine Thought).198 If these two sides of
epistemology and ontology are taken speculatively and not abstractly, they reflect the
logical aspect of the progressively unfolding of the Idea.
To see how Hegel reaches the above mentioned point, I will proceed with his
investigation of the four Aristotelian principles of substance:
In this ontology or, as we call it, logic, he [Aristotle] investigates and minutely
distinguishes four principles: first, determination or quality as such, the wherefore
of anything, essence or form; secondly, the matter; thirdly, the principle of
motion; and fourthly, the principle of final cause, or of the good.199
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There are two interesting features in this passage .The first one is Hegel‘s approximation
of Aristotle‘s ontology—Aristotle‘s science of being qua being—with Hegel‘s
speculative logic. 200 The second one is Hegel‘s equation of Aristotle‘s ―form‖ with
―quality as such,‖ which he further equates with ―essence‖.
Hegel‘s characterization of Aristotle‘s ―essence‖ as that which constitutes the
―quality as such‖ of substance—as that determination without which substance ceases to
be—problematizes the status of the category of ―quality‖ in Hegel‘s Logic. In Hegel‘s
logical doctrine of Being, the characterization of the Hegelian ―Quality‖ looks similar to
the Aristotelian ―essence‖:
Quality is, to begin with, the determinacy that is identical with being, in such a
way that something ceases to be what it is if it loses its quality. 201
While in his Logic Hegel considers ―quality‖ as one of the categories of the doctrine of
Being rather than one of the categories of the doctrine of Essence, his interpretation of
Aristotle now locates ―quality as such‖ as equivalent to ―essence‖ itself. Why this is so
can be articulated more when we see how Hegel moves to the two crucial determinations
of substance in Aristotle‘s ontology: Potentiality and Actuality.
Hegel introduces the two Aristotelian principles of potentiality and actuality by
saying:
There are two leading forms, which Aristotle characterizes as that of potentiality
and that of actuality; the latter is still more closely characterized as entelechy or
free activity, which has the end in itself, and is the realization of this end. 202
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Hegel‘s translation of the Aristotelian energeia is ―Tätigkeit /activity‖. 203 In Hegel‘s
translation, as Ferrarin puts it, ―actuality cannot be understood independently of
actualization, an actuality without activity is for him unthinkable.‖204 In light of this
correlation between activity and actuality, if Hegel‘s subjectivity is a "spontaneous
conscious activity [that] exists for itself and within itself,"205 then subjectivity should be
viewed not only as activity but also as actuality. Now, if what constitutes substance in its
deep speculative sense is nothing but essence as ―actualizing form‖, then substance can
be understood also as a subject insofar as subject is itself actuality. This explains to some
extent what Hegel means at the beginning of his Logic Encyclopaedia:
Philosophy should be quite clear about the fact that its content is nothing other
than the basic import that is originally produced and produces itself in the domain
of the living spirit, the content that is made into the world, the outer and the inner
world of consciousness; in other words, the content of philosophy is actuality.206
The Aristotelian actuality parallels the Hegelian being-for-itself /subjectivity,
while the Aristotelian potentiality parallels the Hegelian being in-itself /objectivity. 207 If
202
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Hegel seems obscure in his identifying of potentiality with objectivity, 208 he is clear in his
identifying of actuality/activity with subjectivity. He writes,
The Energy [Actuality], or more concretely the Subjectivity, is the actualizing
form, the negativity which relates to itself. When we, on the other hand, use the
term ―Essence,‖ we do not posit [express] activity in it; but Essence is only the Initself only potentiality without infinite form [―infinite‖ means self-related].209
We notice here that essence is posited within the logical horizon of ―potentiality‖ or ―the
In-itself‖ just because it does not have ―activity in it‖. However, it is exactly this dead
kind of essence that Hegel refuses to consider as a true candidate for the Idea. The state
of in-itself constitutes just a moment in the process of the unlocking of the essence. In
order for essence to be able to grasp the True as the whole it must be not inert or fixed, it
must rather be in a state of activity. And if actuality is an active state of actualization
which includes its end within it, essence as actuality must be not only in-itself but also
for-itself. We already find this meaning of developmental essence in Hegel‘s preface of
his Phenomenology:
The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence
consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that
it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely
in this consist its nature, viz. to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of
itself. 210
For Hegel‘s Logic, the appearance of essence—essence‘s shining-forth — is the
existential actualization of essence, and this happens through mediation—through the

δσναμις); the second principle is that of being-for-itself, actuality (actus, ενεργεια)….The whole variation in
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negative, self-relating of essence. 211 It is in this Hegelian account of the speculative
Aristotle that essence becomes the ―actualizing form‖ which breaks with the static
traditional view of essence which does not move beyond the level of ―in-itself‖. The
actualization of essence constitutes the essence of essence, so to speak. And this essential
actualization is manifested in the dialectical movement from the moment of in-itself to
the moment of for-itself, that is, from potential objectivity to actual subjectivity.
But this movement is not enough for essence to be true speculative actuality. For
the speculative essence must be not only ―in-itself‖, nor only ―for-itself‖, but ―in-and-for
itself‖. As Hegel says in his Science of Logic, essence
is not only this being-in-itself; as mere being-in-itself it would be the abstraction
of pure essence, but it is equally essentially being-for-self; it is itself this
negativity, the self-sublating of otherness and determinateness. 212
Essence within this third moment of the Idea is no longer that of immediate essence of
intuition, nor of abstract essence of understanding, but of speculative essence of reason.
Essence becomes the Notion which includes within it its determinations not in a state of
immediacy, nor in a state of opposition and difference, but in a state of sublation. The
relationship of in-itself/for-itself is also articulated in the language of Hegel‘s
Phenomenology to support the same point, though from different perspective:
So long as Science lacks this actual dimension, it is only the content as the initself, the purpose that is as yet still something inward, not yet Spirit, but only
spiritual Substance. This in-itself has to express itself outwardly and become for
itself, and this means simply that it has to posit self-consciousness as one with
itself. 213
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In light of these two Aristotelian determinations of potentiality/actuality, 214 and
their Hegelian corresponding relationship of in-itself/for-itself, I will try now to see how
the dialectical relationship between subjectivity and objectivity unfolds, and how,
accordingly, the relationship between essence and existence can be viewed.

The Three Dialectical Moments of the Aristotelian Idea
Hegel recognizes and discerns two opposite sides within the Aristotelian
substance, both of which, taken separately and abstractly, do not reveal the truth of the
Idea. On the one side, we have potentiality, being-in-itself, or objectivity. The reference
of this side is the sensuous perceptible substance. On the second opposite side, we have
actuality, being-for-itself, or subjectivity. The reference of this side is human nous or
understanding. Now, generally speaking, Hegel shows that the true speculative Aristotle
cannot be found in either of these one-sidednesses of substance. Hegel‘s Aristotle should
be found in the third higher moment of substance which represents the true speculative
Idea and which sublates the two preceding moments. This higher speculative moment is
the divine Thought—the true concrete Subject.215
For the sake of my argument, I take the first Aristotelian side of substance as the
representative of the logical Hegelian doctrine of Being—not in its sophisticated details
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by which Hegel surpasses Aristotle in the Doctrine of Essence, but only in its general
point of view. Similarly, the second Aristotelian side of substance operates as the
representative of the logical Hegelian doctrine of Essence. Just as Hegel‘s Logic shows
that neither the doctrine of Being in its immediate presentation of the Idea nor the
doctrine of Essence in its mediate presentation of the Idea grasps the Idea in its
concreteness, so we find that neither the first side of the Aristotelian substance, reflected
in the objectivity of sensuous substance, nor the second side of the Aristotelian substance
reflected in the subjectivity of the human nous, grasps the concreteness of the Idea. And
as the Hegelian logical doctrine of the Notion represents the summit of the Idea in which
subjectivity and objectivity are dialectally dissolved in the identity of identity and nonidentity, so too ends the doctrine of the Aristotelian divine Thought.
Unlike the case with Plato, these three moments of the Idea are not included
implicitly in the philosophy of Aristotle but are explicitly articulated by him. If Hegel‘s
task with Plato consists in making these implied moments of the speculative Idea explicit,
and bringing them together in a system, Hegel‘s task with Aristotle is to bring together
these explicit moments in a system. 216 In what follows, I will give a summary account of
the Hegelian systematic view of these three moments in order to see how the Idea is not
only Substance but also Subject, or in Hegel‘s words, how ―everything turns on grasping
and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject.‖217
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The Sensuous Perceptible Substance or the Immediate Moment of Objectivity
The sensuous substances are all these kinds of material objects that we encounter
in our ordinary experience. They are all these individuals around us. At this stage of
sense-experience, these individual substances seem objective in their independent unity—
each represents its individual objectivity in itself regardless of its relation to the others.
But the dialectic of the object shows that this seemingly individual unity is not an internal
unity between the constitutive principles of matter and form. Matter and form,
potentiality and actuality, are related externally rather than internally. The absence of the
self-organizing factor within sensuous substance is a deficient characteristic of this stage
of the Idea. As a result, this moment fails to grasp the inner depth of the self-constructed
Idea. Hegel writes,
The sensuous perceptual substance is that in which the matter is still distinguished
from the efficient form. Hence this substance is finite; for the separation and
externality of form and matter are precisely what constitute the nature of finite. 218
This moment, then, does not reflect the true unity of the two determinations of
matter/potentiality and form/actuality. That is, it does not reflect the concrete-self-identity
of essence. Essence as such has not been actualized speculatively to be ―for-itself‖. In
Hegel‘s language, this is an inadequate standpoint of the Idea since it reflects just the
externality of the unity of subjectivity and objectivity. ―Thus in sensuous substance,‖
Hegel concludes, ―there appears the diversity of the moments, though not as yet return
into themselves.‖219 This returning into itself of the diversity of the moments is what
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constitutes the moment of ―for-itself‖, the moment of actuality, which the subjective, next
stage of the Idea is its realization.

The Human Understanding or the Moment of Abstract Subjectivity
The second kind of substance is the subjective soul as a thinking activity. Here we
find that the moments of subjectivity and objectivity are not external like that of the
sensuous substance, but internal. Hegel explains,
A higher kind of substance, according to Aristotle (Met, IX.2; VII.7; XII.3), is
that which already contains the activity which is the object of its process. This is
the in-and-for-itself determined Understanding whose content is the final cause
which it actualizes through its activity without undergoing change like the mere
sensuous substance. 220
That is to say, the Aristotelian rational soul, as a moment of subjective activity, is the
object of its own activity. The aim of the activity of this subjectivity, which for the
rational soul ―is essentially actuality,‖ and ―not only formal activity‖ 221 is itself the
content of understanding. The content of this activity, as well as the realization of this
content, does not come ―from somewhere else,‖ as Hegel says, but from within the
activity of thought itself. This kind of substance, therefore, is not only in-itself but also
for-itself. This in-and-for-itself constitutes ―understanding‖ as absolutely determined.
The content of the activity of understanding, however, does not remain only
internal to itself. ―The active,‖ Hegel says, ―posits its content in reality.‖ 222 Consider, for
instance, an architect who actualizes a project he has in his mind by building a house. But
this activity of the understanding which is now actualized in reality is different from a
matter upon which the idea is realized. Matter here appears as a condition for the
actualization of the Idea.
220
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Thus here we still have a matter which understanding demands as its hypothesis.
The two extremes are matter as potentiality, and thought as efficiency: the former
is the passive universal, and the latter the active universal. 223
Although this moment exhibits the Idea in more comprehensive view than the previous
moment, it is still not adequate enough to articulate the pure speculative Idea. This
moment is an abstract subjectivity which knows how to distinguish but does not go a
further step to unite the differences. This moment, in Hegel‘s language of the Science of
Logic, does not "free itself from its immediacy and external concretion,"224 and,
moreover, does not "attain to the pure knowing which takes as its object those same pure
essentialities as they are in and for themselves."225

The Divine Thought or the Absolutely Differentiated Idea: The Speculative
Subject
If the two preceding moments of objectivity and subjectivity exhibit a sense of
separation and externality between (potentiality/in-itself) and (actuality/for-itself),
between matter and form, between reality and thought, between existence and essence,
the third moment resolves absolutely all these kinds of deficiencies. All these dualities
are now sublated in a high speculative identity represented in the Absolute as unmoved
mover.
The highest point is, however, that in which potentiality, activity and actuality are
united—the unmoved, which yet at the same time moves, and whose essence is
pure activity, without having matter.226
With this moment, therefore, we reach the stage of the truly speculative Idea in
which all determinations are internal to the Idea and in which all the material and external
223
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considerations are sublated. It is the moment in which essence is no longer static identity
but ―pure activity‖. Essence is thus liberated from the strict limits of the abstract
understanding and becomes free activity within the unlimited circularity of the immanent
Reason. Essence as pure activity, as pure subjectivity, is no longer a transcendent entity
that exists beyond the objectivity of essence, and it is no longer the unknowable thing-initself. The epistemological and ontological gulf between thought and reality is totally
absorbed in the Aristotelian Absolute of the unmoved mover. 227 Hegel‘s summary of the
internal activity of Aristotle‘s Absolute pushes in the same direction of Hegel‘s own
philosophy. He writes,
The object of thought is first produced in the activity of thinking, which in this
way separates the thought as an object. Hence, in thinking, that which is moved
and that which moves are the same; and as the substance of what is thought is
thought, what is thought is the absolute cause which, itself unmoved, is identical
with the thought which is moved by it; the separation and the relation are one
and the same. The chief moment in Aristotle‘s philosophy is accordingly this, that
the energy of thinking and the object of thought are the same.228
It is thus only when essence breaks with the limitations of the abstract identity of
understanding that Substance can become Subject. And Hegel is clear in this:
227
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If Aristotle had made the jejune identity of understanding, or expression, his
principle, he would never have risen to a speculative Idea like this, wherein
individuality and activity are placed higher than universal potentiality. 229
Reason‘s sublation of understanding, in fact, represents the deep speculative meaning not
only for Aristotle‘s philosophy—as Hegel argues— but also for Hegel‘s own philosophy.
Hegel selects a crucial and long quotation from Aristotle‘s metaphysics, Met. XII.7, to
suggest that Aristotle‘s Absolute supports the Hegelian theme of the circularity of reason.
Hegel enthusiastically comments on that quotation by saying:
This great definition given by Aristotle of absolute Being as the circle of reason
which returns into itself, is of the same tenor as modern definitions; the unmoved
which causes movement is the Idea which remains self-identical, which, while it
moves, remains in relation to itself. 230
It is this crucial moment of the circularity of reason which supersedes
understanding and brings identity in difference and difference in identity, motion in
stability and stability in motion, potentiality in actuality and actuality in potentiality,
essence in existence and existence in essence. 231 All these dualities are absorbed in the
dynamicity of the dialectical relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. Hegel,
therefore, distinguishes his speculative Idealism from the idealism of his age. And he
does not hesitate to oppose his celebrated discovery of the speculative Aristotle against
his opponents:
If in modern times it has seemed a new thing to define the Absolute Essence as
pure activity, we see that this happened only through ignorance of the Aristotelian
philosophy. The scholastics have rightly viewed this as the definition of God, and
229
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have applied to Him the designation of actus purus; there is no higher idealism
than this.232
If there is no ―higher idealism‖ than this, then it is inevitably Hegel‘s own
idealism that is now presented in approximate manner with Aristotle and the scholastics.
For my reading, it is a dialectical approximation which operates as mediation by which
Hegel aims to reform the deficiencies of the philosophies of modern times — as an effort
to reinstate the Idea in its concrete philosophical development. Hegel, after all, does not
merely stop at the Greek level of the Idea but moves further to ―the Christian Teutonic‖
level of Spirit.233 Whether Hegel‘s discovery of the speculative Idea of Plato and
Aristotle can be used as mediation to reform Sadra‘s transcendental Existentialism is the
topic of my later chapters.
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Chapter: Three
Sadra and Hegel on the Metaphysical Essentialism of Arabic Philosophy
Introduction:
In his introduction to his Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel writes,
Speculative Logic contains all previous Logic and Metaphysics: it preserves the
same forms of thought, the same laws and objects—while at the same time
remodeling and expanding them with wider categories. 234
The speculative Idea here requires its dialectical concrete development in such a way that
it should not only negate but also sublate its previous stages. Does not that mean that any
speculative philosopher, in order to produce his new philosophy, should be conscious of
the principles of the philosophies that precede him? Although this demand theoretically
looks possible, practically it seems difficult. Difficulties such as the foreign language and
the distant geographical places of the previous philosophies could contribute to
preventing the philosopher from being fully aware of previous philosophies. Sadra and
Hegel are cases in point. The satisfaction of absorbing the previous philosophies cannot
be applied to Sadra, for he is not aware of the modern progression of philosophy in the
West.235 Neither can it be applied to Hegel, whose evaluation of Arabic philosophy ends
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with Averroes.236 In this context, more than four centuries of the history of Arabic
philosophy— from the death of Averroes in the thirteenth century up until the death of
Sadra in the seventeenth century— are totally absent in Hegel‘s Lectures on the History
of Philosophy.
Situating Sadra‘s philosophy within Hegel‘s Lectures raises two interrelated
problems. The first one is concerned with the historical period in which Sadra‘s
philosophy appeared. The second one pertains to the nature of the philosophical themes
of Sadra‘s thought. If we follow Hegel‘s division of the historical development of
philosophy, Sadra, whose philosophy flourished in the seventeenth century, could be
situated within Hegel‘s classification of ―The Third Period: Modern Philosophy.‖ 237
More precisely, it could be better fit within what Hegel called ―Transition to the Modern
Era.‖238 Here we meet with Hegel‘s treatment of Francis Bacon and Jacob Boehme, both
of whom are contemporary to Sadra.239 This account, however, conflicts with the themes
of Sadra‘s philosophy. The problematic relationship between existence and essence,
which constitutes the basic ground of Sadra‘s philosophy, is more related to ―The Second
Period: Medieval Philosophy,‖ 240 rather than Modern philosophy.
Considering Sadra from the Hegelian standpoint of medieval philosophy faces
another problem. Despite the fact that Sadra does not chronologically belong to this
period, Hegel deals externally and briefly with ―Arabic Philosophy,‖ to which Sadra
belongs. He writes, ―In this second period, philosophy has its locus in the Christen world;
236
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we need refer to Arabs and Jews only in an external way, for the historical
background.‖241 Sadra‘s situation with Hegel becomes further complicated if we add the
fact that Sadra, whose writings are mostly in Arabic, is ethnically Persian. 242 Sadra is thus
seemingly excluded from the divisions of Hegel‘s history of philosophy. He lacks a place
in Hegel‘s Lectures, for neither could he properly be fit within modern philosophy, nor
within medieval philosophy.
Hegel‘s critique of Arabic philosophy, however, could be used as an entrance to
appropriate Sadra‘s thought within Hegel‘s Lectures on the History of Philosophy. The
point here is to see whether Hegel‘s critique of Arabic Philosophy is applicable to Sadra‘s
philosophy. If it is applicable, then the stage of Sadra‘s philosophy within the
development of philosophy would face the same judgment that Hegel already passes on
that of Arabic philosophy. ―We cannot say that Arabic philosophy involves its own
proper principle and stage in the development of philosophy,‖ 243 Hegel states. In what
follows, I will argue that the main points which Hegel considers as deficiencies of Arabic
philosophy are among those that Sadra himself criticizes and tries to overcome. This will
be in light of Sadra‘s account of the primacy of existence over essence, on the one hand,
and the identity of the knower and the known, on the other hand.
The earlier chapters have dealt with Sadra‘s and Hegel‘s critiques of the
traditional views of the Greek essentialism of Plato and Aristotle. Without entering in
specific differences between them, both Sadra and Hegel refuse to accept the abstract
considerations of essence to be equivalent to Truth. In this chapter, Sadra‘s critique of the
241
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essentialism of Arabic philosophy will be examined under the light of Hegel‘s critique of
Arabic philosophy.

Hegel’s Reading of Arabic Philosophy
Two remarks can be noted concerning Hegel‘s concise presentation of Arabic
Philosophy. First, Hegel‘s sources do not rely on his immediate contact with the primary
texts of Arabic philosophy—neither in its original Arabic nor in its Latin translated
version. 244 His sources rather rely primarily on secondary sources written by the Jewish
philosopher, Maimonides, and the German historian, W. G. Tennemann. 245 This
emphasizes the point that Hegel‘s critique of Arabic philosophy is of an external
character. Secondly, Hegel confuses two distinct and opposite Islamic currents of
thought. The first one is led by the theologians, known as Speakers/Medabberm,246who,
as Hegel rightly says,
used Greek [philosophical] science especially for the defense of their dogmas,
since there was a pressing need to defend Islam against the Christian who made
up a large part of the peoples they had subdued. 247
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The second intellectual current, which comes as an opposition to the first one, is
established by the Islamic philosophers, who deal with Greek philosophy in itself, not in
order to serve religious interests.248 Hegel, however, subsumes the Islamic philosophers
under the rubric of ―Commentators of Aristotle.‖ 249 For him, these philosophers ―sank
into a metaphysics of the understanding and into a formal dialectic.‖ 250 He briefly
mentions Alkendi, Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel, Tofail, and finally Averroes, with whom
Arabic philosophy is, in Hegel‘s view, supposedly terminated.251
Hegel‘s listing of the theologian Algazel, who is the very opposite to the
philosophers,252 among the commentators of Aristotle supports the point that Hegel is not
aware enough of the opposition between the speakers and the philosophers in Arabic
philosophy. This opposition, in fact, has a long history in Arabic philosophy. It
eventually culminates in two well-known books: The Incoherence of The Philosophers by
the theologian Algazel, and the reply book of The Incoherence of The Incoherence by the
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philosopher Averroes.253 These two books represent the highest phase of the opposition
between faith and reason in Arabic philosophy, if not even in medieval philosophy. 254
Whereas the opposition between the speakers and the philosophers is not central
in Hegel‘s reading of Arabic philosophy, for Sadra, it is exactly the attempt to overcome
this opposition that distinguishes him from both the speakers and the philosophers. This
claim increases the problematic situation of Sadra within Hegel‘s Lectures, for Sadra
cannot be fit even within the Hegelian division of Arabic philosophy into
speakers/theologians and philosophers/commentators. Sadra‘s philosophy, in fact, forms
a kind of synthesis between the irrationality of the speakers based on faith, on one hand,
and the one-sided rationality of the philosophers based on the formality of understanding,
on the other hand. This claim will be supported in light of Hegel‘s critique of both the
speakers and the philosophers.

Hegel’s Critique of the Speakers
Hegel‘s critique of the Islamic speakers‘ dogmas is a continuation of his systemic
critique of religion, faith, feelings, myths, and mysterious knowledge.255 For him, these
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cognitive forms are external considerations of truth; they do not stem internally from the
pure activity of the speculative reason. These forms do not, as Hegel writes, ―come from
reason as independent;‖ they do not take ―self-consciousness,‖ as ―an essential moment
in the truth.‖256 Within this line of thought, Hegel writes,
The Arabians, like the Christians of the West, were restricted by the dogmas of
their Church (if one may call it so), few though these dogmas were; yet this last
circumstance of the small number of the dogmas certainly gave them greater
liberty. But according to all that we know of them, they established no principle
of self-conscious reason that was truly higher, and thus they brought Philosophy
no further. They have no other principle than that of revelation, therefore only a
principle that is external. 257
For Hegel, then, the speakers‘ determinations of truth are external in that they drive their
principle from outside and not from within thought itself. Thought in this case is not free
and spontaneous. Speakers‘ thought is restricted with what Hegel describes as ―the dead
externality of authority.‖ 258
Although Sadra accepts ―revelation‖ as a source of knowledge, 259 he is different
from the speakers who only look to how philosophical arguments, as Hegel critically
says, ―had to be deployed in order to support their assertions.‖260 Sadra‘s account of
revelation, rather, shares what Quentin Lauer describes as ―Hegel‘s conviction that a
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revelation must be intelligible if it is to be a revelation at all.‖ 261 In fact, what Hegel
found interesting in the Church Fathers can be also applied to Sadra‘s method of thought.
For Hegel, Church Fathers do not restrict themselves to the level of the writings of the
Bible but go beyond that to reach its deep spirit. Their principle, as Hegel points out, is:
―the letter kills but the Spirit gives life.‖262This principle is also present in Sadra‘s
philosophy. He, for instance, devotes a book, Breaking the Idols of Ignorance, just to
criticize the theologians and the Sufi for their inability to go deeper to the meaning of
revelation. Exposing the reason behind their failure to capture the spirit of revelation,
Sadra writes,
This is because the sight of their intellect is concentrated on the forms of things
and their imaginary frames and they do not extend their sight to their secrets or
truths, nor do they perceive the balance between the seen world and the unseen
realm. They have missed that and have become confused by the contradictory
parables explained by the religious laws and prophets. Thus, they neither
perceive, in the way the elite perceive, anything of the truths of belief in God, His
attributes, signs, angels, books, messengers and the Last Day.263
Before seeing how Hegel examines the self-consistency of the speakers‘ thoughtcontent, some remarks should be mentioned on Hegel‘s reading of the speakers. Firstly,
among the many Islamic theological schools, the two opposite schools of Asharite and
Mutazilite are the only theological schools which Hegel brings in his treatment of Arabic
philosophy. On the one hand, he does not give more attention to Mutazilite School and
just considers it as ―the first to take an interest in the abstract knowledge.‖ 264 On the
other hand, he focuses exclusively on the ontological and epistemological consequences
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of Asharite‘s doctrine of atoms. I raise this point because the significant difference
between these two schools in regard to the theory of causation, which Hegel criticizes, is
absent in Hegel‘s reading of them. 265 Sadra, on the other side, was aware of this
opposition between these two theological schools. His theory of causation overcomes this
opposition, as we will see.
In order to satisfy some theological demands related to divine freedom, the
speakers make some modifications on the Greek theory of atoms. 266 It is not my purpose
to enter into these details. My point, rather, is to see how Hegel identifies the
contradiction of the speakers‘ account of causation in relation to their theory of atoms. In
this regard, Hegel writes,
Maimonides says: ―The ground-principle of the Medabberim[speakers] is that
men can have no certain knowledge of the nature of things, because in the
understanding the contrary may ever exist and be thought. Besides this they in the
majority of instances confound imagination with understanding, and give to the
former the name of the latter.‖ They adopted as a principle, ―atoms and empty
space,‖ where all connection appears as something contingent. ―Production is
nothing but a connection of atoms, and decay nothing but the separation of the
same; and time consists of many ‗nows.‘‖ 267
After this short quotation from Maimonides, Hegel criticizes the speakers by saying:
In this way nothing but the atom really exists. They have thus in the more
advanced cultivation of thought brought to consciousness the main standpoint,
then as now the standpoint of Orientals—that of substance, the one substance.
This pantheism, or Spinozism, if you like to call it so, is thus the universal view of
Oriental poets, historians, and philosophers. 268
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Although it is difficult to understand how Hegel reduces in one step the speakers‘
unlimited atoms into Spinoza‘s one substance, three serious points of deficiency in the
speakers can be deduced. The first one is related to their skeptical epistemological view.
The second one is related to their ontological view based on the permanency of substance
and the ever-changeability of accidents. The third one is concerned with their view of
time.
Hegel starts from the speakers‘ account of knowledge and moves to their account
of ontology. He, following Maimonides, bases the speakers‘ ontology on their ―groundprinciple‖ of the uncertainty of knowledge. In fact, the case with the speakers is the
opposite. It is their ontology of the permanency of substance and their account of the
ever-changeability of accidents that lead them to their skeptical view of knowledge. That
is to say, their ontology is prior to their epistemology. Hegel, however, touches on this
point later when he further elaborates on the speakers‘ account of accidents. He writes,
―In the same way knowledge also is an accident, which is created by God at every
moment that I know anything; today we no longer possess the knowledge which we
yesterday possessed.‖269 As we will see later on, Sadra focuses his critique of the
speakers on the three points that Hegel mentions—that of epistemology, ontology, and
temporality. But his critique—contra to Hegel and Maimonides—starts primarily from
exposing the deficiency of the speakers‘ ontology of the permanency of substance that
eventually leads them to consider knowledge as an accident. Rather than starting from
epistemology and moving to ontology, in his own philosophy Sadra moves from ontology
to epistemology. And rather than arguing for the account of the permanency of substance,
Sadra argues that substance substantially moves. With this account of trans-substantial
269
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motion of existence, knowledge is re-defined. Knowledge is not to be understood as an
accident, as the speakers assert, but as a mode of existence. The intensification of
existence goes side by side with the intensification of knowledge. The more existence
becomes simple and pure, the more knowledge becomes simple and pure—as we will see
later.
Hegel discovers in the speakers the notion of the contingency of relations which
reflects the speakers‘ denial of the necessity of the causal connection between events. In
order to find room for the omnipotence of God, who is not bound to laws of nature, the
speakers deny the necessary connection between cause and effect. Instead, they consider
the causal relationship as a mere habit. In his Incoherence, Algazel, who, as Hegel
acknowledges, ―was a sceptic of great ability‖270—well before Hume271—writes,
The connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is
habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary, according to us. But with any
two things, where ―this‖ is not ―that‖ and ―that‖ is not ―this‖ and where neither
the affirmation of the one entails the affirmation of the other neither the negation
of the one entails negation of the other, it is not a necessity of the existence of the
one that the other should exist, and it is not a necessity of the nonexistence of the
one that the other should not exist—for example the quenching of thirst and
drinking , satiety and eating, burning and contact with fire, light and the
appearance of sun, death and decapitation, healing and the drinking of medicine,
the purging of the bowels and the using of a purgative, and so on to [include] all
[that is] observable among connected things in medicine, astronomy, arts, and
crafts. Their connection is due to the prior decree of God, who creates them side
by side, not to its being necessary in itself, incapable of separation. 272
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Hegel, however, criticizes the speakers‘ dogmas without discussing Algazel‘s debate with
the Islamic philosophers. For him, Algazel just ―held the words of the Prophet to be pure
truth, and wrote the Destructio of Philosophorum.‖273
On the basis of their belief of the continuity of God‘s creative activity, the
speakers, as Hegel says, argue that ―no accident can endure for two moments; as soon as
it arises it perishes too, and the substance (God) always creates another in its place,‖ 274
Here the only true cause is God:
Everything may just as well be something else as what it is, and there is no reason
at all why anything should be one way rather than another. They (the speakers)
term it a mere habit that the earth revolves round a center-point, that fire moves
upward and that it is hot; it is just as possible, they say, that fire should be cold. 275
The speakers‘ rejection of the idea of different, discrete substances acting upon each
other through necessary causation leads Hegel to this conclusion:
In the pure philosophy of the so called ―Speakers‖ was expressed the principle,
peculiar to the Oriental mind, of the dissolution of definite thought in all its
consequences as the dissolution of all connections and relation. 276
For Hegel, what make thought definite are its concrete determinations. The
concreteness means that the dialectical, inclusive relationship between various
determinations must be brought dialectally back into a systematic totality—a totality that
insofar as it excludes and negates its parts, it includes and sublates them. Truth as a
whole, then, must include all determinations—nothing should be left out. That is to say,
truth should have nothing outside itself but contain everything within it. This inclusive
view of truth contrasts with the speakers‘ account of substance which does not include its
273
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accidents/determinations. In the speakers, there is no reconciliation of particulars,
accidents, or qualities—taken as determinations— with the whole as a substance or God.
―All determinations are thus fleeting or perishable; the individual alone is permanent,‖277
writes Hegel.
With the speakers, therefore, determinations are always in a state of negation—a
negation that never comes into self-consciousness. For Hegel, this kind of negation does
not reach the stage of the speculative negation in which different moments of the dialectic
must be sublated in a higher stage. The speakers, therefore, do not go beyond ―the
abstract moment of negativity.‖ Hegel writes,
This abstract negativity combined with the permanent unity, is thus a fundamental
conception in the Oriental way of looking at things….Thus the Arabians
developed the sciences and philosophy, without further defining the Idea; their
work is rather the dissolution of all that is definite in this substance, with which is
associated mere changeableness as the abstract moment of negativity. 278

Hegel’s Logic and the Critique of the Speakers
Let us now turn to Hegel‘s Logic and see whether his criticism of the speakers‘
account of causation is consistent with his own position. The abstract moment of
negativity, which Hegel finds in the speakers‘ account of causation, can be approximated
to what, in his doctrine of essence, Hegel calls ―External negation‖:
External negation—and this is what abstraction is—only shifts the
determinateness of being away from what is left over as Essence; it only puts
them, so to speak, elsewhere, leaving them the affirmative character they
possessed before.279
For Hegel, since the speakers‘ negation of accidents neither emerges internally from
substance itself, nor returns into substance, this negation is an external and abstract
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negation. This kind of negation would ground substance upon something other than its
own essence. Its essence would be, as Hegel describes in his logic, ―inherently lifeless
and empty.‖280 Now, since the speakers consider God as the only one substance whose
determinations are abstractly negated, this speakers‘ God is abstract. We have seen that
Hegel characterizes the speakers‘ account of substance as a kind of Spinozism. 281 This
characterization is in accord with his critique of Spinozism in his Logic when he writes
that ―Spinozism is a defective philosophy because in it reflection and its manifold
determining is an external thinking.‖282 For Hegel, in order to give concrete meaning to
God as the absolute ground of opposite determinations, the relationship of
ground/grounded must be re-thought.
For Hegel, rethinking the relationship of ground/grounded means shifting it from
the sphere of abstraction to the sphere of speculation. In the former, the duality of ground
and grounded is thought under the abstract distinction between the opposites of
identity/positive and difference/negative. In the latter, the duality is thought within the
horizon of the unity of opposites. As Hegel writes, ―the proximate result of opposition
(when realized as contradiction) is the Ground, which contains identity as well as
difference superseded and deposited to elements in the completed notion.‖283 Hegel‘s
speculative account of ground does not thus operate within the abstract moment of
negativity in which the opposites are excluded as determinations. Rather, ground is
viewed as the principle into which the opposite determinations speculatively return. To

280

Ibid.
See the beginning of our discussion to Hegel‘s critique of the speakers in this chapter.
282
Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 536.
283
Hegel, Hegel‟s Logic, p. 174.
281

100

clarify this point and approximate it to Hegel‘s critique of the speakers, we will take
finite being and necessary being as our example of opposites.
Hegel writes, ―Finite things in their indifferent multiplicity are simply this, to be
contradictory and disrupted within themselves and to return into their ground.‖284 But
what is the ground of finite beings? The speakers, from their theological account,
consider God as the ungrounded ground of finite beings. However, in their inference of
the necessary being from the contingent beings, the speakers‘ absolute view of the
ungrounded ground suffers a contradiction. 285 For, as we learn from Hegel‘s logic, the
contingent being as the grounded—which in the case of the speakers is abstractly
excluded from the necessary being— is included in the necessary being. ―The grounded,‖
as Hegel finds, ―completely contains within itself the ground, their relation is an
undifferentiated essential compactness.‖286 According to Hegel, the necessary being is
not ungrounded as the speakers‘ inference claims. Hegel explains,
The true inference from a finite and contingent being to an absolutely necessary
being does not consist in inferring the latter from the former as from a being that
is and remains the ground. On the contrary, the inference is from a being that, as
is also directly implied in contingency, is only in a state of collapse and is
inherently self-contradictory. 287
It is thus only when we think the contradiction within a finite being as a speculative
negation rather than an abstract negation that the inference of the necessary from the
contingent is true. ―The truth,‖ Hegel writes, ―is that the absolute is, because the finite is
the inherently self-contradictory opposition, because it is not.‖288
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In contrast to the speakers, Hegel considers the self-contradictory of a finite being
not as a defect that should be excluded from the necessary being but as something
essential and inherent in everything. ―Contradiction,‖ as Hegel writes, ―is the very
moving principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction is
unthinkable.‖289 Hegel rethinks contradiction as the ground which is ―the approximate
result of opposition.‖ Contradiction is thus included within the absolute being as the
ground in which the finite beings dissolve their self-contradiction. So, although the
necessary is, as Hegel says, ―derivative, it must still contain the antecedent whence it is
derived as a vanishing element in itself.‖ 290The speakers‘ derivation of the necessary is,
accordingly, abstract in that it does not explicitly contain its determinations within it. ―It
only puts them, so to speak, elsewhere, leaving them the affirmative character they
possessed before,‖ as Hegel says above.
If the speakers consider the relationship between the absolute being as ground and
the finite being as grounded as a one-sided relation of dependency, Hegel considers it as a
relation of mutual dependence. For him, this relationship is not unilateral relationship but
circular relationship. That is, insofar as the grounded absolutely depends on the ground,
the ground absolutely depends on the grounded:
The ground and what is grounded are one and the same content: the difference
between the two is the mere difference of form, which separates simple-relation
on the one hand, from mediation or derivativeness on the other.291
As the dialectic proceeds, the category of ground is developed further in the category of
reciprocity. Here the relation of cause and effect finds its ultimate speculative unity as a
self-contained relationship. ―Reciprocity,‖ as Hegel writes, ―is undoubtedly the proximate
289
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truth of the relation of cause and effect, and stands, so to say, on the threshold of the
notion.‖292 Here the cause, although it is distinct from its effect, is at the same time its
own effect, and vice versa. That is, cause and effect imply one another:
effect contains nothing whatever that cause does not contain. Conversely, cause
contains nothing which is not in its effect. Cause is cause only in so far as it
produces an effect, and effect is nothing but this, to have a cause. Cause as such
implies its effect, and effect implies cause. 293
In this speculative account of causality, the relationship between cause and effect is no
longer a mere habit or accident, as the speakers say, but something inherent and
necessary. Cause and effect are essentially mutual implications within the development of
truth towards the Absolut Idea.
As in his Lectures, Hegel in his Logic is aware of the reason behind the
theologians‘ rejecting of the necessity between cause and effect—a reason that is related
to their concern about the freedom of God. But, as Hegel writes in his Logic, ―those, who
fancy they honor Divine Providence by excluding necessity from it, are degrading it by
this exclusiveness to a blind and irrational caprice.‖294

Sadra’s Critique of the Speakers
While the speakers stop, as Hegel concludes, at ―the abstract moment of
negativity,‖ Sadra goes a moment further. The ever changeability of determinations
which led to the dissolution of definite thought—which Hegel discovers in the speakers‘
account of the relationship between accidents/determinations and substance /unity—is
pushed by Sadra further into substance itself. With Sadra, the changeability of the
292
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contingent world emerges primarily from within the inner activity of substance itself. As
we have seen in the first chapter, for Sadra, substance is substantially a dynamic unity of
process. In light of this necessary dynamicity inhered in substance—which reflects the
dynamicity of existence as a whole— the habit-relationship between cause and effect is
criticized and rejected.295
For Sadra, therefore, the changeability of accidents is a necessary consequence of
the changeability of substance in itself. Substance‘s changeability is thus not imposed
from outside but emerges from within. The importance of this account of the inner
changeability of substance is reflected in its consequences related to time. As Fazlur
Rahman explains,
Mulla Sadra illustrates the succession of body in time with the example of the
continuity of body in space. Just as a body extended in space is made up of
continuous and successive parts, so do the potentially infinite successions in time
constitute movement and extension in time. This continuity ensures both the
difference and unity of a thing in time. Just as parts of an extension in space are
essentially and existentially different from one another, so are the parts of
movement in time different from one another: A thing is no longer the same in
two successive moments. It is not only of the nature of matter to experience
continuous change through different forms, but it is of the nature of body form
itself to change continuously.296
In contrast to the speakers‘ theory of atoms in which the world is, as de Boer says, ―a
discontinuous mass, without any living reciprocal action between its parts,‖297 Sadra
defends the view that the world is a continuous process based on the necessity of the
295
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substantive change of existents. His philosophy thus breaks with the abstract unity of
substance defended by the speakers.298
The relationship of existence/essence, as well as the relationship of
substance/accident, is reinterpreted by Sadra in light of the relationship of cause/effect.
According to his account of causation, the substantial motion of existence—as a
primordial cause of everything—results in the various essences as effects. For Sadra, it is
because of the primary and necessary changeability of existence as a cause in itself that
effects, as well as the changeability of effects, are produced. Essences as effects of the
substantial movement of existence are reflected as mental representations in the human
mind. In other words, existence in its actual and substantial movement manifests itself to
the human mind in and through various essences. This conceptual reflection of essences
in the human mind reflects, in effect, the intelligible content of reality. The intelligibility
of reality is thus not given from outside existence, but from the inner activity of existence
itself. That is to say, the intelligibility of reality emerges from within and not from
something beyond. For Sadra, it is on the ground of this immanent intelligibility of
existence that the identity of thought and being, the knower and the known is possible. In
this regard, Kalin writes,
Sadra establishes a close link between degrees of existence and levels of
consciousness. A logical result of this is a doctrine of ‗ontological vitalism‘
according to which all things, animates and inanimate, have some degree of
consciousness by virtue of the fact that they exist. It is within this context that
Sadra develops his central thesis that when we interact with the world around us,
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we interact with the various modalities and degrees of existence. What we know
or claim to know is always an aspect of existence. 299
Sadra‘s attempt to overcome the deficiency of theological thought of the speakers
from within, however, does not set him completely free from some dogmatic
attachments. In Islamic tradition, the problem of causation is not taken in itself as a
scientific problem; rather, it is taken in terms of the theological problem of the
relationship of the divine will to the human will. Sadra‘s approach to the problem of
causation consists of how positing a priori causation within the cosmos would not run
contrary to the free will of God. So, the question that is central to Sadra is this: How
could ―determinism and freedom‖ in God, Man, and Nature be possible without
contradiction? Sadra‘s answer to this question is guided by his metaphysical
existentialism. The answer aims to clarify the causal, ontological relationship between
existence and essence, on the one hand, and the causal, epistemological relationship
between subject and object, on the other hand.
To clarify Sadra‘s view of determinism and freedom within the framework of the
existential causality, the following long passage by him is important:
The saying attributed to the foremost monotheist , ‗Ali,‘ ―There is neither total
determinism [of human acts] nor total freedom,‖ does not mean that a given
human action is a sort of composite of determinism and freedom; nor does it mean
that it neutralizes both [by becoming a compound of them]; nor does it mean that
from one point of view it is by constraint while from another point of view it is
free; nor yet does it mean that man is really determined and is free only in form—
as the chief of philosophers[Avicenna and indeed al –Farabi] has expressed it;
nor, finally, does it mean that man has a partial and deficient freedom and a
similarly partial and deficient determination. What this saying means is that in
man [voluntary actions]…freedom and determinism are the same. The adage, ―In
everything the golden mean is the best,‖ is truly realized in this view; [only we
must make its meaning precise in this context]. For, the mean between extremes is
sometimes produced by a compounding of the two extremes in such a way that
299
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both sides lose their extremeness; for example, water may achieve such a balance
between hot and cold that it is no longer either hot or cold actually, and yet it
cannot go outside these two categories. In such a mean, it is said, the mean
―cancels out‖ both sides. But there is another sense of „mean‟ [which is more
appropriate in our case]; this means that in a simpler and higher level or mode of
existence, both sides are actually present [and neither of them is removed], but
they become identical with one another in such a way that they do not contradict
each other [nor do they cancel each other out]. ‗Mean‘ in this sense is better than
the mean in the earlier sense.300
The idea that underlies this passage can be interpreted in the general light of Hegel‘s idea
of sublation. 301 The point here is to touch on the three elements of abolishing, preserving,
and transcending in Sadra‘s notion of ―means.‖
In the above passage Sadra suggests a ―means‖ by which the absolute simplicity
of existence is a mediation of extremes, of opposites, of what is different. Mediation here
is nothing other than existence in its highest simple mode— existence as absolute infinity
which includes all finites. For Sadra, the ―means‖ in its true highest simplicity must be
neither one of its extremes, nor the combination of both in such a way that they are
abstractly negated. Instead of the abstract conception of ―means‖ based on the traditional
Aristotelian view of the abstract essence in which the opposites are canceled, Sadra‘s
existential account holds a ―means‖ in which the opposites are actually identical. The two
opposite extremes, as Sadra says, ―become identical with one another in such a way that
they do not contradict each other nor do they cancel each other out.‖ This moment of
identity can be realized at a final stage of the unfolding of existence. God, Man, and
Nature, as three distinct moments, are reflected within this progressively unfolding of
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existence that leads to the absolute identity of determinism and freedom. Freedom thus
excludes and includes determinism insofar as determinism excludes and includes
freedom. They are distinct and identical at the same time. Each abolishes, preserves, and
transcends the other.

Hegel’s Logical Account of Ground
Let us now consider Hegel‘s account of the relation between identity and
difference in comparison with Sadra‘s above view. To make this comparison consistent
also with Hegel‘s critique of the speakers, we will view it in light of Hegel‘s account of
ground.
Hegel writes, ―The Ground is the unity of identity and difference.‖ 302 Ground here
is the source into which identity and difference solve their contradiction. But what is the
relation of ground in terms of essence and existence? Sadra and Hegel, as we will see,
provide two different answers.
Sadra, as we have seen above, maintains that the ground into which the opposites
of identity and difference return is existence in its simplicity. For him, the reconciliation
of differences is reflected in the continuous process of the unfolding of existence. As
Sadra writes, ―everything is an instantiation and ‗particularization‘ of existence which
unfolds itself in a myriad of ways, modes, states, and degrees.‖303This process of
existential unfolding ultimately finds its final realization in the self-centered totality of
the Absolute simplicity of existence. In this stage of absolute existence, the differences
that constitute the nature of essences are completely identical to the degree that there
would be no essence but only pure existence.
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In contrast to Sadra, Hegel writes, ―The ground is the essence in its own
inwardness; the essence is intrinsically a ground; and it is a ground only when it is a
ground of somewhat, of an other.‖304Moreover, contrary to Sadra‘s ―positive simplicity of
existence,‖ Hegel introduces the ―negative simplicity of essence‖ as the ground into
which identity and difference found their solved contradiction: ―Essence, as infinite
return-into-self, is not immediate but negative simplicity; it is a movement through
distinct moments, absolute self-mediation.‖305 Now, since, as Hegel writes, ―an Existence
only proceeds from the ground,‖306 and since the ground is the essence, then, existence
proceeds from essence. But how come that essence is the ground from which existence
proceeds? To understand the emergence of existence from essence we should first
understand the emergence of essence from being.

Essence in Itself: Essence’s Issuing From Being
At the end of the Doctrine of Being and on the section of ―Transition into
Essence‖ Hegel writes, ―Absolute indifference is the final determination of being before
it becomes essence; but it does not attain to essence.‖307 The indifference which precedes
the issuing of essence refers to the general feature of the sphere of Being in which the
categories of the immediate being are indifferent to each other. They are immediately
taken to be externally distinct from each other. But their logical movement ultimately
unveils the deficiency of this relationship of indifference. As the dialectic proceeds in the
section of measure, the qualitative determinations and the quantitative determinations of
the immediate being necessitate each other. In their unity in measure, quality becomes in
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itself quantity and vice versa. They now intrinsically mediate each other. They are no
longer indifferent immediate determinations of being as the ordinary consciousness
considers them. 308 Being at this moment is a unity constituted by relative, non-immediate
moments. ―We now obtain,‖ as Hegel writes, ―the being that is negated in its
determinations, in general terms the sublated being that is Essence.‖ 309 Hegel summaries
the process of the emergence of essence from Being in § 111 of his Encyclopaedia Logic:
Instead of the more abstract sides (of being and nothing, of something and an
other, etc.) the infinite, the affirmation as the negation of the negation, now has
quality and quantity for its sides. Theses sides (α) have passed over into one
another: quality into quantity (§ 98) and quantity into quality (§ 105), and they
have thus exhibited themselves to be negations. (β) But in their unity (in measure)
they are at first distinct, and each is only through the mediation of the other; and
(γ) after the immediacy of this unity has proven to be self-sublating, this unity is
now posited as what it is in-itself, as simple self-relation that contains within it
being in general and its forms as sublated.—Being or immediacy which, through
self-negation, is mediation with itself and relation to itself, and which is therefore
equally mediation that sublates itself into relation to itself or into immediacy—
this being or immediacy is Essence.310
Essence, therefore, is not something beyond the immediate being, as the traditional views
of the metaphysical essentialism might think. It is rather the result of the dialectic of
quality, quantity, and measure, as determinations of being that are no longer fixed but
pass over into each other. That is, essence emerges at the moment when the relation
between the determinations of immediate being is not the indifferent relationship of
immediacy, but different relationship of mediation.
At the end of the doctrine of being we reach, therefore, the conclusion that the
immediacy of being is no longer simple immediacy but mediation. Essence as mediation
is thus not the starting point of thought, for it comes after the thought of what is
308

Hegel writes, ―Ordinary consciousness interprets things as [simply] being, and considers them in terms
of quality, quantity, and measure.‖ Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, § 111, p. 173.
309
Ibid.
310
Ibid., § 111, p. 173.

110

immediately there before us. ―Essence,‖ as Hegel writes, ―issues from being; hence it is
not immediately in and for itself but is a result of that movement.‖311 Essence is nonimmediacy and as thus it is the negation of immediacy. Here we reach the negative
feature of essence. For, although essence issues from immediacy, it is the negation of
immediacy.
If, however, essence emerges when it has been proved that the immediacy of
being is not simple immediacy, essence cannot be understood apart from its relation to
immediacy. Essence here is the essence of what is immediately given. This means that
essence at the moment of its emergence from the immediate being is not independent as
such. Regarding essence in its immediate contrast with the immediate being, essence
seems to have its own immediacy as the essential comparing to what is unessential. That
is, when we take essence to be immediately different from the immediacy of the doctrine
of being, immediacy is still in consideration of essence. 312 Here we have two kinds of
immediacy: the immediacy of essence itself and the immediacy from which essence has
emerged. The latter is the simple immediacy of the doctrine of being which is now
negated by the essence in its own immediacy.
The dialectic of essence, however, does not stop at this ―first negation‖ 313of the
initial immediacy of being. If it stops at this moment, Hegel would be a traditional
essentialist who believes in two distinct beings, one essential and the other unessential.
For him, essence is rather the negation of the immediate negation of immediacy, or
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absolute negativity of being. ―But essence,‖ Hegel writes, ―is the absolute negativity of
being.‖314 In this double negation of immediacy,
the immediate that is still distinguished from essence is not merely an unessential
determinate being but the immediate that is in and for itself a nullity; it is only a
non-essence, illusory being.315
Although illusory being also seems as if it is distinct from essence, 316 essence‘s
reflective movement shows that this illusory being is itself projected by the essence
itself. 317 As Hegel writes, ―This illusory being is not something external to or other than
essence; on the contrary it is essence‘s own illusory being.‖318 This makes Hegel again
different from an essentialist in the traditional sense. For, in the light of considering
essence as a process of negativity, there is no distinction between what seems to be
illusion and what is immediately taken to be beyond this illusion. 319The illusion of the
immediacy of being is ―essence itself in the determinateness of being.‖ 320
In its process of self-negativity, essence, however, does have immediacy in
itself. 321 But the intrinsic immediacy of essence is not the first immediacy of essence that
results in the difference of essence from both the unessential being and the illusory being.
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It is rather the sublation of this first immediacy, which does not reflect the true
determination of essence. Hegel characterizes essence‘s intrinsic immediacy that sublates
the first immediacy, which results in unessential being and illusory being, as ―the
immediacy that is as pure mediation or absolute negativity.‖322 Essence‘s intrinsic
immediacy as pure mediation and absolute negativity determines the very nature of
essence in itself.
This latter consideration of essence in itself, which Hegel also calls simple
essence, leads us to sharp distinction between Hegel and Sadra. As we have seen in the
first chapter, Sadra treats essence from two prospective: essence in itself, and essence for
existence. We found that Sadra‘s essence in itself is equivalent to nothing. For Sadra,
essence in itself does not have any meaningful sense; essence has meaning only in
relation to the reality of existence. In contrast, the meaningful richness of essence in itself
in its Hegelian account makes it the absolute negativity that exposes the deficiency of any
kind of external immediacy, whether it be the immediacy of the unessential being or the
immediacy of the illusory being. For Hegel, essence in itself is not mere nothing as Sadra
maintains but ―the movement of nothing to nothing, and so back to itself.‖ 323 Essence in
itself contains its mediation; as thus, it is not (abstract self-identity) that could be equated
with nothing. Hegel‘s essence in itself is rather (speculative self-identity) in which
opposition is not left out but included within essence as ground—a ground in which the
contradiction of the opposites is resolved.
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However, Hegel‘s consideration of essence does not stop only at the level of
essence in itself. Here are the three interrelated perspectives of essence as Hegel
introduces them before he treats them in details:
I.
II.
III.

As simple essence, essence in itself, which in its determinations remains
within itself
As emerging into determinate being, or in accordance with its Existence
and Appearance
As essence that is one with its Appearance, as actuality.324

These are the three sections that cover the whole of the Doctrine of Essence. Our above
analysis is only related to section one, which Hegel further named as ―Section One:
Essence as Reflection Within Itself.‖ 325 Let us now touch on the second section in which
essence emerges into existence.

Essence’s Emerging into Existence
Before its issuing from the general immediacy of the sphere of Being, ―essence,‖
as Hegel writes, ―was already implicit within measure.‖326The unity of simple essence, or
essence in itself, is thus contained in the sphere of Being but ―only as an implicit
unity.‖327 Essence in this state is ―indeterminate essence.‖ 328 If essence at the end of the
doctrine of being has no determinate being, the sphere of essence is its own sphere in
which ―it must develop determinate being.‖ 329 Hegel writes,
Since essence is at first simple negativity, it now has to posit in its own sphere the
determinateness that is only implicit in it, in order to give itself determinate being
and then being-for-self.[…] The negativity of essence is reflection; and the
determinations are reflected, posited by essence itself and remaining in essence as
sublated. 330
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In its own reflective process of negativity essence determines itself within itself as
the ground of its two moments of reflection: (inward reflection/identity) and (reflectioninto-another/difference). Essence as ground is thus the unity of identity and difference.
But this unity is not abstract; instead, it is self-sublating unity. 331 For Hegel, it is in
considering the unity of identity and difference as speculative unity rather than abstract
unity that essence as ground determines itself and thus emerges into existence. That is,
the speculative unity of essence as ground involves essence‘s self-sublating of its own
determinations that results in its emerging into existence. Hegel writes,
The ground is self-sublating and what it sublates itself toward, the result of its
negation, is existence. Existence, therefore, which is what has emerged from the
ground, contains the latter within itself, and the ground does not remain behind
existence; instead, it is precisely this process of self-sublation and translation into
existence.332
Essence in its own meditating movement of reflection thus sublates itself within
itself. Essence‘s sublating of itself constitutes it as ground that does not result in
nothing—as Sadra might argue— but in existence. As Hegel writes, ―reflection, in ending
with the sublating of itself, does not therefore have for result nothing.‖333 Existence,
rather than nothing, is, therefore, the reflective result of essence‘s meditating movement
with itself in which the ground and the grounded become identical. As Hegel writes,
―essence has passed over into Existence in so far as essence as ground no longer
distinguishes itself from itself as the grounded, or in so far as this ground has sublated
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itself.‖334 In this essence‘s self sublating of its own determinations, the reflected
determinations of essence are dialectically affirmed as the ground of existence.
If existence proceeds from essence, does that imply the priority of essence over
existence? It looks as if we retreat with Hegel to a kind of essentialism in which essence
in its ontological primacy takes advantage over against existence. But Hegel‘s existence
is not viewed as an ontological entity that is bestowed or predicated upon a static essence,
which might exist in the Platonic world of Ideas or in God‘s knowledge. For Hegel, the
inner dynamicity of essence in itself, which constitutes it as pure mediation or absolute
negativity, produces existence not ―as a predicate or as a determination of essence‖ 335—
as the traditional metaphysics of essentialism holds. Instead, the intrinsic dynamicity of
essence as the ground of its own opposites produces existence as ―a being that has come
forth from negativity and inwardness.‖336 This result breaks with the transcendental
relationship between essence and existence in its traditional sense. For, as Hegel writes,
Having issued from the ground, existence contains the ground in it; the ground
does not remain, as it were, behind existence, but by its very nature suspends
itself and translates itself into existence. 337
In its intrinsic process of negativity toward its unfolding as existence, essence has
determined itself as ground. Essence as ground is speculative unity of its inclusive
opposites rather than abstract unity of exclusive opposites. Essence emerges into
existence when it proves to be the ground in which the contradiction of identity and
difference is resolved. In its unfolding process into existence, essence sublates its three
immediate moments of unity: (1) The immediate unity of essence as implicitly reflected
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in the section of measure in the sphere of Being, (2) the immediate unity of essence when
it is regarded in contrast to what seems as unessential being, and (3) the immediate unity
of essence as reflected in the positing reflection of illusory being. Essence as ground that
emerges into existence is the sublation of all these immediacies. The movement of
essence by which it emerges into existence is thus intrinsic movement within essence
itself. Existence is thus the result of essence‘s immanent movement within itself—a
reflective movement from one of its determinations to its opposite one and so back to
itself. In this immanent movement, the opposite determinations of essence do not stand
on their own dependency—as it is the case with the determinations in the sphere of
Being. In Essence, as Hegel writes,
we do not have a genuine other, but only diversity, relation between the One and
its other. Thus in Essence passing-over is at the same time not passing-over. For
in the passing of what is diverse into another diversity, the first one does not
vanish; instead, both remain within this relation. 338
The remaining of the opposites within the same mediated relation of essence does not
mean that they are in static relationship, for they are sublated by essence itself in its
emerging into existence. This reflective dialectic within essence results in existence.
Here, as Hegel writes, ―Existence is essence‘s absolute emptying of itself.‖339
Let us analyze further essence‘s reflective movement within itself that results in
existence, as we found above. At the beginning of the doctrine of essence, Hegel deals
intensively with three types of reflection: positing/pure, external, and determining
reflection.340 In what follows I will not enter into the complex details of the development
of these reflections. I just want to follow the general path that essence, in its reflective
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process of determinacy, takes in the way of its determining itself as ground. The point is
to see the logical results of these moments of reflection that essence intrinsically endures
before it ―converts itself into ground and passes over into Existence.‖341
Essence‘s initial movement as positing reflection results in considering the
immediacy of the sphere of Being neither as distinct unessential being nor as distinct
illusory being. With positing reflection the two latter kinds of being no longer stand in
their immediacy contrasting the immediacy of essence. They are now reflectively brought
back into essence itself. In this inward reflection, essence determines itself as identity
with itself. As Hegel writes in his introducing to the category of identity in his
Encyclopaedia Logic, ―essence shines within itself or is pure reflection. In this way it is
only relation to self (though not as immediate but as reflected relation): identity with
itself.‖342 But this inward reflection which results in essence‘s category of identity is
further opposed by essence‘s external reflection. If the former reflection is inward
reflection that results in identity, the latter reflection is reflection-into-another that would
result in difference. As the external reflection opposes the positing reflection, they are
now both united further in the determining reflection. ―Determining reflection is,‖ as
Hegel writes, ―the unity of positing and external reflection.‖ 343 The reflective movement
of essence as manifested in determining reflection is thus the unity of positing
reflection/identity and external reflection/difference. It is in this determining reflection
that essence sublates its own opposites of identity and difference and then determines
itself as the ground in which the contradiction is resolved. Hence, as Hegel writes,
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―Ground is the unity of identity and distinction….the inward reflection which is just as
much reflection-into-another and vice versa.‖344 It is in this moment of its reflective
totality as ground of its own opposites that essence determines itself.
Thus essence, in determining itself as ground, proceeds only from itself. As
ground, therefore, it posits itself as essence, and it is in positing itself as essence
that its determining consists.345
Essence thus determines itself as ground that sublates its own reflected
determinations. Through the mediation of determinate ground, the dialectic of essence
proceeds from the absolute ground to the conditioning ground.346At the moment of the
determinate ground we reach the sufficiency of ground in which ―there is nothing in the
ground that is not in the grounded, and there is nothing in the grounded that is not in the
ground.‖347But this identity of the ground and the grounded ―remains a mere formalism
and empty tautology.‖348 It is not until the formalism of the determinate ground is further
sublated in the conditioning ground that essence emerges into existence. ―For existence,‖
as Hegel writes, ―is the immediacy that has emerged from the sublating of the mediation
by which ground and condition are related, and in emerging it sublates this emerging
itself.‖349
Hegel‘s essentialism is thus not abstract essentialism in which the relation
between existence and essence stands as abstract duality. For essence‘s reflection is
neither only inward reflection of identity nor only external reflection of difference. The
determining reflection of essence is rather the speculative totality of these previous kinds
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of reflection and kinds of being. It is the speculative unity of identity and difference that
determines essence as ground that emerges into existence. Here the identity of essence is
not to be taken as abstract identity, nor is difference to be taken as abstract difference.
Hegel‘s essentialism is different from abstract essentialism in that it is not a onesided determinateness of truth. For Hegel does not view identity as ―unmoved
identity,‖350 governed only by the mere nature of the law of identity as ―analytic‖. ―It is
evident,‖ for Hegel,
that the law of identity itself, and still more the law of contradiction, is not merely
of analytic but of synthetic nature. For the latter contains in its expression not
merely empty, simple equality-with-self, and not merely the other of this in
general, but, what is more, absolute inequality, contradiction per se. But…the
law of identity itself contains the movement of reflection, identity as a vanishing
of otherness.351
By discovering the ―synthetic‖ nature of the law of identity, Hegel becomes able to states
that ―truth is complete only in the unity of identity with difference.”352 We will see in the
next chapter how Hegel‘s synthetic approach of essentialism is a sublation of the two
analytic views of the positive, qualitative account of essence of the traditional
metaphysics, on the one hand, and the negative, qualitative account of essence of Sadra,
on the other hand.
But our above analysis of the relationship between essence and existence does not
mean that Hegel stops at the moment of essence‘s emerging into existence. Existence
itself becomes an immanent moment within essence‘s unfolding toward the Notion. As a
dialectical movement of reflection toward the Notion, the Logic of Essence has three
general moments: positedness, transitoriness, and determinateness. The latter moment is
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the sublation of the previous two moments. In this context, Hegel writes, ―it is the
determinate that has brought into subjection its transitoriness and its mere positedness, or
has bent back its reflection-into-other into reflection-into-self.‖353 Not until the logical
movement of reflection reaches its category of ―reciprocity,‖ does essence free itself from
the externality of its other and becomes self-determined reflection. For it is in the
opposites of cause and effect as reciprocal determinations of essence that mediation
becomes self-mediation rather than mediation by its other. Here ―reciprocity,‖ as Hegel
writes, ―stands, so to say, on the threshold of the notion.‖354 Notion as self-mediation is
thus the sublation of the mediation of Essence and the immediacy of Being. ―The
Notion,‖ Hegel writes,
is to be regarded in the first instance simply as the third to being and essence, to
the immediate and to reflection. Being and essence are so far the moments of its
becoming; but it is their foundation and truth as the identity in which they are
submerged and contained. They are contained in it because it is their result, but no
longer as being and essence. 355
Let us conclude here by returning to our discussion of Hegel and Sadra in relation
to the speakers. There is a difference between Hegel‘s and Sadra‘s critiques of the
speakers‘ account of causation. While Hegel treats it from outside its theological context,
from outside its sophisticated details related to other theological themes, Sadra reads,
analyzes, and exposes its deficiency from within its theological context. Despite the two
different approaches of Sadra and Hegel, the final result looks similar. Both of them
refuse to accept the relationship between cause and effect to be a mere habit. Both insist
on the necessity between cause and effect. Both push this necessity between cause and
effect to a high level of identity which ultimately finds its manifestation in the Absolute.
353
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Whereas Sadra‘s Absolute is the higher moment of ―simple existence‖356 that
progressively includes and transcends essence, Hegel‘s Absolute is the highest moment
of the speculative Idea that dialectically includes and transcends Being and Essence.

Sadra’s Critique of the Philosophers’ Account of Causality: From the
Essential Contingency to the Existential Contingency.
Supposing that an effect must need a cause, what is the main reason of having a
need for a cause? In other words, why does an effect need a cause? Or, as As-Sadr puts it,
―why do things require causes or agents without which they cannot come to exist; and
what is the real cause that makes them depend on those causes and agents?‖ 357 Prior to
Sadra, there were two opposite Islamic answers, one by the speakers and the other by the
philosophers. As we have seen above, Sadra‘s philosophy is in accord with Hegel‘s in
rejecting the speakers‘ denial of the necessary connection between cause and effect. We
will see now how Sadra‘s rejection of the philosophers‘ account of causality is grounded
on the basis of the primacy of existence over essence.
Under the influence of the theological account of creation in time, the speakers
maintain that the reason why an effect needs a cause consists in its ―temporal
origination‖. For them, because the existents have been preceded by ―non-existence,‖
they need a cause to bring them to existence. The speakers, therefore, consider ―the need
of things for their causes as based on the creation of these things.‖ 358 Accordingly, God is
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uncaused cause because He is not created. In other words, since God is not originated in
time, then He does not require a cause.
This account of causality is rejected by another revival scheme of causation
offered by the philosopher Avicenna. Sadra, however, rejects Avicenna‘s view. Let us
first explain Avicenna‘s view to understand how Sadra rejects it. For Avicenna,
―contingency,‖ rather than ―temporal origination,‖ is the reason why an effect needs a
cause. This account is viewed within Avicenna‘s three modalities of Being: Necessity,
Impossibility, and Contingency. By definition, neither ―necessity‖ nor ―impossibility‖ is
the reason for having a cause. On the other side, contingency by definition means that an
essence has an equal relation to ―existence‖ and ―non-existence.‖ The crucial point that
implies this account is this: Contingency is eternally realized in essence before it exists or
originates in time. That is to say, essence subsists before its actual existence. On this
account, it is possible to consider ―essence‖ as eternal and originated—eternal in its
contingency and originated in its temporality. That is to say, it is because in the first place
an essence in itself is eternally contingent/possible that it is then temporally originated .
Hence, the eternal contingency/possibility of an essence is prior to its temporal
origination. For if an essence is in itself impossible, rather than possible, it cannot come
to exist. Accordingly, in order to be granted ―necessity of existence‖ or ―necessity of nonexistence,‖ an essence needs a cause. 359The reason why an essence or an effect needs a
cause thus is part of its contingency. God does not need a cause since He is necessary
rather than contingent.
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According to Sadra, the consequence of Avicenna‘s philosophical solution to the
problem of causality is the affirmation that existence is an accident supervenient to
essence. In other words, existence is temporally added by God to an essence which is
eternally contingent. Hence, the philosophical account of essential contingency as a basis
of causality results in the ontological priority of essence over existence. Essence in this
account is a distinct ontological entity indifferent to existence and nonexistence; essence
could exist if there is sufficient cause and it could not exist if there is no sufficient cause.
For the [Avecennian] philosophers, therefore, since contingency (could be/could not be)
rather than impossibility (could not be) is equivalent to essence, then essential
contingency is the reason why an essence needs a cause—a cause for an essence to make
it appear or exist. Essence for the philosophers, as Sadra describes it, ―is made
contingent, so it needs [a cause to bring it to existence]. Then it is made necessary, so it is
necessitated.‖360 Hence, the contingency of essence is viewed as a primary ontological
stage that precedes the existential externality of essence. This philosophical account of
causality makes the contingency of essence an ontological condition for existence. That is
to say, existence is conditioned and preceded by another entity than itself.
This dependency of existence on something other than itself, which implicitly or
explicitly supposes that essence precedes existence, is totally rejected by Sadra. He
considers it as a deficiency in the Islamic philosophers.
Although Sadra supports the philosophers‘ view that contingency is the reason
why things require causes, he criticizes them for their mistaken connection between
―contingency‖ and ―essence.‖ His critique can be viewed as an exposition of the
metaphysical essentialism of the Muslim philosophers. Against the notion that essence is
360
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the bearer of contingency in a contingent— which entails the pre-reality of essence over
its external existence— Sadra denies all reality to essence. Avicenna‘s account of
causation implies that essences in their eternal contingency share a kind of eternality with
God. In order to save the eternality only for God, Sadra consider essences as pure
negativity or nothing. God, in this case, must be pure existence without any trace of
essence. It is only when we view God as pure existence unmixed with essence that He is
in no need of a cause. That is to say, it is only on the basis of the primacy of existence
over essence that God is uncaused cause.
In order to make God the only cause that does not require cause, the reason why
things require causes must consist in the existential possibility rather than the essential
possibility. This line of thought pushes Sadra to consider that, essences, as Rahman puts
it,
are nothing, i.e., even ―something‖ cannot be predicated of them except when
they are conceived by the mind; otherwise, they are absolutely indiscernible in
their native darkness. The locus of contingency is, therefore, the contingent
existent itself insofar as it has the possibility of existence. 361
The existential contingency here affirms the necessary priority of existence over essence.
Contingency on the existential level, rather than the essential level, means the necessary
ever-newness of existence according to its substantial movement. For Sadra, this eternal,
existential contingency constitutes the reason why the things require causes. On this
existential account of causality, it is not the case that existence causes the essence to exist
as if essence is ―something‖ independent and waits for an accidental act. This latter view
of causality is accepted only from an analytical point of view based on the limitation of
the faculty of understanding. In the external realization of truth, existence as Absolute
361
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simplicity has nothing outside itself and consequently develops itself within itself. To
understand this point more clearly let us look how the concept of ―necessity‖ is situated
in Sadra‘s scheme of Being.
For Sadra, the logical relation of ―necessity‖ in terms of ―affirmation‖ and
―negation‖ determines three modes of being: ―Must be/Necessary,‖ ―Could not
be/Impossibility,‖ and ―Might be or Might not be/Contingency.‖ In their logical relation
to ―necessity,‖ these three modes of being can be further explained as follows:
1-

The absolute ―affirmation‖ of ―necessity‖ is equivalent to ―Must be,‖ as
manifested in the Necessary Existent/God—the pure actuality.

2-

The absolute ―negation‖ of ―necessity‖ is equivalent to ―Could not be,‖
as manifested in Non-Existence/Nothing—the pure potentiality or the
prime matter.

3-

The indifference of negation and affirmation of necessity is equivalent
to ―Might be or Might not be,‖ as manifested in the contingent
existents—the world as a compound of potentiality/actuality and
essence/existence.

But these above distinctions remain, for Sadra, conceptual distinctions rather than
real distinctions. If we conceptually consider ―necessity‖ in an absolute and unqualified
sense, then we reach the notion of the Absolute Necessary Existent/God— which entails
that He Must be. Similarly, if we conceptually posit an absolute negation of ―necessity‖
then the result would be the notion of ―Absolute non-existence/ Could not be.‖ But if, on
the other hand, we consider ―necessity‖ as relative to both ―affirmation‖ and ―negation,‖
then neither ―Absolute existence,‖ nor ―Absolute non-existence‖ is our notion. Rather, a
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new notion emerges that will be neither the notion of ―Absolute existence‖ nor the notion
of ―Absolute non-existence‖ but the synthesis of both.
This new synthetic notion reflects the notion of the ―existential contingency‖ in
which ―existence‖ and ―non-existence‖ are progressively related in a dialectical, implied
sense. On the basis of this ―existential contingency,‖ the world incessantly evolves
through successive stages into its simplest form, ultimately recognizing its existentiality
in the simplicity of the Absolute Existence/God. Sadra here uses the term ―simple‖ to
mean, as Rahman says, ―that that which exists at the lower levels with separate or
mutually exclusive parts exists at the higher levels as mutually inclusive and unitary.‖ 362
Existence as absolute simplicity, therefore, includes all things in its unity. Existence
embraces in its simple unity the totality of its different modes.
The point that could find appreciation in Hegel‘s Lectures on the History of
Philosophy consists in Sadra‘s representing of the simple Absolute existence not as
empty and abstract unity, but as a unity of the different modes of existence. These
different modes of existences are internally produced due to the substantial movement of
existence itself.
The innermost existential activity of substance as determined in itself, and not as
imposed externally from outside, brings us to Hegel‘s notion of organic life of the
whole. 363 The notion of the unfolding of the world on the basis of its inherent, existential
contingency has, Hegel would say, ―its efficacy in itself.‖
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That which has organic life, whose principle is formative, which has its efficacy
in itself, and in the same only remains at home with itself and maintains itself, is
nothing but the end, the activity determined in itself, which in its relation to what
is different does not comport itself as mere cause, but returns upon itself. 364
Sadra‘s notion of the Absolute simplicity of existence entails this Hegelian idea of the
cause that ―returns upon itself.‖ For Sadra, existence alone is real and God is pure
existence. The reality of existence reveals itself as organic unity in which the different
modes of existence, as plurality, find their identity not only in their relation to one
another but also in their relation to the life of the whole. The contingent existents, as
modes of the Necessary existence, find their existential originality in God.365 For Sadra,
the Necessary existence/God is pure life, and the contingent existents—in their relations
to their origin/God—are manifestations of the organic life of existence in its simple
totality. 366 Hence the existentiality of the organic life of the whole is a self-contained
cause which finds its causality in itself. And, as Sadra writes,
existence, insofar as it is existence, has no agent from which it emanates, no
matter into which it transforms, no subject in which it is found, no form by which
it is clothed, no goal for which it is [established]. Rather, it itself is the agent of all
agents, the form of all forms, and the goal of all goals. 367
Against the one-sided causality based on the temporality of the world, on the one
hand, and the one-sided causality based on the eternality of world, on the other hand,
Sadra‘s view of causality synthesizes temporality and eternality in terms of the
metaphysical unity of the unfolding existence. But this synthesis is first preceded by
Sadra‘s distinction of two lines of causes: the horizontal, temporal line of causes, and the
vertical, eternal line of causes. The former is related to natural causes. The latter is related
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to God‘s existential identity with ―the Intelligence of Muslim Peripatetics, the Forms of
Plato, and the Attributes of the theologians.‖368 These two lines of causes are interrelated.
The natural temporal causes cause movement and change but do not give existence to the
effects. Existence, rather, comes through the vertical line of causes. This does not mean
that God causes Platonic Forms to come into existence. Existence rather is substantially
in a state of flux, in a state of unfolding toward its absolute simplicity realized in God.
The graduated levels of reality correspond to the gradual unfolding of existence on the
scale of these two interrelated lines of causes. 369The existential causality here reflects this
causal dialectical relationship between what is natural and what is supernatural, what is
material and what is spiritual, what is immanent and what is transcendental. Within this
causal viewpoint of reality, existence maintains itself as the ultimate real cause which
eternally emerges from itself and returns to itself.

Sadra’s and Hegel’s Critiques of The Formal Logic of Arabic Philosophers
What Sadra considers as ―the concept of existence,‖370 —a concept that we
abstractly have in our mind about the external and actual existence—approaches what
Hegel means by the abstract account of ―existence‖ in his Logic. For both Hegel and
Sadra, the concept of existence as ―abstract category of thought‖ is an inadequate
predicate of truth or God. Both of them try to advance over the finite characteristics of
the faculty of understanding which limit reality only within the abstract form of
existence. In the context of his critique of the metaphysics of abstract existence, Hegel
writes,
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The thinking of the old metaphysical system was finite. Its whole mode of action
was regulated by categories, the limits of which it believed to be permanently
fixed and not subject to any further negation. Thus one of its questions was: Has
God existence? The question supposes that existence is an altogether positive
term, a sort of ne plus ultra. We shall see however at a latter point that existence
is by no means a merely positive term, but one which is too low for the Absolute
Idea, and unworthy of God.371
That which is unworthy of God is not existence in its concrete and actual sense, but
existence in its abstract sense. Hegel, therefore, refuses to accept the abstract, narrow, and
rigid term of existence to be an equivalent to truth. For him, existence, taken as isolated
and abstract category, is finite form. ―But truth,‖ Hegel writes, ―is always infinite, and
cannot be expressed or presented to consciousness in finite terms.‖ 372 But what Hegel
means here by infinite ―is not to be conceived as abstract away and away for ever and
ever.‖373 Instead of this spurious infinity, Hegel argues that truth is ―the genuine Notion
of infinity.‖374 If the spurious infinity is the infinite of the understanding in which the
finite is negatively excluded from the infinite, the genuine infinite of reason is that which
speculatively includes the finite within it. For if every negation is a determination then
the infinite‘s negation of the finite implies the determination of the infinite along with the
determination of the finite. But this means that the infinite is limited. As thus, the infinite
contradicts its definition. It is only when we understand the infinite as the negation of
negation that we reach the genuine infinite as a sublation of the spurious infinite. Hence,
as Hegel writes, ―in saying what the infinite is, namely the negation of the finite, the
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latter is itself included in what is said; it cannot be dispensed with for the definition or
determination of the infinite.‖ 375
The difference between the notion of existence as ―abstract‖ and ―an isolated
predicate of a thing,‖ on the one hand, and the notion of existence as ―concrete,‖ on the
other, is significant in both Sadra‘s and Hegel‘s philosophy. 376 Sadra reflects this
difference between these two different senses of existence by saying,
The reality of existence-qua-existence is not limited by generality and
delimitation, universality and particularity, and inclusiveness and specificity. It is
neither one [numerically] by a oneness added to it, nor many…. In its inner most
truth, it is nothing but full realization, actuality and manifestation. These
meanings of contingency, concepts of universality, attributes of rational
consideration, and terms of mental analysis are attached to it on account of its
degrees and stations.377
For Hegel, this difference between the abstractness and concreteness of existence reflects,
in fact, the difference between Dialectic and Reflection:
Dialectic is different from Reflection. In the first instance, Reflection is that
movement out beyond the isolated predicate of a thing which gives it some
reference, and brings out its relativity, while still in other respects leaving it its
isolated validity. But by Dialectic is meant the indwelling tendency outwards by
which the one-sidedness and limitation of the predicates of understanding is seen
in its true light, and shown to be the negation of them. 378
Within these Hegelian and Sadrian account of the concreteness of existence, the Islamic
philosophers do not advance over the stage of the metaphysics of abstract knowledge. In
his critique of the Arabic philosophers on this limited view of knowledge, Hegel writes,
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―The Arabians developed the metaphysics of understanding and a formal logic,‖ but
―much good is not to be got from them.‖ 379
The reason why "much good is not to be got from‖ the Islamic philosophers‘
formal logic lies in its inability to unite in a concrete system many pairs such as
subjectivity/objectivity, simplicity/complexity, infinity/finitude, etc.380 For Hegel, the
sphere in which this formal logic operates is Essence: ―The terms in Essence,‖ Hegel
writes, ―are always mere pairs of correlatives, and not yet absolutely reflected in
themselves. Hence in essence the actual unity of the notion is not realized, but only
postulated by reflection.‖ 381
This means that the categories of essence are not the final categories by means of
which thought can adequately grasp the truth. Although the doctrine of essence is an
advance over the doctrine of being in that it is no longer only immediacy but includes
mediation, the mediation of essence is still mediation by another and is not selfmediation. As we have seen before, logic shows that each category of essence is mediated
by its opposite. Here the opposites within the categories of essence are not absolutely
taken to be identical; they are “not yet absolutely reflected in themselves,‖ as Hegel says
above. Essence, therefore, does not absorb the opposites within an absolute unity in
which these opposites are sublated.
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Since the opposites that determine the essence are not yet themselves identical,
essence is not self-determined. Accordingly, the sphere of essence is not the sphere of
freedom but the sphere of necessity. ―Freedom,‖ by contrast, Hegel writes,
belongs to the Notion because that identity which, as absolutely determined,
constitutes the necessity of substance, is now also sublated or is a positedness, and
this positedness as self-related is simply that identity.382
This is why Hegel finds that ―in essence the actual unity of the Notion is not realized,‖
for it will be realized only when essence‘s necessary determination by its other is
sublated by the free self-determination of Notion in which there is nothing outside it.
Here we reach the genuine Notion of infinity which does not take the finite outside it but
within it. The infinite of the understanding which is considered by the logic of essence as
―the absolute Truth‖ is for Hegel, ―absolute contradiction.‖ 383 For if, according to the
logic of abstract essence, infinite and finite are just opposites, the infinite will be as Hegel
shows ―the limit of the finite and is thus only a determinate infinite, an infinite which is
itself finite.‖384
Here we can find some general similarity between Hegel and Sadra with regard to
the relation of essence to Truth as Absolute. For Hegel, as we have seen above, essence
in its abstract sense is posited within understanding‘s epistemological standpoint of
Truth. For him, this stage of knowledge is a necessary stage toward a further higher stage
of knowledge, but it is not the ultimate one. Essence accordingly is not the higher
definition of the Absolute. Essence as a result of the external reflection of understanding,
which knows how to distinguish between its own isolated determinations, is higher than
the mere immediacy of sensation, which takes these different determinations in simple
382
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self-relation. But this stage of abstract essence still falls short in expressing Truth in its
Absolute and unconditioned sense. For, as we have seen above, this stage knows how to
distinguish its own opposites but does not know how to unite them. Any attempt that the
abstract view of essence makes to unite the differences would result in contradictions that
could not be reconciled under the formal logic‘s principle of non-contradiction. 385 In
order to embrace the differences in a higher stage, truth as Absolute infinity must,
therefore, advance over the abstract logic of essence.
To clarify Sadra‘s epistemological view in terms of the relation between essence
and truth, it is important to explain his understanding of the relation between subject and
object. Sadra‘s theory of knowledge operates against many Islamic philosophers who do
not accept the identity between subject and object. With this regard, let us take, for
instance, Sadra‘s critique of the Master of the Islamic philosophers, Avicenna. Sadra
writes,
There are two points we have to know before delving into the critique of what the
Master and others have said to reject the unification between the intellector
[knower] and the intelligibilia [known] in a general and specific way. The first is
that existence in everything is the principle reality in existentiation, and it is the
principle of its particularity, the source of its quiddity, and the measure of its
essence. Existence belongs to the category of things that allow intensification and
diminution in terms of perfection and imperfection, and it has fundamental
qualities and modes in every degree of intensification and diminution other than
what it had before. The second [point]: as motion and transformation take place in
quality and quantity, it also occurs in the formal substance (al-jawhar al-suri),
which is connected to matter in a certain way. Motion in every category is
necessitated by a single existence that is continuous, individual and gradual, and
has, in every presumed moment of the time of this motion, a specific delimitation
385
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among the limits of existence, which exists neither before nor after it [i.e.,
motion].386
This passage reflects how Sadra‘s theory of the unification of subject/ ―intellect‖ and
object/―intelligible‖ is based on his theory of existence. His critique of the
epistemological view of the formal logic is basically founded on his critique of the
ontological ground of that logic.
If, for Sadra, the distinction between existence and essence is only conceptual,
then the way to bridge this conceptual gap between existence and essence is to bridge the
epistemological gap between the subjectivity of thinking and the objectivity of that which
is thought. This needs another mode of knowledge that goes beyond the abstract
knowledge of understanding. Sadra would agree with Hegel in his statement that ―the
battle of reason is the struggle to break up the rigidity to which the understanding has
reduced everything.‖387 This ―battle of reason‖ eventually culminates in the identity of
existence/essence by means of the identity of subject/object. The true triumph of the
battle of reason against the abstractness of understanding is when man reaches ‗complete
existence‘ through consciousness and self-realization.
Another example of Sadra‘s arguing against his previous Islamic philosophers can
be viewed in the light of Suhrawardi‘s refusal of the unity between subject and object.
Suhrawardi, who is one of the most prominent defenders of the primacy of essence in
Arabic philosophy, writes,
Some people have thought that when the perceiver perceives something, he
becomes [identical with] it. […] When we say that A becomes B, does A remain
the same and then we have B, thus both of them becoming multiple entities? Or is
it rather that A is destroyed and B has not come into being, in which case there is
no unification between the two?...When the soul thinks of A, does it remain the
386
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same as it was before [it thought it]? If so, then there is no union or the
establishment [of a new being]. Or perhaps the soul is destroyed and something
else has come into being, in which case there is again no unity [obtained between
the soul and its object of intellection]. 388
In his response to this passage, Sadra exposes Suhrawardi‘s metaphysical essentialism.
He writes,
The Shaykh (i.e., Suhrawardi) has assumed that disparity [differentiation]
(tafawut) takes place between two things in terms of perfection and deficiency in
their shared quiddities [essences] without regard to any other condition
concerning difference (fasl) or accident. The truth is that a single concept
(mafhum) does not possess disparity [differentiation] from the point of view of its
meaning (ma „na). Disparity [differentiation] can be only in reference to more
intensity and weakness through the modes of actualization and concrete beings
(al-wujudat) because existence allows disparity [differentiation] [in terms] of
perfection and deficiency. 389
Sadra clarifies his position against Suhrawardi more clearly by saying:
The realization of this matter [i.e., the unification of the intellect and the
intelligible] is impossible except through the principles that were mentioned in the
beginning of this book [i.e., the Asfar] concerning the view that existence is the
principle reality and essence is derived from it. It is certain that existence allows
intensification and diminution, and whatever is strong in existentiation (qawiyy
al-wujud) becomes more inclusive and encompassing of universal meanings and
abstract intellective quiddities. When existence reaches the level of the simple
intellect which is completely disengaged from the world of corporeal bodies and
quantities, it becomes all of the intelligibila/universals and all things in a manner
more virtuous and nobler than what they are based upon. Whoever has not tasted
this path cannot understand the simple intellect which is the source of all detailed
sciences. That is why you see most of the virtuous people finding it very difficult
and unable to verify it in spite of their deep involvement in following the science
of wisdom such as Suhrawardi in the Mutaratht, Talwihat , and Hikmat al-ishraq,
who has clearly rejected this view, and Imam [Fakhr al-Din] al-Razi and those
who are in their state and class.390
On the epistemological level, Sadra thus believes that the reconciliation of
opposites could be reached by the intellectual intuition in which the knower and the
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known are identical. Here the intellectual intuition is the epistemological ground in which
the opposites of the knower and the known are dissolved. On the other side, Sadra‘s
absolute simplicity of existence is the ontological ground in which the opposites of
essence are absolutely dissolved. For Hegel, this higher stage of groundedness is the
stage of the Absolute Idea in which Being and Essence, the immediate and mediated,
subject and object, are brought dialectically in a higher system of totality. This totality,
however, is not abstract totality in which differences are not distinguished. It is rather a
sublated identity in which differences are preserved in the higher whole. Both Sadra and
Hegel consider this process toward the Absolute as unfolding. For Sadra, it is the
unfolding of the actual existence. For Hegel, it is the unfolding of the Idea which reflects
the speculative unity of Being and Essence.
If we take Sadra‘s insistence on the difference between the abstract sense of
existence and the concrete sense of existence, and add the fact that his philosophy is
based on the substantial movement of existence, then we can say that Hegel‘s notion of
Dialectic is already implicit in his philosophy. This can be supported by what Hegel
means by Dialectic when he says:
It is of the highest importance to ascertain and understand rightly the nature of
Dialectic. Wherever there is movement, wherever there is life, wherever anything
is carried into effect in the actual world, there Dialectic is at work. 391
Despite these general similarities between them, Hegel‘s and Sadra‘s critiques of the
deficiencies of Arabic philosophy are significantly different. Whereas Hegel‘s critique is
external in the sense that it is imposed upon Arabic philosophy from outside its actual
formulation, Sadra‘s critique emerges from within the dynamicity of the cultural context
of the Arabic philosophy itself. In this sense, Sadra‘s critique of his Arabic previous
391
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philosophies satisfies Hegel‘s demand of the progression of philosophy. That demand
which, as Yovel puts it, must ―emerge from within the development of actual knowledge
and actual forms, and not as an artificial imposition upon them.‖ 392
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Chapter Four
Hegel, Sadra, and the Qualitative Determination of Truth
In his Science of Logic, right before the section of ―The Transition to Essence,"
Hegel reaches this account of essence:
This unity thus posited as the totality of the process of determining, in which it is
itself determined as indifference, is a contradiction in every respect; it therefore
has to be posited as sublating this its contradictory nature and acquiring the
character of a self-determined, self-subsistent being which has for its result and
truth not the unity which is merely indifferent, but that immanently negative and
absolute unity which is called essence. 393
This long and complex sentence displays the most progressive moment in the doctrine of
Being, in which the immediate unity of Being eventually shows itself to be ―a
contradiction in every respect.‖ As the dialectic proceeds, the indifferent unity of Being is
sublated by the absolute unity of essence. Essence, however, is a moment within the total
spontaneity of the process of determining that unfolds dialectically towards the Idea. If,
for Hegel, the determining process of truth is ―the nature of the content itself which
spontaneously develops itself in a scientific method of knowing,‖394 Logic is this method
which dialectally proceeds as a self-explanatory process of scientific knowing. The
importance of Hegel‘s Logic lies in this self-explanatory principle that exposes truth‘s
process of determining—a process that leads to the unitary totality of the speculative
determinate being as Absolute. In my view, Logic as a self-explanatory process of
determining reveals three main logical moments of determinate being.
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Determinate being is firstly manifested within the sphere of ―Quality.‖395 The
qualitative determinate being corresponds to the epistemological standpoint of
immediacy in general. The second logical moment of determinate being is ―essence‖ as
unfolded by the mediation of the epistemological view of reflection. 396 ―But,‖ as Hegel
discovers,
the determinate being which essence gives itself is not yet determinate being as in
and for itself, but as given by essence to itself, or as posited, and is consequently
still distinct from the determinate being of the Notion.397
Thus, the third logical moment of determinate being is ―Notion‖ as is speculatively
culminated within the epistemological view of sublation. For Hegel, as he concludes,
―Notion is the absolute that in its determinate being is absolute.‖398
In what follows, I argue—as a conclusion to this dissertation— that Hegel‘s
speculative account of truth sublates both the traditional metaphysical view of truth based
on considering essence as affirmative quality on the one hand, and Sadra‘s existential
metaphysic based on considering essence as negative quality on the other. This sublation
lies basically in Hegel‘s speculative treatment of the qualitative determinateness of truth
as presented in ―Section One: Determinateness (Quality)‖ of his Science of Logic.
***
In his Introduction to his Objective Logic, Hegel writes,
Objective logic is therefore the genuine critique of them [categories as
determinations of thought and being]—a critique which does not consider them as
395

Hegel explains the first moment of the emergence of determinate being by saying: ―From becoming
there issues determinate being, which is the simple oneness of being and nothing.‖ Ibid., p. 109.
396
I should mention here that I do not consider Hegel‘s logic as merely an epistemological logic but also as
ontological. Hegel‘s speculative categories as determinations of Truth/ Idea are not only selfdeterminations of thought but also self-determinations of being. Hegel‘s logic is this dialectical relationship
of determining what it is to be and what it is to think—a dialectical relationship that leads to the speculative
identity of thought and being.
397
Ibid., p.391.
398
Ibid.

140

contrasted under the abstract forms of the a priori and the a posteriori, but
considers the determinations themselves according to their specific content.399
According to my reading, Hegel‘s Objective Logic is a critique to the first two moments
of determinate being: that of (the qualitative determinations of immediacy) as manifested
in the doctrine of Being, and that of (the reflective determinations of mediation) as
manifested in the doctrine of Essence. The former can be directed to the classical, formal
logic which takes the forms of thought as a posteriori—as abstraction from the external
objective world. The latter is directed to the modern, transcendental logic which take the
a priori determinations of thought as the objective element of universality and necessity.
This leads me to consider Hegel‘s objective logic as a critique to two accounts of the onesided objectivity of truth:
1- The classical account of the objectivity of the qualitative determination of truth—
as represented especially by the Aristotelian traditional view.
2- The modern account of the objectivity of the transcendental logic of truth—as
represented especially by Kant.
Whereas the first point is implicit in Hegel‘s objective logic, the second point is explicit.
In this regard, Hegel writes, ―What has been called objective logic would correspond in
part to what with him [Kant] is transcendental logic.‖400 Unlike Kant, who focuses on
―the so-called transcendental aspect of the categories,‖ Hegel focuses on ―the treatment
of the categories themselves.‖ 401 His aim is to expose, first, ―what they (categories) are in
themselves without the abstract relation to the ego common to all,‖ and, second, ―what is
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their specific nature relatively to each other and their relationship to each other.‖ 402
Hegel‘s speculative treatment of the categories, represented more effectively in the
doctrine of Essence, leads to the third shape of determinate being: The Absolute Idea
determined in-and -for-itself, as exhibits in the speculative logic of Notion.
That Hegel treats the sphere of quality as a critique of the traditional view of
essence can be generally clarified in light of the difference between quality and property.
―Property,‖ Hegel warns, ―should not be confused with quality.‖ 403 For, as he adds,
―something is what it is only by its quality: whereas, though the thing indeed exists only
as it has its properties, it is not confined to this or that definite property, and can
therefore, lose it, without ceasing to be what it is.‖404 In contrast to the accidental
property, quality is thus the essential characteristic that is identical with being to the
extent a determinate being ceases to be what it is if it loses its quality. This point makes
the essentiality of quality in regard to a determinate being equivalent to essence in the
traditional sense. But, as we will see later on, Hegel‘s dialectical method of selfdetermining of Truth exposes the deficiency of the one-sided view of the qualitative
determination of Truth.
Several passages from Hegel support my last point. The striking passage can be
found in Hegel‘s Lectures on Logic, Berlin, 1831. In this passage, Hegel explicitly
mentions Aristotle:
Such a determinate being is first given out to be the quale, quality [τὸ τί ἦν
εἶναι]405, as Aristotle says. Something is constituted by such and such a nature,
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and if it loses that nature its very being falls by the wayside. Its [qualitative]
determination is inwardly connected with its very being. 406
It is not by chance that in this passage Hegel brings in Aristotle. This passage is in accord
with Hegel‘s identification of the four Aristotelian principles as he introduces them in his
Lectures on The History of Philosophy. Hegel writes,
In this ontology [Aristotle‘s] or, as we call it, logic, he [Aristotle] investigates and
minutely distinguishes four principles: first, determination or quality as such, the
wherefore of anything, essence or form; secondly, the matter; thirdly, the
principle of motion; and fourthly, the principle of final cause, or of the good. 407
Essence, in its Aristotelian metaphysical sense, can be thus equated with a specific
quality completely jointed to a determinate being. If, for Aristotle, a thing‘s essence is the
statement of its definition, of what it is,408 then, as Hegel writes, ―quality is, in the first
place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if
it loses its quality.‖409 And, again, ―a something is what it is in virtue of its quality, and
losing its quality it ceases to be what it is.‖410
It is clear from these passages that the function Hegel assigns to quality in the
logic of being is, in general, equivalent to the function which is assigned to essence by
the Aristotelian metaphysics. However, this does not mean that Hegel agrees that quality
is equivalent to the truth of a determinate being. This is merely an initial account of the
truth of a determinate being within the total spontaneity of the process of determining.
That is to say, both Hegel‘s initial account of quality and the Aristotelian qualitative
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account of essence are regarded as the ontological principle of a determinate being—a
principle the loss of which makes the determinate being cease to be what it is; its very
being, as Hegel mentions, falls by the wayside. As Hegel writes, ―take away from the
dog its animality, and it becomes impossible to say what it is.‖411 Quality in this limited
sense in Hegel‘s doctrine of Being thus plays the same ontological role that essence plays
in the classical metaphysics. We will see later how Hegel shows the inconsistency of
regarding quality as equivalent to the truth/essence of a determinate being.
There is another point that could support my claim of considering Hegel‘s
quality–in this circumscribed sense – as equivalent to the Aristotelian account of essence.
Let us, following Hegel‘s evaluation of the speculative Aristotle, take Aristotle as the
systematic philosopher with whom the concept of being takes its proper place in the
classical metaphysics. Aristotle‘s science of being as being differs from other determinate
sciences—such as mathematics, physics, etc.— in that it is not limited or restricted to a
particular genus of being. 412 Aristotle‘s being as being is, therefore, free from all the
restrictions and limitations of a determinate being. In this sense, being as such is the
negation of all determinations. Being as such is thus an indeterminate being.
In my view, the starting-point of Hegel‘s Science of Logic carries out this
Aristotelian demand of the absolute indifference of being as being to its highest possible
form or mode.413 For Hegel, ―it is the abstract indeterminateness and immediacy in which
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it must be the beginning.‖ 414 Pure being, as the starting-point of Logic, is absolutely
different from any other kind of being. While the other modes of being are, determinate,
restricted, limited, particularized, and therefore finite, pure being is absolutely
indeterminate to the extent it “becomes” identical to ―nothing”.415 ―Becoming,‖ then, as
Hegel shows, consequentially proceeds to ―determinate being,‖ from which the other
categories deduce themselves spontaneously.
Thus both Aristotle‘s being as such and Hegel‘s pure being do not presuppose
any determination. However, in his semi-systematic process of determining,416 Aristotle‘s
being as such reaches the essential consideration that the very nature of a determinate
being lies in, as Hegel says, ―its qualitative determination.‖ That qualitative
determination Hegel writes, ―is inwardly connected with its very being.‖ Hegel clearly
writes, ―It has already been shown that the beginning is made with being as such,
therefore, with qualitative being.‖ 417 Quality, in this immediate and limited account,
therefore, is the first determination that makes a being a determinate being— a
determination so identical to a being to the extent a determinate being ceases to be what it
is if it loses its quality. This immediate account of quality thus becomes equivalent to the
essence or the ―what it is‖ of a determinate being in the classical metaphysics.
For Hegel, this classical metaphysical account, as thus far expressed, is deficient.
In order to show the deficiency of taking quality as an equivalent to the essence of a
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determinate being, Hegel invites us to speculatively contemplate the category of quality
itself. The point is to investigate whether this category is self-consistent or selfcontradictory. This will be in light of discussing the metaphysical view which bases its
account of the distinct quality of a determinate being on the abstract assumption that a
genus must exclude differentia. That is to say, a genus, as a universal, must exclude the
differences of its species. Genus must only include what is common among its species.
The essence of a certain species consists in its qualitative difference from other species.
Hence, as W. T. Stace, in his The Philosophy of Hegel, shows, ―The boundary lines
between species and species are qualitative limits.‖ 418 For example, the essence of man,
as a species subsumed under the genus animal, consists in its specific quality of
rationality that differentiates it from other species. If man loses his quality of rationality
that differentiates him from other species, he will cease to be what he is. Difference from
others is thus considered in the qualitative determination of man but only as exclusion,
and not as inclusion. That is, quality as a distinct characteristic of a determinate being
excludes but not includes difference or other. Moreover, when essence in its qualitative
determinacy is considered in itself as a universal of its individuals, it also excludes the
differences of its individuals. For Hegel, this exclusion of others from the account of
quality in the classical sense of essence is self-contradictory. As Stace puts it,
The problem was how to pass from genus to species in view of the fact that the
genus expressly excludes the differentia. Now Hegel‘s discovery consists in this,
that the required differentia is always the negative, and that, when this is
understood, it is seen that the old view that the genus excludes the differentia is
not the complete truth.419
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Hegel‘s Logic, as we will see, proves that the other must be included in the account of
quality as determination.
From the Hegelian point of view, the metaphysical account of essence— as a
quality that determines the inner nature of a determinate being—is mistakenly taken to be
only the reflection of the affirmative reality of a determinate being in itself. As Hegel
writes, ―quality, taken in the distinct character of being, is reality.‖420 Hegel criticizes this
one-sided affirmative, qualitative account of reality because it excludes negation from
being an essential moment of the constitution of the distinct character of being.
―Reality,‖ Hegel shows, ―is given the value of something positive from which negation,
limitation and deficiency are excluded.‖421 Against even the conservative religious views
which consider God only in his positive quality, Hegel writes, ―Thus in God himself,
quality (energy, creation, power, and so forth), essentially involves the determination of
the negative—they are the producing of an other.‖422 The insufficiency of the
determination of quality is exposed further in the logic of Quantity in which, as Hegel
proves, ―[the] inner connection of being and quality is no longer present.‖423 But, for the
purpose of my argument, I will not follow the dialectic of quantity in its details.
Let us now turn to Sadra and see how we can appropriate his metaphysical view
of essence with Hegel‘s critique of the qualitative being. According to Hegel‘s Logic,
―every philosophical system should be regarded as the presentation of a particular
moment, or a particular stage, in the process of the development of the Idea.‖ 424 If this is
420
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so, Sadra‘s philosophy can be regarded as the presentation of the opposite moment of
essence as the positive quality of a determinate being. For Sadra, essence is rather the
negative quality of a determinate existent. This claim I consider as an answer to the
question that I had posed at the beginning of the third chapter regarding the philosophical
status of Sadra‘s philosophy within Hegel‘s evaluation of the history of philosophy.
Arguing that existence is the only reality, Sadra criticizes his predecessors,
including the traditional views of Plato and Aristotle, for giving affirmative reality to
essence—as we saw in chapter one and three. For Sadra, essence-in-itself without
reference to its mode of existence is absolutely ―nothing‖. By considering essences as
mere negative qualities rather than positive qualities of determinate existents, the
knowing existent unfolds ontologically and epistemologically towards the pure simplicity
of the Absolute Existence/God. The Absolute Truth of truths as Extended existence425
negates any qualitative determination by essence. Essence, as quality in itself, is
absolutely negative; it is nothing.
But, in Hegel‘s speculative language, Sadra still operates within the abstract
sphere of the qualitative determinateness of truth. From the standpoint of Hegel‘s
speculative logic, Sadra‘s account of essence makes the inward negativity of essence not
a constitutive element of the Absolute‘s process of determining but a mere negative
quality. That is to say, although Sadra‘s account of essence implies negation, this
negation is only taken as mere deficiency and not as a principle drive of unfolding and
moments of pure being, nothing, and becoming. Hegel writes, ―It was the Eleatics, above all Parmenides,
who first enunciated the simple thought of pure being as the absolute and sole truth.‖ Hegel, Science of
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determining—not as a principle of sublation. Here I agree with Fazlur Rahman that the
Hegelian idea of sublation is absent in Sadra‘s account of the evolution of existence.
Rahman in his The Philosophy of Sadra writes,
Sadra‘s thought presents certain interesting features resembling Hegelianism,
notably, the explicitly stated idea that contradiction at a lower level are
systematically synthesized at a higher level which is, therefore, more concert and
real….In the West, the element of movement was systematically worked out by
Hegel. In Sadra, however, while the existence of opposites is recognized at all
contingent levels, which are synthesized at higher levels (that is why, for Sadra,
the law of contradiction is applicable within the perimeters of opposites at a given
level only and does not extend beyond that level so far as those opposites are
concerned), there is no trace of any explicit formulation of the characteristically
Hegelian doctrine of the generation of its opposite or anti-thesis by a thesis. 426
However, I do not agree with Rahman‘s characterization of Hegel‘s element of
movement as a pattern of thesis, anti-thesis, and syntheses. For this pattern still implies a
kind of abstract duality between two opposites and implies also a determinate thesis as a
given presupposition of the system. On my account, Hegel‘s system of logic does not
start with a determinate thesis but rather with a radical presuppositionless of any
determination—the pure immediate indeterminate being. In this regard I agree with
Houlgate who writes that
in a genuinely presupposition-less philosophy we have no right to assume in
advance any general model as a standard by which to evaluate Hegel‘s particular
arguments. We are not to assume, therefore that the Logic is structured according
to the famous pattern of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Nor indeed that Hegel
arranges concepts in any other, more subtle, triadic sequence. We have simply to
consider indeterminate being and observe how, if at all, develops. 427
It is this inadequate account of negation that leads Sadra to consider essence-initself as nothing. For Hegel, ―negation taken as mere deficiency would be equivalent to
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nothing; but it is a determinate being, a quality, only determinate with a non-being.‖428
Negation is thus not the same as pure nothing. In contrast to Sadra‘s account of negation
as nothing, Hegel, therefore, introduces negation as a quality that is also a determinate
being. It is this grasping of the role of negativity within essence that makes Hegel stands
above the traditional view of the static essence as mere quality in-itself as well as Sadra‘s
view of essence as mere nothing. ―Essence,‖ for Hegel ―is what it is through negativity
which is not alien to it but is its very own, the infinite movement of being. It is being that
is in itself and for itself.‖429
Hegel‘s dialectical method of determining thus splits quality into two determinate
beings, one positive and the other negative. 430 Here we are faced with two opposite views
of quality: one considers it in its affirmative dimension as a real quality—as is the case
with the traditional view of essentialism— and the other considers it as a negative
quality—as is the case with Sadra‘s view of existentialism. Hegel accepts both views
only to overcome them. For him, real quality and negative quality both entail the same
simple oneness that constitutes a determinate being: ―Both are determinate being, but in
reality as quality with the accent on being, the fact is concealed that it contains
determinateness and therefore also negation.‖ 431 For Hegel, the difference between real
quality and negative quality within a determinate being is internal difference. It is this
internal qualitative difference—which is speculatively inseparable from its ―quantitative
difference‖432— that eventually constitutes the truth of self-determined, self-subsistent
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being. In Hegel‘s Logic, this more concrete determination of being is implicit in the
section of ―measure‖ and explicit in the ―doctrine of essence‖.
Let us now analyze further these two sides of quality—that of the traditional view
of essentialism and that of the existential view of Sadra—and see how Hegel not only
criticizes them but also overcomes them.
The Hegelian understanding of the traditional view of determination considers
essence as the real determinate quality of a being. Regarded only in its positive aspect,
essence is understood as the quality of being-in-itself that a determinate being enjoys as
such. In this view, what constitutes the essence/truth of a determinate being lies in its
own relation to itself rather than its relation to the other. As thus, essence is pure or
abstract self-related being. ―Its character, therefore, is to lack all determinate character, to
be inherently lifeless and empty,‖ 433 as Hegel writes. On the other hand, regarded only in
its negative aspect—as is the case with Sadra—essence as quality is mere being-forother.434 Both views, therefore, are one-sided views of quality. Both of them still operate
within the stand point of formal logic. ―As formal,‖ Hegel agrees, ―this relation recurs in
the two distinct sides.‖ But, as Hegel further elaborates,
these sides thus continue themselves into each other also in respect of their
qualitative determinations; each quality is self-related in the other and is present
in each of the two sides, only in a different quantum. Their quantitative difference
is thus indifference in accordance with which they continue themselves into each
other and this continuation as the self-sameness of the qualities is in each of the
two unities. The sides, however, each as the whole of the two determinations and
hence containing the indifference itself, are thus at the same time posited as selfsubsistent relatively to each other.435
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Otherness, or ―the quality of being another,‖436 is thus a constitutive, qualitative moment
in the determinate being. Quality therefore must not be considered only in-itself as a
positive reality nor only as for-other as a negative quality. For Hegel, at the very core of
its nature, a determinate being proves to be its two dialectical moments of being-in-itself
and being-for-other.
While the traditional views of metaphysical essentialism focus on the moment of
being-in-self as a constitution of the quality of a determinate being, Hegel shows that this
moment cannot logically sustain itself without its other moment. He writes, ―Something
through its own nature relates itself to the other, because otherness is posited in it as its
own moment; its being-within-self includes the negation within it, by means of which
alone it now has its affirmative determinate being.‖437 This makes the two essential
qualities of being-for-other and being-in-itself not two something(s) but one something
with two aspects or moments. ―Being-for-other and being-in-itself are,‖ as Hegel writes,
―moments of one and the same something.‖ 438
In his speculative treatment of quality by which he overcomes the abstract
determinateness of quality, Hegel gives this example:
The determination of man is thinking reason; thought in general, thought as such,
in his simple determinateness—by it he is distinguished from the brute; in himself
he is thought, in so far as this is also distinguished from his being-for-other, from
436
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his own natural existence and sense-nature through which he is directly connected
with his other.439
Here Hegel refers to the relation of quality as ―simple determinateness‖ to its other.
Houlgate‘s comment on this passage supports my point. He writes,
As an example (borrowing a phrase from Fichte), Hegel mentions the
determination of humanity (die Bestimmung des Menschen), which he claims is
―thinking reason.‖ That which characterizes humanity‘s proper nature and
distinguishes us from the animals, Hegel maintains, is thought (Denken). Thought,
however, is not a purely inner quality of which each individual alone is aware. It
is a quality that exhibits itself in and suffuses our dealing with others (whether we
act in explicit accordance with the dictates of reason or not). Thought is our
determination, therefore, because it is the defining character of humanity evident
in our relation to others.440
Moreover, essence as a mere quality of being in itself is limited to what Hegel
calls the category of determinateness (Bestimmtheit) and not to the category of
determination (Bestimmung).The former views the determinate being only in the
simplicity of its intrinsic quality or nature regardless of its other-relatedness. As Hegel
shows, ―determinateness thus isolated by itself in the form of being is quality—which is
wholly simple and immediate.‖441 And again, ―the determinateness is in the form of
being, and as such it is quality.‖442 It is noteworthy to mention here that Hegel in the
Doctrine of Essence still considers Modern Idealism as a philosophy that operates within
the sphere of determinateness. He writes, ―The various forms of idealism, Leibnizian,
Kantian, Fichtean, and others have not advanced beyond being as determinateness, have
not advanced beyond this immediacy, any more than skepticism did.‖ 443 Determination,
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on the other hand, brings the truth of the determinate being not only in its relation to its
own affirmative quality but also in its intrinsic quality to others. Hegel writes,
Determination is affirmative determinateness as the in-itself with which
something in its determinate being remains congruous in face of its entanglement
with the other by which it might be determined, maintain itself in its self-equality,
and making its determination hold good in its being-for-other.444
Unlike the traditional views that make essence a quality that encloses in rigid identity,
Hegel argues that ―it is the quality of something to be open to external influences and to
have a constitution.‖445 The truth of a determinate being, therefore, does not consist in the
abstract unity of the qualitative enclosure of being in-itself. Hegel‘s true speculative unity
of being, as he writes,
is not abstract but a living, concrete unity in virtue of the fact that in the
opposition in consciousness between a self-determined entity, a subject, and a
second such entity, an object, is known to be overcome. 446
Hegel, therefore, liberates the determinate being from the sole quality of being-in-itself,
which represents only its subjective side, by revealing its other essential quality of beingfor-other. For Hegel, these two qualities of determinate being—whether in its ontological
or epistemological level— are no longer separate. But this does not mean that they are
not distinguishable. It is exactly this dialectical difference between these two identical
moments of determinate being (being-in-itself/subjectivity, and being-forother/objectivity) that is essential for the constitution of the determinate being. In its
dialectical unfolding toward the Notion, however, determinate being is neither being-initself as a positive quality, nor being-for-other as a negative quality, but being-for-self.
Hegel writes, ―As mere being-in-itself it would be only the abstraction of pure essence;
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but it is equally essentially being-for-self; it is itself this negativity, the self-sublating of
otherness and determinateness.‖ 447
It is important to mention here that the latter statement comes at the very
beginning of The Doctrine of Essence. Here it is clear that Hegel equates what is mere
―being-in-itself,‖ which in the Doctrine of Being is equivalent to quality as affirmative
reality, with abstract essence. Hegel thus sublates both the traditional view of truth based
on the abstract affirmation of essence as real quality and Sadra‘s view of truth based on
the negation of essence as negative quality.
***
If, as Hegel writes, ―the truth of being is essence,‖448 then, what is ―the essence of
being‖ which can be considered as ―the truth of being‖? Before we answer this confusing
question we need to investigate another question: Is it logically valid to substitute
Hegel‘s proposition of ―the truth of being is essence‖ with the proposition of ―the truth is
the essence of being‖ without contradiction? The short answer is this: no, if we consider
the latter propositions as abstract propositions, and yes, if we consider them as
speculative propositions. To clarify this point, let us again confront Sadra with Hegel by
the mediation of the traditional view of essence as quality.
For classical metaphysics, as we have seen, ―the essence of being‖ consists in its
distinctive quality taken as affirmative reality that excludes negation or difference. In this
account, ―the truth of being‖ is essence as a quality that holds only what is identical and
rejects what is different. For Hegel, this position is logically rejected as one-sided truth
that exposes self-contradiction. For Sadra, as Christian Jambet puts it, ―if God is
447
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existence, the object of our highest knowledge will be the nature of the act of existing
rather than the essence of things.‖449 Now, if we can substitute Hegel‘s proposition of
―the truth of being is essence‖ with the proposition of ―the truth is the essence of being,‖
then, for Sadra, ―existence is the essence of being,‖ because existence is God.
Sadra could agree with Hegel that ―the truth of being is essence‖ only insofar as
―the essence of being‖ is absolutely identical with existence to the extent that ―the truth
of being‖ becomes actual existence. In this sense, what is actually determinate, for Sadra,
is not essence, but existence. Essence is only reflectively determinate in the subjectivity
of the human mind as a mental being. That is to say, essence takes its determination not
from itself as an independent real quality but from existence. Existence is independent
being while essence is dependent being. Existence is dynamic substance that in its
perpetual unfolding towards the existential simplicity of the Absolute/God produces
essences as mere conceptual accidents appearing in the human mind. Existence is the real
that exists in the most actual sense, while essence appears reflectively in the human mind
as inadequate representation of the reality of existence. Sadra thus overturns the
Platonism upside down. Rather than essence, existence is itself the differentia that makes
a determinate being what it is. What determines and differentiates the quality and value
of some existent from other existent is its existential degree that it occupies within its
gradual existential unfolding towards the Absolute existence. Existence, therefore, is the
real deferential quality of a determinate existent.
For Sadra, the determining process of truth as a whole consists in this ontological
tension between the intensification of existence as affirmative qualitative reality and the
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diminution of essence as negative quality. The more existence a determinate existent has,
the less essence it has. Consequently, the determinate existent, which is free from any
determinations related to the negativity of essence, is the Absolut Existence/ God. Hence,
God as absolute affirmative quality of His existential reality is pure and absolute
existence. For Sadra, ―this absoluteness,‖ of the existentiality of God is, as Jambet puts it,
a simple negation that implies the negation of all qualification, statuses, and
determinations…it is the absence of linkage and of definition in a description or a
name, a determination, or anything else to the point of negating this negations
themselves, in so far as they are things that express only a point of view of the
intelligence regarding them. 450
In his description of the unity of this Absolute Existence, Sadra writes,
His Unity is not the particular unity that is found in an individual of a (particular)
nature; nor is It the generic or specific unity that is found in any general notion or
any quiddity. Neither is It the conjunctive unity that is found when a number of
things become assembled or unified into a single thing; nor is It the unity of
contiguity found in quantities and measurable things. Nor, as you will learn, is It
any of the other relative unities, such as unity by resemblance, homogeneity,
analogy, correspondence, reduplication—although (certain) philosophers have
allowed that—congruence, or any of the other kinds of unity that are not the True
Unity. No, His Unity is other (than these relative ones), unknowable in Its
innermost core…except that His Unity is the Source of all (particular) beings. 451
As the source of all particular beings, the unity of the Absolute existence is the existential
ground of one Extended existence, which at once includes and transcends the Relative
existence. Essences do not proceed from the Absolute existence, for they are ―nothing‖ in
themselves. From God, as infinite and eternal existence, comes only existence. ―So,‖ as
Sadra concludes, ―privation (or ―nonbeing‖) does not enter into the existence and actual
occurrence of a thing, although it may enter into its definition and its concept.‖452 There
is thus no ―nothing‖ in the existential level of realization. ―Nothing‖ is only a conceptual
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notion that arises in the human mind when essence is simply considered in itself without
reference to its mode of existence.453 From God, as pure existence, issues only one
existence: the Extended existence, which is the mediation between the unity of the
Absolute existence and the multiplicity of the Relative existence. While the Absolute
existence remains absolutely unknowable in His unity, the Extended existence as (unity
in multiplicity) and (multiplicity in unity) can be grasped by the intuitive rather than the
discursive reasoning.454
In Sadra‘s metaphysical view of the reality of existence, there is no reality of
essence except as a reflective creativity of the human mind under the impact of the reality
of existence. Essences as such, without the impact of the reality of existence, have no
qualitative determination other than absolute nothing. This account makes essence
unessential quality. But the proposition ―essence is unessential quality‖ is a
contradiction, for it will imply that the essence of the Absolute is also unessential quality.
But Sadra‘s Absolute is free from any trace of essence. Sadra‘s philosophy cannot solve
this contradiction within the Absolute except by appealing to a theory of knowledge that
goes against the cognitive laws of understanding. In this aspect, Sadra comes close to
Hegel. Sadra, as we have seen in the third chapter, embraces the theory of the identity
between knower/intellect and known/intellectual. 455 As Sadra writes, ―Everything that is
intelligible in its being is also actively intelligizing. Indeed, every form in perception—
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whether it be intelligible or sensible—is unified in its being with that which perceives
it.‖456 However, on the ontological level, the status of the inessentiality of essence is still
a matter of contradiction that Sadra could not solve except by a dogmatic return to the
theological account of Plato‘s Forms. Although essences, for Sadra, are deficiencies and
mere negative qualities that reflectively appear in the human mind, existents still have
intellective forms, ―existing in God‘s knowledge and the world of His Decree.‖ 457 Out of
some theological considerations, Sadra is forced to this account, ―since none of these
Forms and Names has an independent being, but rather are all modes of the Divine
Essence and the veils of the divine Lordship.‖ 458
How can the unessential—essences as negative qualities—on the one hand, and
the true—God as pure existence— on the other, be reconciled without contradiction?
While Sadra could not solve this contradiction except by a dogmatic return to the
intellectual forms of Plato, Hegel solves this contradiction by the speculative
interpretation of the Platonic intelligible world of essences. We have already seen this in
Hegel‘s reading of Plato in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy.459 The same point
is brought back in Hegel‘s Logic. Hegel discovers that otherness is implicitly constituted
in the classical definition of essence as real quality. Hegel‘s speculative account of
quality renders explicit what is implicit in the classical definition of essence as
affirmative quality of reality. In his Logic, Hegel explicitly brings Plato in order to
emphasize that the truth of something, its inner quality that makes it what it is, neither
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should be considered as merely being-in-itself nor as merely being-for-other. Hegel
writes,
Plato says: ―God made the world from the nature of the One and the Other
(touheterou); he brought them together and formed a Third out of them, which is
of the nature of the One and the Other.‖—This expresses the general nature of the
finite which, being something, does not stand over against the other indifferently,
but in such a way that it is in-itself the other of itself and hence alters. Alternation
exhibits the inner contradiction with which being-there[determinate being] is
burdened from the start, and which drives it beyond itself. 460
This passage implies that the internal qualitative difference in a determinate being
constitutes a contradiction. But this contradiction is not pure nothing. Rather, it is a
determinate negation that provides the main drive of alternation and change at the very
core of the determinate being. This result brings us closer to Sadra‘s account of the
substantial change of a determinate existent. For Sadra, as we have seen in Chapter one,
change and alteration emerge from within the inner nature of a determinate existent. That
is to say, change is not externally imposed upon a determinate existent but stems
internally from its very nature. Hegel agrees,
Such changeableness in existence is to the superficial eye a mere possibility, the
realization of which is not a consequence of its own nature. But the fact is,
mutability lies in the notion of existence, and change is only the manifestation of
what it implicitly is. The living die, simply because as living they bear in
themselves the germ of death.461
However, unlike Hegel, Sadra does not take changeability, which for him is
inherent in a determinate existent, as a dialectical relationship between two opposite
moments, one positive and the other negative. He merely considers the negative aspect of
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a determinate existent as a mere subjective reflection in the human mind. In the objective
side of reality there is but realized existence unfolding gradually from one degree of
existence to another higher degree of existence. In this gradual picture of the unfolding of
existence there is no reality to essence in itself. Here we reach again the paradoxical
proposition in Sadra‘s philosophy: Essence is unessential.
If we take the proposition of ―essence is unessential‖ as an abstract proposition
that operates by the formality of understanding based on the law of non-contradiction,
then this proposition is clearly self-contradictory. Hegel accepts this abstract proposition
of understanding only to overcome it by the speculative propositions of reason. Logic‘s
doctrine of Essence, as we saw in the third chapter, presents Hegel‘s critique of such
abstract thinking of understanding. For this kind of thinking knows how to distinguish
between the essential and the unessential but fails to unite them. From the standpoint of
Hegel‘s speculative propositions, ―the truth of being‖ is ―essence‖ insofar as what is
essential is not only ―different‖ from but also ―identical‖ with what is unessential.
It is thus not surprising that Hegel starts the doctrine of Essence with the section
of ―The Essential and the Unessential.‖ And, as he says, ―In the sphere of essence, we
have first essence opposed to the unessential.‖ 462This first abstract duality of ―the
essential and unessential‖ is thus the foundation for all other abstract dualities, and
overcoming this duality will open the door for solving all other abstract dualities. The
significance of Hegel‘s speculative logic of essence is to prove that the essential— the
being-in-itself, the quality as affirmative reality— does not only exclude the unessential,
the being-for-other, the quality as negative, but also includes it in a higher speculative
unity of being-for-self: ―The in-itself into which something is reflected into itself out of
462
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its being-for-other is no longer an abstract in-itself, but as negation of its being-for-other
is mediated by the latter, which is thus its moment.‖463
Against the traditional view of essence as inner qualitative nature of
determinateness, Sadra asserts the absolute negation of essence. For him, truth consists in
the affirmation of the outer existence in its unfolding towards its absolute simplicity in
God. From the Hegelian point of view, Sadra‘s existential account of truth is still a onesided view of truth:
The sense in which, on one hand, outer existence is made the criterion of the truth
of a content is no less one-sided than when the idea, essential being, or even inner
feelings is represented as indifferent to outer existence and is even held to be the
more excellent the more remote it is from reality. 464
For Sadra, the ultimate definition of the Absolute is the pure simplicity of
existence in which the mental being of concepts—including the concept of existence and
the concept of essence—is dissolved. Existence in its pure simplicity is the Absolute.
From the Hegelian point of view, Sadra‘s Absolute is indeterminate for it does not
contain negation within it and this is why it remains absolutely unknowable for Sadra.
Hegel would accept this indeterminate simplicity of the Absolute not as an ultimate
moment of truth but as one moment that constitutes the whole mediated movement of the
Absolute. In his Logic, at the beginning of the chapter of The Absolute, Hegel writes,
The simple substantial identity of the absolute is indeterminate or rather in it
every determinateness of essence and Existence, or of being in general, as well as
of reflection, has dissolved itself. Accordingly, the process of determining what
the absolute is has a negative outcome, and the absolute itself appears only as the
negation of all predicates and as the void. 465

463

Ibid., p.122.
Ibid., p. 112.
465
Ibid., p. 530.
464

162

Sadra‘s Absolute is accordingly the void. For Hegel, the ultimate definition of the
Absolute does not stop at this moment, in which “essence and Existence, or of being in
general,‖ are dissolved. Essence and existence are also definitions of the Absolute, but
they are inadequate definitions of the Absolute. Unlike Sadra, who excludes essence from
the definition of the Absolute and holds firmly only to existence, Hegel includes both
essence and existence as moments of the determining process of the Absolute.
We can also point to another difference between Hegel and Sadra—a difference
related to the priority of essence over existence. There is a difference between the
affirmation that essence has a speculative, logical priority over existence—as it is the
case with Hegel— and that it has mental, human, priority over existence—as it is the case
with Sadra. Hegel‘s speculative priority of essence over existence is considered in Logic
without any reference to what is external to the pure thought. ―What we are dealing with
in logic,‖ Hegel writes,
is not a thinking about something which exists independently as a base for our
thinking and apart from it, nor forms which are supposed to provide mere signs or
distinguishing marks of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and selfdeterminations of thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself. 466
In contrast, Sadra‘s mental priority of essence over existence is considered in relation to
what is external to the human thinking.
Hegel‘s view of the logical priority of essence over existence, however, does not
mean, as we found in the previous chapter, that essence exists in a transcendental realm
over against existence. Nor does he consider existence ―as a predicate or as a
determination of essence, the proposition of which would run: essence exists, or has
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existence.‖467 Sadra would agree with Hegel‘s disapproval of considering existence as a
predicate of essence. Unlike the Avicennian tradition, Sadra does not regard existence as
an accidental reality superadded to essence.468 It is only by means of the human mind‘s
conceptual analysis of reality that essence has priority over existence. In the external
sense of reality, it is the essence which can be considered as accident to existence. As far
as finite beings are considered, Sadra rejects the real distinction between essence and
existence and maintains only the conceptual distinction between them. God is the only
existent in whom there is neither real nor conceptual distinction between essence and
existence. This is what makes God pure simplicity of existence, for Sadra.
Unlike Sadra, who treats and limits the concept of essence to the human mind,
Hegel exposes the ontological possibilities of essence within the scope of the absolute
reason that goes beyond the finite mind. If we take Hegel in his own words, what he
means by thought is neither subjective in the sense that is only related to human mind,
nor objective in the sense that is only related to the extra-mental reality. Rather, thought,
which in its immanent activity produces its own dialectical determinations, is the absolute
reason. ―Logic is to be understood,‖ Hegel writes,
as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth as it
is without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this
content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation
of nature and finite mind.469
Hegel thus simply considers the thought of essence in itself and in its immanent relation
to its own determinations. His logic of essence is pure thought without any referring to
467
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what can be considered as external to the movement of thought. This speculative
treatment of essence in itself leads him to reject the abstract distinction between essence
and existence. Rather than the proposition ―essence exists‖ which implies distinction
between essence and existence, Hegel concludes,
the proposition should therefore run: essence is Existence; it is not distinct from
its Existence. Essence has passed over into Existence in so far as essence as
ground no longer distinguishes itself from itself as the grounded, or in so far as
this ground has sublated itself. 470
Whereas Hegel‘s logical priority of essence is a sublated priority that pushes
essence towards more logical unfolding that revels its ontological possibilities, Sadra‘s
mental priority of essence confines essence only within its anthropological horizon. Sadra
insists only on essence‘s mental being, whose significance is merely reflected within the
human subject. Hegel, on the other side, liberates essence from its anthropological limit
by discovering within it its own logical necessity of contradiction—a contradiction that is
sublated by essence itself as the ground that must result in existence. Essence‘s own
sublating of its opposites is the ground that produces existence not as abstract qualitative
determination of reality but as a dynamic net of reciprocal relations of ground and
grounded. By breaking with its anthropological limitations, essence becomes able to push
its unfolding towards its concrete determination as manifested in the Notion. Essence, as
the truth of being, extends and penetrates into all possible aspects of being. For these
aspects of being are themselves essence‘s self-negativity that leads ultimately to the truth
as the Idea. And, as Hegel writes, ―the definition of the Absolute as the Idea is now itself
absolute. All the definitions given previously return into this.—The Idea is the Truth.‖471
***
470
471
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As a process of determining, Hegel‘s Logic starts with the determination of the
indifference as manifested immediately in the sphere of Quality. As the dialectic
proceeds, this moment eventually proves to be a contradiction in every respect. Logic
consequently proceeds to the determination of difference as manifested in essence ―as a
system of reflected determinations.‖472 Proving that the moment of essence ―is still
fettered by the externality of immediate being,‖ 473 the Logic is spontaneously necessitated
to progress to the third moment of determination in which indifference and difference are
brought back in a higher moment of identity. At that point, the Logic reaches the
speculative moment of Notion, the speculative identity of undifferentiated unity and
differentiated unity, or the speculative identity of immediacy and mediation as shown in
the Subjective Logic.
In his Preface to the First Edition of his Science of Logic, Hegel writes
I maintain that it is this self-construing method alone which enables philosophy to
be an objective demonstrated science. It is in this way that I have tried to expound
consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Consciousness is spirit as a
concrete knowing, a knowing too, in which externality is involved; but the
development of this object, like the development of all natural and spiritual life,
rests solely on the nature of the pure essentialities which constitute the content of
logic.474
Truth‘s process of determining as a ―self-construing method‖— whether in the Logic or
in the Phenomenology— progressively develops itself through an immanent critique of
itself. It results in the speculative Idea of Being and Essence if this immanent critique is
taken only as a pure movement of the determinations of onto-epistemological
categories—a movement that insofar as it shows the immediacy and independency of
thought‟s own determinations, also shows their mediation and dependency on each other.
472
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But this pure movement of thought dialectically reflects the rational structure of the
movement of the reality of the experience as actual existence. ―What is rational is actual
and what is actual is rational‖ 475can be understood as a dialectical process by which the
speculative logic of the Idea in its pure rationality on one hand, and the
phenomenological consciousness of the Absolute Knowing in its realized actuality on the
other, are brought into identity-in-difference. Truth in its speculative wholeness reflects
this dialectical identity between the logical Idea and the phenomenological Absolute
Knowing. But this identity is not abstract identity. Rather, it is a speculative identity of
circularity that contains both immediacy (Being) and mediation (Essence) in a higher
totality (Idea).
Hegel writes,
there is nothing, nothing in heaven or in nature or mind or anywhere else, which
does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation, so that these two
determinations revel themselves to be unseparated and inseparable and the
opposition between them, it is to be a nullity. 476
Both the Logic as the science of ―pure knowing‖ 477 and the Phenomenology of Spirit
1807 as ―the science of manifested spirit,‖478 represent Hegel‘s consideration of these
determinations of immediacy and mediation. Considering this opposition between
475

G. W. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right. trans. H.B.Nisbet. ed. Allen Wood (Cambridge:
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immediacy and mediation within the pure activity of cognition is the business of the
Logic. Logic here reveals the concrete unity of immediacy and mediation inasmuch as
this unity reveals ―the nature of cognition as such.‖ 479 However, ―the more concrete form
of cognition,‖ Hegel tells us, ―falls to be considered in the philosophy of spirit and in the
phenomenology of spirit.‖480
Both the Logic and the Phenomenology begin with immediacy. While the Logic
begins with pure immediacy, the Phenomenology begins with empirical immediacy. ―In
this science of manifested spirit the beginning is made from empirical, sensuous
consciousness and this is immediate knowledge in the strict sense of the word.‖481 The
Phenomenology ultimately results in ―the Idea as pure knowledge,‖482 which itself is the
presupposition of logic.483 ―In logic,‖ Hegel writes, ―the presupposition is that which has
proved itself to be the result of that phenomenological consideration—the Idea as pure
knowledge.‖484 The beginning of Logic, therefore, proves to be ―neither an arbitrary and
merely provisional assumption, nor is it something which appears to be arbitrarily and
tentatively presupposed, but which is subsequently shown to have been properly made
the beginning.‖485 In the Logic, the pure Idea, as resulted from the empirical dialectic of
immediacy and mediation in the Phenomenology, is now examined purely and
immanently within the pure dialectic of immediacy and mediation. The resulted Idea of
Phenomenology as the beginning of Logic remains immanent in its scientific
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development.486 This immanency of the Idea within its own dialectical development
produces its own determinations—the Logic‘s different categories as self-deduction.
These categories as determinations of ―thought and being‖ are themselves the unfolding
of Truth. Since essence and existence are among other determinations that operate within
the immanent dialectical relationship of immediacy and mediation, Hegel cannot be
classified as an essentialist in the traditional sense or as an existentialist in the Sadrian
sense. Hegel‘s account of reality, as this dissertation has tried to show, is the sublation of
the one-sided view of essence as the qualitative determination of reality and the one-sided
view of existence as the sole affirmative qualitative reality. It is the sublation of the onesided view of the traditional essentialism as well as the one-sided view of the
existentialism of Sadra.

486

Hegel writes, ―The essential requirement for the science of logic is not so much that the beginning be a
pure immediacy, but rather that the whole of the science be within itself a circle in which the first is also
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